- The philosophical ideas presented in this part of the
book are the fruits of reflection and contemplation. These
ideas were omitted by anthropological science as is reflected
in the words of Clifford Geertz, a well-known anthropologist
who wrote, regarding the anthropological subjects he had
studied, "I never successfully got to the bottom of
anything I ever wrote about, neither in my essays here nor
elsewhere." In contrast to Geertz's approach, this
book seeks to construct a theoretical understanding of human
group behavior within the framework of broader human societies.
There are many questions that have yet to be asked and some
that have been asked but yet to be answered in philosophical
literature, such as: What characteristics are shared by
all modern Western moral theories and what distinguishes
them from moral codes that are based on belief in God? Why
did human beings look towards worlds beyond the reality
they knew for forces that ruled and could rule over their
societies? Why did modern man, after usurping God's reins
over moral and social behavior, base new rules of social
and moral behavior on reason rather than on emotion? What
differences are there between moral codes predicated on
logic and those predicated on emotion, and what is at the
root of their differences? Does man need to believe in something
that is beyond his reality and that is not verifiable, and
how does he acquire such faith? Can man exist without such
faith (defined in the previous section as belief in God)?
What connection is there between all these questions and
the question that has engaged the attentions of the legal
world and political circles in Israel regarding the Jewishness
of the State of Israel? These basic questions receive short
shrift in academic scholarship of the 20th century. Geertz,
in his book (p.44), concedes that the prevalent view during
the Enlightenment according to which man's civilized behavior
is a consequence of his fundamental inherent nature - is
accepted also today. Nevertheless, he notes (p.45) that,
"There do not exist people who are not molded by customs
of particular places…It is particularly difficult to
differentiate between what is natural, universal, and fixed
in man's nature, and what is conventional, particular, and
variable." Geertz offers the example of trance states
that are common in some societies and rare in others as
proof that all people do not have the same fundamental traits.
This is a specious argument, however, since it is not man's
nature that hampers certain societies' success in achieving
these trance states, but rather their ignorance of the proper
technique and the absence of a conducive atmosphere. Additionally,
Geertz's opinion regarding the difficulty of differentiating
between what is natural, universal and fixed in human nature
to what is specific, conventional, and variable among different
cultures does not negate our contention that there are in
fact basic universal traits common to all humanity. On page
46 of his book, Geertz speaks of the danger of abandoning
man as a force behind his culture - and his consequent fall
into one of two traps - the relativism that perceives man
as a captive of his time, and the historic determinism that
began with Hegel that leads to the idea of cultural evolution.
The approach taken here avoids both of these traps, and
seems to be the golden mean, the only path without obstacles.
Geertz (in his book pp. 48-52) challenges Kluckhohn's theory
of universal forces that determine certain common perspectives
to all cultures, and suggests alternatively that there are
three preconditions for a fundamentally uniform culture.
These conditions are not relevant to this part of our book,
as our theory which is reasonably consistent with Kluckhonhn's,
does not relate to the uniformity of the products of various
cultures but rather to the uniformity of the physical and
emotional factors that affect the fundamental direction
every human society takes in its cultural developments.
Similar sources of influence can produce different cultures
or different religions. The issues examined in this part
of the book are well-known. They are basic ideas that logically
follow the first part of this book - 'Why religion,' and
that focus on human nature. The heart of this section challenges
the approach that man is a predominately intellectual creature
within whom emotion plays a secondary or negligible role,
arguing instead that man is by nature a logical and emotional
creature. Man is a social creature by nature, blessed with
a desire to comprehend the details he observes by finding
links that connect them. This inclination is a gift that
was given only to man and it has enabled man to achieve
greater heights than any other creature. Man not only seeks
to grasp how the natural phenomenon he observes interconnect
to form the laws of nature, but also the technological details
of these laws. He then employs this knowledge to accomplish
his own technological feats. This inclination to categorize
and classify led man, in the social realm, to establish
rules of behavior, and to deduce from them appropriate behavior
in every specific case. Man is 'programmed' by his Creator
with traits that precede him, so that he can succeed in
the grandest of endeavors, as he in fact does. Despite all
his 'technical' achievements, man could not have risen to
a level qualitatively different from all other of God's
creations, if not for his emotions. Without his intellect,
man would be incapable of action, but without emotion, man
would be unmotivated to act. The combination of these two
forces enabled man to contribute to this world. It is emotion,
and not intellect that is man's compass. When the emotional
position is defined and clear, then emotion will always
prevail. Reason arbitrates between options only when emotion
is ambivalent or apathetic. A person who allows his child
to drown after rationally assessing that if he attempts
to save him, he will also drown, is acting based on reason,
because his emotions are torn between his will to live and
his love for his child. Reason only steps in when there
is an emotional void. Whoever lacks these two components
of reason and emotion is not human. Whoever possesses these
two components - is God's helper and agent - the only helper
God has in this world. This book calls for a revolution,
that is in fact a counter-revolution, for it comes to counter
and rectify the results of the revolution described in this
author's book about the Jewish State, a revolution carried
out by the Israeli Supreme Court. This book advocates the
adaptation of a certain philosophical social approach specifically
with regard to Israeli society, an approach that differs
from all Western ones that are common in Western democracies
including Israel. Yes, Israel, is in many respects part
of the West; its norms as well as its secular-liberal Supreme
Court rulings are typically Western. This reality, however,
is intolerable, and problematic from both a moral standpoint,
as well as from the legal one that is binding today in the
State of Israel though not implemented. This book, however,
in contrast to the one mentioned above, will not deal with
the legal issues involved, but rather with the moral and
national ones. The goal of this work, both in presenting
the religious view and in attacking accepted Western theories,
is not to prove the superiority of the religious viewpoint,
but rather to divest secularists of their smug attitude
toward the religious whom they consider primitive and ignorant.
Once the religious position is at least no longer viewed
as inferior - it will be possible to conduct an evaluation
and discussion without being hampered by preconceived notions.
One of the main subjects this section will discuss is that
of 'Moreshet Yisrael', Jewish heritage, a tradition whose
roots are in a divinely based morality, which according
to the "1980 Basic Law" is the basis for Israeli
law. Debunking Myths (A View of the West): One should never
presume the truth of conventional ideas, and this includes
Western ones. In critiquing Western theories, attention
must be directed to the principles they are based on. This
work reveals their structural flaws and undermines this
foundation in order to make room for a new one. Before beginning
the actual critique, this work surveys the historical development
of the sources of social moral codes in human society and
offer a new perspective on historical facts. It divides
the history of the evolution of human societies into three
periods: primitive, religious, and secular, according to
changes in the source of moral guidance. The roots of the
Jewish tradition are fixed in the religious period. There
are many flaws in the traditional analysis of the motives
behind the transition from the religious to the secular
period that everyone seems to ignore. The arrogance involved
in transferring the source of societal behavioral norms
from God to man has caused the instability of the entire
Western moral structure. Even if one assumes the secularist
position that also in the religious period, it was not God
who charged man with ethical norms but rather human beings
masquerading as divine messengers, secular man still exhibited
greater conceit when he proclaimed himself as the source
of morality than did religious man who attributed his ideas
to a higher being. This book discusses the weaknesses and
pretensions of Western thought in its evolution from the
rule of God to the rule of man, evaluating and critiquing
the ideas of Kant and Rawls among others. There is injustice
in the system Rawls speaks about and his theory of justice.
The democratic system, allows a nation to turn whatever
it chooses into incontrovertible law; it is a wild offshoot
of secularism that began with Rousseau in the eighteenth
century in France, followed by Sieyes during the period
of the French Revolution. The philosophical connection between
"human desire" and "human right" should
rightly be viewed as the beginning of the fall and the source
of the deviations that sprung up in society. These wild
offshoots resulted from the translation of the sanctity
of the general human will (according to democratic principles)
to the plane of the individual's will; the individual, like
the general public wishes to see his will followed. The
individual reckons: If the general public can legislate
whatever it desires, why can't I also find justification
for my personal desires? Why can't I say that since what
I want is proper in my own eyes - it should also be respected
and considered legitimate by others? This perspective ultimately
develops into a belief that 'it is coming to me,' a view
strengthened by the individual's sense that it is fitting
that he should get what he wants as compensation for something
positive he has done. This is the transition from general
will to personal will, both very human feelings. This belief
of 'it is coming to me' has developed in modern days within
the framework of liberal individualist thinking, which favors
the individual's legitimate interest over the interests
of the general public, and even condones certain deviant
behavior for certain individuals. A father may be of the
opinion that 'it is coming to him' that he should be obeyed.
Use of violent means to achieve what 'is coming to him'
is often the next obvious step. Who is Supreme? This section
presents the bird's eye view of human social development,
not only in the plane of ethical norms, but also regarding
human progress in the realms of science and technology and
social behavior. Man is portrayed as driven by his inherent
nature, by the way he was programmed, a nature to which
he owes thanks for enabling him to surpass all other creatures.
Presenting the development of humanity in this manner emphasizes
the true inferiority of man, and demonstrates to all Western
secularists who scorn 'primitive religious people' that
there must indeed exist 'something' greater than man. It
forces them to recognize that man acts and achieves only
because a greater 'force' 'programmed' him with these capabilities,
and that we are indebted to that same greater force that
programmed us all for all of our achievements including
our ability to engage in debates such as this one. This
understanding will impart a bit of humility and proportion
to the discussion. This discussion begins with the topic
of "human rights' since this is a key factor in the
field of societal behavior in the modern world. Wrights
and Benefits - (p. 272) - The term "right" seems
self-explanatory until one attempts to define it or to examine
its development and its relationship to other concepts.
The concept of rights is one of the legs upon which the
normative social structure stands. It is a key player, in
Western societies, in both the ethical and legal realms.
Sieyes', a theoretician of the French Revolution, and one
of the first French philosophers to discuss the realm of
jurisprudence, deals with the question of who has the right
to establish law. He posits that the very existence of the
national wills warrants it being made into law. All other
wills, in contrast, do not turn into binding norms, except
within the framework of what the national will and law have
established. Only the national will and the nation can establish
law; one's personal will can become a legal right only and
on condition that it is consistent with the national will
(constitution) and all statutory law. The individual's will,
according to Sieyes, differs in this way from the general
will. According to Sieyes' approach, the will of the national
government (which is to be differentiated from the national
will of the nation) can become normative only if it is consistent
with the nation's constitution, which should be remembered
is determined according to the national will. National rule
or government is not synonymous with the 'national will'
of the nation, even though the specific persons ruling in
a democratic country must be elected in accordance with
the nation's will. Choosing Between Rights and Benefits:
In the moral realm, consider the following perspective regarding
the development of social norms before there were established
countries in the world, and then later once there were national
entities: Man was endowed with certain traits. One of them
is his inclination to live within a social framework. Man
does not seek the company of others in order to enjoy the
benefits of societal living but rather because he is by
nature a social being. The advantages of societal living
were not the cause but rather the consequence. In modern
days, as a result of the development of Western ethical
social thought, much of the clarity and sharpness which
characterized these ideas during Sieyes' lifetime, has been
lost. The consequent muddle and ambiguity are apparent in
the ideas of Avishai Margalit, a professor at Hebrew University
and student of these schools of thought. Margalit claims
that rights are matters that are in one's self 1. Does the
mere fact that I am an interested party (that it will be
beneficial for me) confer rights regarding the object of
my interest? Does my interest in getting a 90 on an exam
entitle me to that mark? Of course not, and certainly Margalit
did not mean to imply otherwise. 2. Could it be that I have
a right to speak, even if I have no interest in doing so?
The answer of course is yes. It is possible that I have
the right to the empty seat on the bus, but that does not
imply that I have any interest or desire to exercise that
right. I many inherit something I never wanted and am indifferent
to. I may bear a child not to my liking, and through this
merited the right to participate in his education, though
I have no interest in doing so. Margalit defines a benefit
or self-interest as that which it is fitting for a man to
desire. Its existence (a potential will) does not imply
that man will necessarily make it real (a will in practice).
Yet this definition still leaves cause for wonder: is the
mere fact that it is fitting that I should desire something
sufficient or requisite basis for my right to that thing.
From where did Margalit draw the connection that in his
opinion exists between rights and self-interest? It seems
likely that this stemmed from Western thought's placement
of man, his interests and rights, in the center, in place
of the dominant conception during the religious period that
viewed God and his commandments as the source of behavioral
norms. In the context of this discussion, which is more
expansive than the question that prompted it, the concept
of rights in Western vs. Jewish thought will be analyzed,
preceded by an anthropological perspective. "Rights"
will be examined, not only vis-?-vis the more narrow question
of the connection between it and self-interest (as Margalit
contends), but also with regard to the general roots and
sources of the concept of rights. This section will grapple
with the question of what preceded both rights and self-interests
and in what order they developed, first examining the beginning
of the development of morality and then addressing the moral
distinctiveness of the State of Israel.
