) - 9. Perspectives as to the essence of Israel: as a Jewish State or as or a State of all its citizens as shown by the actions of the Israeli Government Authorities. When discussing Shelach's thesis on Israeli civil religion and when pointing to the only living proof of an Israeli Civil Religion, the existence of Canaanism was raised. A state's civil religion has to be equally applied to all those of its citizens who see themselves as patriots to that state, and who maintain all the ideas connected with that patriotism and with the attributes of that state. Practitioners of the American Civil Religion who fiercely uphold the principles of the American Constitution, and who by virtue thereof are liberal, will cling to America's national history and its founding fathers and will create for themselves an image of the American nation, as evidenced by their ritualistic celebration of Thanksgiving Day. Their families' national religious history prior to arriving on American shores plays no part in the civil religious framework. Participation in this American ness, in this American civil religious experience, is not limited to Protestants. The United States of America, in the eyes of the American Civil Religious practitioner, is a multi-racial and multi-ethnic nation. America's black population are not debarred from playing a role, especially since the American Constitution was designed to accord all its citizens equal treatment. The American civil religious practitioner will never disqualify an American citizen from participating in American civil religious rites based on his racial/ethnic background. The key for opening doors and gaining entry to this community oriented American civil religion is American citizenship. The American president is the president of this civil religion and the American government its (i.e. civil religion's) government .American public state institutions are this religion's institutions in the same way as institutions connected with the Catholic Church including the pope and the Catholic administrative headquarters in Rome are considered the institutions of all Catholics worldwide. Nonetheless from its very beginnings American citizens had dual loyalties. In the antebellum years they were loyal primarily to the U.S. Federal Government, followed by, and of secondary importance, the individual state government. In the post-bellum period Republicanism gained the upper hand and ethnic ties overtook individual state loyalties to take second place behind an overall loyalty to the United States as a whole. Ethnic loyalties can be seen in cases where for instance Italian immigrants living in the US try help their kinsmen, just as in the case of other ethnic minorities. The total rupture within America whose final form was shaped by the outcome of the American Civil War and the resunew direction American nationalism would take is all discussed in Liah Grinfeld's writings. Owing to the fact that no two countries are alike, each country has its own unique way of centralizing the loyalties of its citizens. A multi-ethnic state like the Indian Federation will for certain struggle against dual loyalties, since the Federal government's only loyal supporters will be those who harbor similar loyalties towards the ethnic group to which the government ministers belong. In Switzerland, as is obviously the case, secondary loyalties are split between local cantons and parties that speak the same one of the four constitutionally recognized languages as that citizen. In Belgium it is very acceptable to owe allegiance to one of the two language groups, the Flemings or the Walloons, without affecting overall loyalty towards Belgium. Therefore civil religion which is completely affiliated with the state and its institutions cannot forbid secondary loyalties so long as they are subject at all times to an overall state loyalty. Considering the above and taking into account what I said in my book about the Jewish State wherein I concluded that Israel is the State of the Jewish People in all its dispersions and that through its citizens, both Jew and Arab, the Jewish People are loyally served, three primary questions arise. 1. Does the Knesset as the State of Israel's parliament operate on behalf of the State of the all the dispersed Jewish People or is it the parliament of a state of all its citizens? (As would fit the ideology of the civil religion). 2. Does Israel's government act as if they are the executive authority for the State of the all the dispersed Jewish People or are they the executive authority over a state of all its citizens? 3. Does Israel's Supreme Court act as if it is the highest judicial authority for the State of the all the dispersed Jewish People or is it the highest judicial authority for a state of all its citizens? The Knesset: The composition of the Knesset reflects two different trends but in actuality it operates with one clear mindset. The Law of Return and the Law of Foundations of Justice as well as other Laws encourage an ingathering of the exiled people. These Laws also provide a budget for creating areas demarcated for Jewish settlement in order to prevent the existence of an Arab majority in the Galilee as well as ensuring separation between Arabs living in the disputed territories and those in the Israeli Wadi 'Ara. All these actions either rely on legislative acts or have to do with the character and composition of the governments that have been approved by the Knesset. The Knesset upholds individual equality of all its citizens by not discriminating between Jews, Arabs, Druze and other minorities. On the national level however the object of their attention is the Jewish national group that is intimately linked with the Jewish Diaspora. To summarize, the Knesset acts most decidedly as if it represents all of the Jewish Diaspora, which can be most clearly demonstrated when it deals with immigrant absorption. The Government: The government's composition is made up almost exclusively of Jews (with the exception of one instance which lasted a very brief period) who in relation to the question of representation are even more one dimensional in their attitude than the Knesset. There were some prime ministers who on the rhetorical level spoke of the "people in Israel" as if Israel was a "State of all its citizens" and as if there was one Israeli nationality not based on its Jewishness but on citizenship. Yet beyond these verbal declarations, that always seemed to pop up close to elections and were uttered in order to garner support from the Arab vote, the governments have always acted as if they were preserving Israel's prime interest to remain a Jewish State. As far as the nationalist meaning of a Jewish state is concerned the government has always acted- both on the level of rhetoric and pragmatics as heavily focused on the Jewish idea. Like Knesset the government has sought to accord equal rights to its Jewish and other citizens as it relates to the individual on the municipal level. In this regard however it has not been careful to prevent discrimination against the Arab minority when it comes to employment opportunities, municipal budgets, hiring of public servants, development work etc. This discrimination has nothing to do with our being a Jewish state, since the State's Jewish identity is in no way associated with discriminating against non-Jews. As to the different attitude with regard to the Jewish State's national aspect as opposed to its religious one, the uneven funding by every government regardless, of religious and ultra-Orthodox educational institutions as opposed to those of a more general nature, comes as a result of coalitional pressure rather than of any inner convictions that this is the right path to follow. Other budgetary considerations that touch on religious matters involve mainly similar pressures. Since "Jew" is a concept which has both religious and nationalist considerations and the Jewish religion is a national religion, the designation "Jewish State" must refer to both these planes simultaneously. The governments of Israel have never done anything for the "Jewish State" in its religious context, because of an inner desire or conviction that they should work towards this goal. There has never been a positive impetus urging furtherance of religious causes; all that has been done in this regard is the result of negative pressures and stimuli. It follows then that Israel's governments that have displayed a good measure of sensitivity towards the nationalist aspects of the Jewish State have not displayed similar sensitivity in regard to its religious aspects. This point of delving into this subject is not to suggest that the "Jewish Religion" per se is coercive. Yet beyond circumventing religious coercion there is a much wider field of operations upon which Israel's governments have paraded, to a great extent against their will. As a consequence of following this policy which it has been compelled to adopt, the government has eroded the Israel's status quo on religion so that it is lopsided against the Jewish religion (in its non-coercive form, obviously). This erosion owes much more to Israel's government than to its Knesset. In any event, as a final summation of what has been said, all of Israel's governments as a rule have reacted negatively to the concept of a "civil religion", even if their positive response to the concept of a "Jewish State" is very pronounced as it relates to the nationalist connotations while contrarily exhibiting no special enthusiasm for its religious character. The Supreme Court: At the initial stages of its tenure the Supreme Court acted like the court of the Jewish State and in its promotion of equal rights on the individual level did not oppose the policies of the Knesset or the government when it came to issues of national importance. The Supreme Court from very early on consistently expressed its reservations with regard to the issues surrounding the religious connotations of the State of Israel being a Jewish State. An exhaustive list would be too long to be reproduced here but landmark decisions include the Shalit, Rufeizen, Kaplan (admittedly this was decided in a lower tribunal, but the fact it was not appealed against in one of the higher divisions is proof that it was commensurate with the judicial policy of the Supreme Court) Jezeramcus and Shakdiel cases, along with a long line of other judgments including the whole Bar Ilan Street episode. In all these judgments the Supreme Court decided against the status quo on religion and even against the values that are accepted in those countries that impose strict separation of state and religion, akin to the United States. Any semblance of religious coercion is immediately repealed by the Supreme Court so for instance, a law relating to the closure of public places of business on the Sabbath, recognized as constitutionally grounded in the United States was rejected out of as invalid. This was after the local municipality democratically sanctioned this provision by including it in one of its local by-laws. The closure of Bar Ilan Street, which passes through the center of the Jerusalem Chareidi (ultra-Orthodox) neighborhoods and which closure caused Sabbath travellers, at most, a few minutes delay, was deemed from the outset as coercive. Furthermore a permit issued by a Public Committee in terms of which the street would be closed during a specially allotted time was discarded when the court began its debate on the issue. It was only after much arm twisting that the permit was finally approved. At the time of handing down its judgment approving the permit the court informed the Chareidi community that if they were to make any more demands or if they would engage in violent activity the court would weigh the options of retracting the permit. Such a statement coming as it does in the middle of a court judgment was equivalent to taking sides in the secular/religious debate. If the ruling was motivated by a desire to strike a fair balance there would be no place for threatening one of the sides that in the event that they "do not act nicely" or if they "come with more demands" an evenhanded decision would be overturned and replaced by a decision lopsided against them. It is patently obvious that Supreme Court is completely negatively attuned to any issues that relate to religious aspects of the Jewish State. When dealing with the nationalist aspects of the Jewish State, the Supreme Court Justices, until the end of the 1990s, were active in preventing the release of "captives" who in fact were prisoners of war, within the context of the war between the State of Israel and the Hezbollah. They were also very vociferous in joining Israel's demand for the release of Ron Arad from the clutches of the Hezbollah or at least for some information as to his fate. A similar patriotic stance was in evidence when the Supreme Court decided the extent of physical pressures that could legally be exerted against a Palestinian terrorist who is deemed a "ticking time bomb" (the torture case). The Court similarly backed the government, when, basing itself on the principle of reciprocity withheld the rights from two senior Hezbollah members- Mustafa Dirani and Sheikh Obeid to be visited by Red Cross personnel until similar visits could be arranged with Jewish captives held by the Hezbollah. However by the end of the 1990s this trend ended. This is strikingly demonstrated in the Katzir episode, discussed under title of the Ka'adan decision, in which Arabs demanded the right of abode in a Jewish hilltop settlement that was established by the Jewish Agency as a buffer between Arabs living in the Territories and those living in Wadi Ara. The Court held that so long as no new settlements were being specifically designated for Arabs there could be no new settlements built for Jews. Following this reasoning specific land could not be allocated to the Jewish Agency since it was an organization that practiced discrimination against Arabs by setting up exclusively Jewish settlements. All these kinds of decisions reflect a trend that asserts that Israel is a State of all its citizens while denying the idea that State of Israel belongs to the People of Israel and is a realization of the Zionist enterprise. The court's ruling, delivered in the Katzir case, is a clear example of how it conforms to the spirit of civil religion. While it is true that it still employs the terminology of the "Jewish State" and is not yet ready to use alternative language that the rest of the world uses i.e. a "State of all its citizens", it only does so for strictly legal and semantic reasons. According to this Court the rules of the game are defined in the Basic Laws, enacted in 1992, and since these Laws pay lip service to the constitutional idea of Israel as a Democratic Jewish State, the court follows suit. In practice the decisions of the Supreme Court Justices have already downgraded the Jewish character of the state so that it is only of symbolic, abstract value, devoid of any particularistic attributes. The state's democratic nature on the other hand is given detailed application. Paradoxically if the principle of a "Democratic State" were to be followed - a principle that has no constitutional value save for its reference in a few Laws and which therefore awaits constitutional classification - it would be discovered that it is always a secondary feature which exists only in the abstract. By rights the principle of a "Jewish State" should occupy prime position, however it is the lower ranking principle that is not constitutionally enshrined- that of our being a "democratic state" that our Supreme Court has declared through its various judgments that trumps everything else. Owing to democracy's supreme value it empowers the Supreme Court with the authority to change the structure of all existent Laws and to strike down any of the governments' administrative acts, its delegated legislation or the by-laws of the local authorities on the grounds that they are all expressions of a democratic regime. In the eyes of the Supreme Court circa 2000, all citizens enjoy equal rights not only in their capacity as individuals - which no one in Israel would question - but also in their capacity as members of various nationalities. Therefore Azmi Bishara's candidature for Prime Minister cannot be invalidated. That is what the Supreme Court believes, and that is the ideology that is mandated by members of the Israeli civil religion who observe religiously what Ilana Shelach defined as the Israeli secular (civil) religion. The Israeli Civil Religion is then - as it emerges from our previously conducted analysis-one religion that cannot be split into two. It is not possible for a Jewish Israeli Civil Religion to operate alongside an Arab Israeli Civil Religion. To speak of the Arab ness or Jewishness of a member of the Israeli Civil Religion is pointless. That is the situation in civil religions across the globe and there is no reason why Israel should be any different especially since citizenship is "born" so to speak without any heritage or history that pre-existed that State. If members of the Israeli Civil Religion who are descendant from Jews cease to identify themselves as part of a larger Jewish Diaspora that lives outside of Israel's borders, they have to perforce cut themselves off from their antiquated history that serves to unite them with Diaspora Jewry. Continuing along the same lines it must be concluded that there is no reason why they should separate themselves from those whose roots go back to the Arab-Palestinian nation but who also practice Israeli Civil Religion. The Israeli Civil Religious practitioner as he has been defined does not bow down to the Jewish State. Instead he worships a State of Israel that has burnt all bridges with the Jewish religion, its history and its nationalist aspirations. It does not deny the right of Judaism and Islam to flourish in Israel yet for it, its emotional mainstay, and its central focus for expressing personal loyalty by the individual citizen is the State that was created on 15 May 1948, with no past just a present and a future. In light of the judgments delivered by the Supreme Court, it would be correct to say that this court is an institution of the state of Israel that is very careful not to be associated with any one of the nationalities or religions that exist in Israel. This makes it an institution that is very close in spirit to the Israeli Civil Religion. In the opinion of this institution, as it emerges from what is contained in its judgments, not from the declarations or terminology that is used there, Israel is a "State of all its citizens". According to the latest President of the Supreme Court, there is no real difference between the concepts "Jewish State" and State of all its citizens" especially when the former has been relegated (in his opinion) to contain elements only very broadly relating to it, while the latter (which he prefers to refer to rhetorically as a "DemocraState") is embodied with concrete and particularistic meaning. The State of Israel in his view is a "Jewish State" only to the extent that this concept is construed to be identical to a "Democratic State". Yet Barak will disagree with the opposite proposition i.e. that the State of Israel is a "Democratic State" only to the extent that this concept is construed to be identical to a "Jewish State". 10. The contrast between associating oneself with Israeli "civil religion" and a worldview that sees Israel as a Jewish State. The world-view expressed by the President of the Supreme Court Aaron Barak is the same that dominates the thinking in the most recent judgments. Present day court rulings in Israel will not present arguments that oppose Barak's world-view, and will certainly not rearrange things so that the principle of a "Jewish State" gains the upper hand over the idea of a "Democratic State". Only a small minority of cases dares to plead equality between these two concepts by blurring the differences between them. According to the principles of freedom of religion as spelled out by the founding document of the State, the Declaration of Independence, civil religion is granted equal religious standing in so far as the individual's rights in Israel are concerned (which according to the concepts of the Declaration is the citizens' rights). By contrasting the idea of equality on the individual level with the preferred [collective] idea, which is the essence and raison d'être of the state, of a "Jewish State", and by locating the points of friction between the two concepts, the differences between civil religion and the principle of a "Jewish State" can be seen. When balancing the values of a "Jewish State" versus a "Democratic State" and when discussing how the points of friction between these two are eventually reconciled, three possible outcomes must be borne in mind, i.e. 1. A preference for a "Jewish State" over a "Democratic State". 2. Equal value for a "Jewish State" and a "Democratic State". 3. A preference for a "Democratic State" over a" Jewish State". Possibility (a) is commensurate with what has been said thus far in the discussion in this part of the book. Possibility (b) is the opinion of Menachem Elon, while possibility (c) reflects Barak's views. In accordance with the view in (a) that holds that a "Jewish State" trumps a "Democratic State" it should be said (following the trend of the Declaration of independence) that in a private sense, on the level of the individual, any citizen who feels a common identity with the spirit of the "Israeli Civil Religion" or "Canaanism", is allowed to set up voluntary organizations and together with others he can establish institutions that enable him to undergo the Canaanite experience, so long as the Jewish religion has complete (and unequal) precedence over civil religion or any other religion for that matter. As to (b) Menachem Elon would see both concepts as vying for the same thing so that they are of equal value. According to third way of looking at it, that of Aaron Barak, level (c), the Jewish religion has no advantage whatsoever over any other religion in Israel. All religions are equal and are eligible for equal treatment, so held the court in the decision of the "Women of the (Wailing) Wall." According to this third possibility practitioners of civil religion are entitled to the same burial rights as those practicing the Jewish religion and therefore there is no legal impediment to civil burials conducted by an organization which is not under the control of Jewish law or any other religious laws. These practitioners are further more entitled to a mandatory order by the High Court of Justice to enable the establishment of their own religious institutions with a state budget allotted to them as is the case (which is equally applicable) with the Israeli Chief Rabbinate. The Knesset can expect to receive an order mandating it to enact appropriate legislation; otherwise the H.C.J. will set out constitutional guidelines mandating the same. In addition it is expected that the H.C.J. will order budgets set aside for civil religious educational institutions to which its members are entitled. This means that civil religious clubs will be set up that unite Jew and Arab while blurring the differences between the two. Additionally it is envisioned that a joint Arab-Jewish educational system will be put into place which will encourage intermarriage between Jew and Arab, following the new tradition of introducing the ideas of the Israeli Civil Religion or sect to the unsuspecting public. Members of this new religion or sect will be entitled to the same budgets that are presently given to synagogues, churches, mosques and religious educational institutions. Members of this religion or sect will be entitled to all of this if they only ask for it. In light of the interpretation presented in this book when it discusses the constitutional situation in the State of Israel the last mentioned possibility cannot be implemented by virtue of its being unconstitutional. However in practice the Israeli Supreme Court does not follow this line of thinking. 11. Relevant Judicial policy in Israel. The judgments rendered in the Katzir and "Women of the Wall" episode conform to the liberal, democratic, secular and egalitarian agenda that is found in the United States and its Constitution. The Israeli Supreme Court Justices are in the habit of adopting the American terminology and case law without carefully discriminating between the constitutional situations that prevail in either country. Generally they do not even bother to mention that America has a written Constitution and case law is decided specifically in accordance with the American Constitution. The impression created is that Israeli law is linked to the American Constitution, even if the Israeli justices do not believe this or do not want others to think that that is the case. They imbibe the American ideology to such an extent that they are unable to deal with the constitutional differences that separate the two countries; simply a result of the approach that they have of late adopted. The ruling in the Chorev (Bar Ilan Street) case was delivered in this same spirit. In an article that appeared in the supplement of the Ha'aretz weekend edition the description of the Israeli Supreme Court President Aaron Barak as the "[Hassidic] Rebbe (literally: Grand Master) of the Secularists" seems an appropriate title heading for the purposes of our discussion in this part of the book. Does the Supreme Court-like its President make up the leadership of the Israeli Secular Religion? And to what degree is this court "relevant" to the State as a whole? In the Chorev case the Justices viewed the interests of the Chareidi residents to be emotionally impaired and they juxtaposed this with the interest of freedom of movement of the secularists taking into account the fact that Bar Ilan Street was a quicker thoroughfare than any other, so that it cut travel time by a few minutes. If so the emotional impairment suffered by the religious population, which is not on the same level as a basic right of every citizen, did not fare well against the basic right so to speak of the secularists, especially since the right of "freedom" , in this case freedom of movement, is always preferred. The very fact that the problem was framed in such a manner just goes to show how ignorant the justices are when it comes to their understanding of observant Jewish lifestyles. An observant Jew is indeed concerned that "the whole Jewish people" observe the precepts of the Creator of the World, but more than this, much more than this, the observant man is worried about the education of his children- that they be educated in the religious spirit. Exposing the children of the neighborhood to massive traffic violations on the Sabbath and Festivals frustrates his ability to preserve a consistent education for his children, in the spirit that he chooses. In any event it is not simply hurt feelings that are at issue. The concept "emotions" is one that belongs to the secularist lexicon,and not to the Jewish religion. An observant Jew toils in order to fulfill the precepts and obligations that are incumbent upon him, not for the sake of emotional fulfillment. This typifies the difference between the Western world's penchant for focusing on rights on the one hand and the religious Jew's penchant for focusing on duties, on the other. The expression "emotional impairment" reflects a secularist thought process and not a Jewish religious way of thinking. The Chorev case is similar to litmus paper which helps us identify whether a problem exists. Indeed the problem has been identified as existing on two levels: 1. On the level of the principle of being the authority. 2. On the communicative level. On the level of principle of being the authority, it would appear that those principles that guide Supreme Court Justices do not dictate to them any duty to help observant and religious Jews create an environment conducive to their religious lifestyles. Connected to this is the matter of a Jewish State supporting and aiding Jews who want to fulfill Jewish religious precepts and providing them with the tools, atmosphere and conditions that will make it easier to realize their aims. On a matter of principle the aid that is extended is based on the very essence of the State, in that it is a Jewish State, whose central mission is to spread Judaism to all of its Jewish inhabitants who simply request it, within reasonable limits. This mission is the number one task of the State which precedes all others, and cannot be pushed aside by the principles of democracy as in "freedom of movement" especially in the marginal definition of that concept when speaking of a few added minutes of Sabbath travel time. The standard for evaluating interests and aims of the Jewish State are different from the standards employed by the justices in this instance. On a communicative level the justices in the Chorev case were unable to construe the Chareidi language. The Chareidim, it is true did breach the bounds of behavior, but that was not because there is something uncouth about them. The reason they resorted to lawlessness was because there was no one from among the highest authority of the land (which for all practical purposes is the Supreme Court) who understood their needs. The Chareidim spoke of their needs and the justices understood this to mean their feelings. It can be confidently said that the sides suffered from serious language and communication difficulties. All this is reflective of a certain estrangement that leads to discrimination in practice and in deed. 12. Summary: The possible and the desired future. In Israel the prevailing judicial trend is to separate religion and State, even if this trend is unable to prevent the continuing registration of marriages and divorces by religious authorities or the institution of a chief rabbinate and religious council. The court, when interfering with the composition of and appointments to the religious councils, acts beyond its obligations, as a correct reading of the Law reveals. Similarly when it comes to interfering in questions regarding kashruth, they often needlessly clash with the religious councils or with legislation of the Knesset. In these circumstances it should come as no surprise that the religious and Chareidi communities are increasingly turning to the ecclesiastical courts for a ruling though the status of such a ruling is only on a par with arbitration. In the future this trend will be broadened further especially if the courts continue down the same path. It is foreseeable that Chareidim will put forward political demands asking Knesset to legislate changes in the Law that will make way for ecclesiastical authorities to be recognized as a separate judicial system on par with the judicial system presently in place. From a political-moral perspective such a demand would be difficult to object to, and could only be faced off if the present judicial system altered its thinking to the extent that it emphasized its duty to act within the framework of a Jewish State, notwithstanding its democratic nature. Doubtless neither the Israeli Supreme Court nor the majority of those, consciously or not, affiliated with Israeli Civil Religion actively seeks to introduce marriages between Jews and Arabs. In any event the idealists from either side of the spectrum will not deny this marriage option to those who seek it. In a similar vein many liberals who are not homosexual or lesbian do not deny the right of those who are so inclined to follow their inclinations. They also noisily object to any hardships the state places in the way of the gay community in contrast with the services and recognition granted by the state to straight families. Therefore just like the accusation cannot be thrown at these [straight] liberals that they undermine homosexual and lesbian activity within society so too the Supreme Court Justices cannot be accused of undermining intermarriage within society, even while acknowledging that these justices do not consciously serve the court as representatives of the Israeli Civil Religion or even attempt to further its cause. The forecast presented here on the future awaiting Israel and on the links between the Supreme Court and Civil Religion will certainly put the backs up of any one of the Supreme Court Justices, in the event that they hear of this claim. Israeli Civil Religion is not a religion that has recognized leaders with a fixed and known membership list neither does it have established institutions that formally protect its membership. The subject of discussion is made up of an ideology that is multi faceted and divided, but which binds together many people who in practice are generally unaware of the fact that they are members of this religion or have even heard of this religion's existence. What unite the members of this religion are a common ideology, culture and ritual. A distinguishing feature of civil religion in states whose populations originate from many different lands (like the USA, Canada and Israel), is the members' total severing of emotional ties with the history of the countries or people that they originated from before arriving in their new country. In the USA, Australia and Canada the matter speaks for itself, in Israel this is not at all clear. A Jew who emigrated from Poland to Israel and who joined the Civil Religion is distinguished first and foremost by his keen interest in things that happen in Israel, and concomitantly by his total break with Jewish Polish events that are presently occurring. Furthermore: in order to sincerely join this new religion he must for instance prefer American ideals that have been absorbed in Israel, which account for the similar lifestyles and living standards enjoyed in the US and Israel, over and above the principles enunciated by his Jewish heritage. Indeed this is the direction that seems to be unfolding in the Israeli Supreme Court's rulings that have rejected any attempt at embracing the "Jewish Heritage" as a normative source for judicial review as was the case when the legislator mandated such an inclusion in the old Law of the Foundations of Justice ,5740 (1980). Apart from their rulings the tendency of Supreme Court Justices to view the concept of a "Jewish State" as something vague having no concrete value, of very broad conceptual application can be contrasted with their clinging onto the smallest particularistic details of what is called for by the principles of a Democratic State. The Supreme Court Justices, all of them, will mock any idea that suggests they have any political link to-or patronization of any sector of the Israeli public sector in general or Israeli Civil Religion in particular. They confidently believe with all their heart and soul that they are free of all and any prejudice because when they sit in judgment they have no ties to the people involved and are thus able to dispense justice to all. To them it must be said that intentions of the heart are not at issue, but deeds, a reality embroidered by their hands and the exact product of their pens. The Israeli Supreme Justices (those who are Jewish, that is) obviously believe that they are good and loyal Jews faithful to the Jewish religion. And behold they are being told here that they have links to a new religion which intends wiping away Judaism from the Jewish State, and that in practice they are strengthening the hand of the civil religion which is bent on taking over the reins of the State and depriving the Jewish religion of any influence over the governing process. Like these Supreme Court Justices so too the majority of Israel's Jews feel that they are good and loyal Jews (the same thing can be said with regard to Israeli Arabs who wholeheartedly believe that they are loyal Palestinians). Nevertheless looking at the principles that many of Israel's citizens rally behind, combined with the ever diminishing emotional ties to that part of Israeli life that connects them to their ancient and well worn heritage, to the point where they are almost cut off from it, and without them even being aware of it they have left the old religion, their antiquated feelings of nationality, and have created in its place a new religion, even a new people has been formed thanks to their active help. Another segment of the population has adopted two religions, one of them being civil religion. They practice one or another theistic religion in their homes and are members of the Israeli civil religion outside their homes, in the political lives they lead and in their relationship to the State. This is exactly the way the majority of Americans are, they look up to the USA, without at the same time giving up membership in this or that theistic religion. Just like the Israeli Supreme Court Justices defended the rights of the "Women of the Wall" to realize their egalitarian aspirations by their loud chanting of the Torah portion next to the (Western) Wall while all time being wrapped in (male) religious garb, talitoth, so too continuing along this path our Supreme Court Justices in the future will look favorably upon those non-profit organizations who will increasingly demand that they receive a state budget to set up an educational system imparting values, completely severed from what is unique individually to the Old Testament, the Koran and the New Testament, as well as those values that are in common. Instead they will teach western, liberal- democratic values, with patriotic leanings to the State of Israel, and it is completely possible, even probable, that they will not raise any objections to marriages taking place between Jew and Arab, especially since the student body will be composed of both Arabs and Jews. In practice this chilling scenario that makes your hairs stand on end, is taking place right now in the most clear-cut way in Neve Shalom, which is in the Latrun district, where a mixed settlement has been set up for the express purpose of integrating Arabs and Jews. The root of the problem is embedded in the high prestige that is given the Supreme Court Justices in Israel. This status allows them to determine who will succeed their place on the bench. These Justices have become an authoritative body that is immune to any harm and that has the "final word", after the legislator has had his say. Even when the legislature amends legislation which the court's judgment disapproved of this amended piece of legislation is returned to the table of the Supreme Court Justices who again add their interpretation to it as they see fit. Such a scenario has already happened as in the Harris case in South Africa which is described in my book on the Jewish State.