The power of theistic religion can be clearly seen in its strong influence on morality, an influence which continues to exist even when people have stopped believing in religion or adhering to it. It may be said that a wo/man without God in his/her heart lacks the spiritual weight which might give him/her and his/her race the rules of conduct to which the heart is drawn. The concept of "God" here goes back to the definition given at the beginning: God is any idea or heart-faith which directs the actions of the person who adheres to the particular idea or faith. In order to exist, morality must constitute a special inner quality. It must be able to convince a person to behave according to its dictates, as well as persuade his/her human environment to exert public ("moral") pressure on him/her to make sure that s/he will behave thus. The concepts that governmental laws are insufficient to guarantee conformity - in the sense of compliance to an ordinance in order that the law will prevail and that human beings must get to a state in which the majority of human beings in society are convinced that it is right to comply with the law - and the need for moral laws to be a more powerful persuasive force than the force of law have been addressed by Hart, who differs in this respect from Austin's views. Immanuel Kant's theory may be understood against this particular background of theistic religion's influence derived from its supernatural nature, together with its objectivity, derived from the same source and in contrast to human subjectivity derived from wo/man's mortality and dependence on the world. Kant sought the source of morality in a place unconstrained by concrete reality. He claimed that moral laws must be created out of pure practical reason. This view may be interpreted and understood in light of the central problematic of the period, the problem of alienation from an immutable source of moral laws in the past - the divine source - and from the non-discovery of a substitute source whose validity cannot be questioned - just as in the religious period the religious source of moral laws could not be doubted. What will a person seeking for such a source, who believes in human reason, do? S/he will consider it possible for human reason which is not embedded in personal interests and inclinations to be accepted as an impeachable source of moral laws - and that this "invention" has the power to save the human society (white, European, Christian society) in which s/he lives from the anticipated chaos due to the loss of the theistic source. And indeed this was a successful invention in Kant's time for the wo/man who had removed the fetters of theistic morality and divine authority from over him/herself and seated him/herself on the seat of authority in his/her world. In this way a person is delivered from the undermining of his/her control. According to Kant's thesis, this person could be strengthened and find a way through his/her own resources (and with the aid of his/her own pure practical reason as a rational being) and to impose a moral imperative on him/herself and on his/her fellows to replace the divine imperative. In this way it was possible to come to terms with the secular revolution of the great rebellion against God. This constitutes a purely analytic way to rebel against Him, even though Kant, contrary to his own ethical system, remained a believer in God. Indeed, this is one of the tragic aspects of Kant's personal experience. Regarding the educated discussion of morality and religion and the power of both, the source of which lies in theistic religion, one must stop and ask: Is morality a matter of emotion or intellect? Is religion a matter of emotion or intellect? Does the power of theistic religious morality derive from emotion or from intellectual persuasion? And consider: the religious and ethically-motivated person is a being of dual inwardness - i.e., a being given to both intellect and emotion. He serves both attributes, even though the second part of this book will demonstrate that a hierarchy obtains between them and that emotion has the upper hand. This raises a lengthy discussion, all of whose issues not be able to resolve here. It has been seen that the different positions of Kaufman, Otto, and Roth represent three ways of approaching God or recognising His/Her existence. This subject cannot be exhausted in this part of the book. As will become clear later, wo/man always follows the inclination of his/her heart and only when his/her heart (or emotions) do not explicitly guide him/her in a specific direction does s/he turn to his/her intellect and enlist its help in reaching a decision. The power of religion is primarily the power of emotion, and no philosophical analysis of deity can change this fundamental fact. Morality is also, in its essence, a matter of emotion, neither Kant's theory of pure practical reason, nor Hobbes' insight into the social contract, nor even the logical American commercial system of Rawls regarding the public consensus based on the veil of ignorance and - a proper (commercial-like) consensus being able to deal with the biblical morality of the senses which continues to influence the conduct of the western individual, as will be demonstrated in chapter 5 of this book, which reviews the work of Rawls, Nozick, and American injustice. Secular western culture, known for its science, among other ways also through mechanistic means according to Darwinian evolutionary theory which is devoid of emotion, has attributed the concept of morality, which has been considered to be a matter of emotion here, to evolution. Sober and Wilson, who contend that, in contrast to the prevalent view in the 1960's that the natural human tendency which corresponds to human genes is not necessarily selfishness and that what directs wo/man is not wo/man him/herself (whether by means of his/her intellect or in the framework of emotions) but human genes. While genes are actually "selfish," concerned with self-perpetuation, to the extent that they are implanted in a social being - wo/man - they are "preoccupied in an egoistic-selfish manner" with their self-propagation in the framework of society or a given group - in other words, they are concerned with the self-preservation of the group. Sober and Wilson argue that the guarantee of the existence of a given human society requires the presence of altruistic individuals who place the good of their fellow-citizens over their own personal good. Genes consequently "direct" the conduct of individuals in society towards altruism rather than towards individual egoistic tendencies. This is a phenomenon examined by Rudolph M Nesse, who asserts that according to this principle the mother who cares for her children tenderly and with love does not do so out of maternal feelings but in order to satisfy the selfish needs of the genes of the group to which she belongs. Her behaviour is not due to altruistic motives but a result of her feminine genes. Nesse consequently asks whether it is not reasonable to think that these same genes will make sure that more males will be born than females, since that will produce more genes of the same type. The fact that males are able to produce many females avoids the need for an equal distribution (50/50) between males and females. Nesse also contends that the social perspective demands the preference (in terms of the male group, which is the dominant one) of sexism and that in the framework of the ethnic group, members of the same ethnic community will be preferred, that in a national group the national motive will be preferred, and in a racial group race will be preferred. He asks whether this is the way in which morality develops in practice, the natural answer being that if this does not constitute the sole permanent stream in human beings Sober and Wilson's argument is defective. It is a pity that despite such a forceful argument, with its fundamentally correct basis, Nesse is trapped in the web of the western society in which he flourishes and rather than destroying the theory which he criticises so harshly he contents himself with adding additional motives to those of Sober and Wilson, numbering four in all: Social classification. The person who deviates from the path which society values and removes it from his/herself. Here Nesse repeats Sober and Wilson's theory, acknowledging his debt to the latter but also arguing that they do not make their claims explicit. This point applies both to Nesse and to Sober and Wilson, who also addressed the topic. Social esteem and social sanctions, even state sanctions (in a state), are merely tools and means and do not provide a remedy for defects in the system, of which Nesse speaks. Altruism derived from commitment. According to Nesse, commitment is expressed by the person who possesses the quality of decency, or derives from love. Nesse argues that the person who does not possess a sense of decency does not live up to his/her commitments in a time of crisis and that the decent person carries greater weight in his/her society. This a form of social selection according to which decent people are preferred. Regarding love, Nesse asserts that it gives a person inner power to stand behind his/her commitments. Human genes will consequently prefer decent people and those with the capacity to give and to receive love. Nesse adds that only the person who is capable of loving gains the ability to be loved. In this way he turns the delicate emotion of love into a genetic game or, more accurately, into a pawn under the rules of the genes which play with these tools and prefer this utilitarian attribute, called love. Nesse thereby falls into the field into which he himself is shooting arrows and turns love into something to be ridiculed, something which exists only for the utilitarian value which can be drawn from it. Wo/man him/herself turns his/her emotions into a game of human genes. Wo/man does not possess the capacity of decision or choice but is a pawn in his/her very essence. In place of the Jewish principle that "everything is foreseen, yet the freedom of choice is given" - in which wo/man stands opposite God - human genes have become God. Genes, however, are a much crueler God, heartless and very, very cold. Sexual relations. Nesse recalls that wo/man's structure necessitates that s/he conduct protracted sexual relations and carries an inherent tendency towards relationships. He remarks that in choosing a partner, intellect, wisdom, pleasantness, and other qualities, including goodness of heart, are considered very important. Here too Nesse follows, unsuccessfully, the cold path of western reason and does not even attempt to loose himself from its grip. Once love has turned into a beating stick in the framework of the "section" on commitment and utilitarianism, goodness of heart becomes an appendix to rationality and human intellect. Its value is due merely to the benefit which people who favour it gain from it. It is through goodness of heart that wo/man merits protracted sexual relations according to his/her natural aspiration, and human genes, which oversee from above (or perhaps from below), produce happy and good hearted genetic types from the same business-utilitarian good-heartedness. The possibility of transition to another group. Here Nesse adopts the western openness which cuts itself off from its own roots. In this he deviates from Darwinian evolutionary principles. Do human genes receive information through some sophisticated means of communication regarding a person's decision to move to another group? Do they transfer the original gene type of this person, the essence of the self, to the care of genes from another family in response to some such "message,"? How do two gene types communicate? The whole theory becomes confused, even though it is stamped with the seal of western rationality and openness, which is itself tied to confusion, as shall be seen in the framework of the criticism levied against the West in Parts 2, 5, 7. In general, the work of Sober and Wilson and Nesse is based on Darwinism, the theory which promised that it would explain in the future how all beings developed through evolution. With the emergence of this doctrine Darwin claimed that the fact that anthropological research did not contain a continuity of findings regarding the transition from single-cell beings to superior beings - derived from the short period during which, correct to Darwin's time, excavations and the collection of biological findings were collected. Today, another fifty years have passed and this continuity has not been fulfilled. Despite this, the secular West still clings to Darwin's theory. The question is: Is this clinging due to the fact that western secularism has not found a substitute concept? The framework of the existing concept has erected a barrier which hides from our eyes the relationship between emotion and morality and directs our thoughts away from theistic religion and emotion to civil religion and logic, as will be examined in detail in Parts 2-4. The last word about religion with regard to the question "Is religion a matter of morality or intellect?" has not yet been said. The answer received from the wo/man in the street, generally speaking, when s/he is an uneducated secular person, clearly indicates that religion is a matter of emotion - that wo/man "senses" whether or not a certain action is moral. The educated secular western person, in contrast, usually replies that religion is a matter of logic. The religious person will respond that a divine morality stands above secular morality, a morality based on God's commandments rather than feelings or logic. These three answers reflect different periods of development in human history, as well as different approaches to one's relationship with God. As noted above, the secular person sought substitutes for God's commandments, the only plausible replacement found being something s/he him/herself created, whether through pure practical reason, the social contract, or in other ways which this chapter has examined. In this way modern wo/man reached a general crisis. The two other answers unite, religious morality being tied to emotion - just as religion itself is tied to emotion. To this is joined the insight proffered above regarding the preference of emotion over intellect in wo/man's decision-making. Emotion is something deep rooted and clear which give direction; the intellect hovers and possess no orientation. This chapter suggests that the roots are vital to wo/man, morality not being a matter of truth and logic as much as a matter of emotion. Emotion joins together the family cell and the ethnic weave, two of the strongest fabrics which have proved themselves from the beginning of human existence and are appropriate to wo/man in light of his/her natural tendencies. Beyond the general discussion conducted here regarding religion and morality much debate has been expended amongst western thinkers regarding the source of morality in human society, debates which, while mentioning religion, have recalled it alongside other causes. Such thinkers include the psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud, the sociologists Emile Durkheim, Black, and Christopher Boehm, and biologists like Matt Ridley. Freud and Durkheim referred to field studies on the totem amongst Australian, African, and American tribes, an almost unified phenomenon despite clear evidence that no communication existed between them. The central features of this phenomenon were a) a prohibition against sexual relations between mother and son and brother and sister, but not between father and daughter; b) the prohibition against patricide; c) tribal allegiance obligating mutual aid and assistance between a man and his wife's family members, an obligation which did not apply to the members of the father's side of the family. As already described in this chapter, Freud spoke in of his field of inquiry and specialty of one primal father common to all the tribes who reserved all the women in the group for his personal sexual needs and satisfaction and forbade his sons sexual relations with them - until the sons rebelled and killed him. In order to prevent further conflict between them they imposed on themselves a prohibition against conducting sexual relations with their mother and sisters. The guilt feeling they experienced at having murdered their father and the prohibition against sexual relations with female family members of the first degree passed down as an inheritance and thence arose the prohibition against murder and incest. This theory is hard to accept. It is difficult to think that a guilt feeling is passed down through the generations and it is hard to imagine that a single son not in conflict with his brothers would be prevented from engaging in sexual relations with his sister on the basis of an event which occurred in the distant past,. It is difficult to ascribe general rules of morality which remain permanent over generations to a single event. It is more logical to assign similar moral codes to human nature which does not change in its fundamentals over generations, a nature which produces similar motifs across different cultures. Durkheim speaks of values which differ from society to society and guide community opinion, the latter imposing rules of conduct in correspondence to these values. While his work is undoubtedly correct on the field level, his conclusions do not go sufficiently deep to uncover the source of the values - the source of morality. Although values are moral principles determined as particular rules according to Durkheim, the question of how these principles were created and the foundation of morality still remains unanswered. Black refers to social forces which influence controversies and social supervision. But interested social forces change, whereas the foundations of morality are fixed and permanent. It may be that a certain temporary force may dictate rules of behaviour acceptable to group A (let us assume men, or people from a certain ethnic group, for example), but when the society's social structure changes the play of forces also changes, causing a change in rules of conduct as well. Moral codes are fundamentally immutable. Ridley holds to Darwinian theory and places morality within the same sphere as biological evolution. Morality does seem to have become purer over the generations, however, and if once women and slaves were oppressed, today the situation has changed for the better. While biological evolution - if this theory still stands in the face of the many negative proofs against it - is a necessary process tied to the substance and rules of nature, as well as to the use and even the very essence of existence, morality is an existential phenomenon, even though it does possess utilitarian value. And despite being realized in practical living, it possesses a spiritual element and relation to what is above and beyond the concrete world. Just as love between the sexes is not confined to sexual relations, even though it is connected to them, so also morality cannot be reduced to the biological, even though a link can be made between them, and not necessarily in an analogical sense. The initial source of morality is certainly not assisted by Darwinian theory. For this reason the similarity of behaviour displayed by other mammals is nto instructive. Human morality is spiritual and tied to emotion and must consequently be dissociated from biology. Boehm speaks of socio-political forces which hold the power to oppress groups or the person who deviates from the path, forces which are intended to prove the point which politic power groups aspire to make. This approach also seems too shallow to reach the depths of the anthropological perspective which will lead to understanding the origin of morality.