- The corporative, as seen above, is one of two institutions that express the hierarchic spirit that pervades Latin American society. Within this context, this chapter will discuss workers' unions, focusing on the situation in each of the four countries that were chosen in Chapter I: Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela. Latin America will be studied as a whole, and not each country separately. Malloy, in his discussion of workers' unions in Latin America, describes how businessmen in Brazil wield both direct and indirect influence over the government, while the workers' unions lack real power to influence to government, even though their contacts with it afford them an image of power. In Columbia and in Chile, the unions are more powerful and have at times even managed to veto certain governmental appointments. As a rule, ties exist between workers' unions and certain parties, with the two offering mutual support and even sometimes exchange of members. This situation strengthens the trust between the two sides that is the basis for these relationships. In Argentina, Chile (until Pinochet's military regime), and Venezuela, the workers' unions displayed strength and determination against the government. In Venezuela, the unions opposed Marcus Perez Imenes' dictatorship. The powerlessness of the unions in Mexico and Brazil stemmed from the central government being dominant and not dependent on the workers' unions. As a result, the percentage of workers in these two countries who are members of the unions is approximately 20%, in contrast to 68% in Venezuela, and 34% in Argentina. These statistics definitely reflect the power of the unions in the different countries. Malloy claims that in Latin America a presidential regime exists which decides certain issues behind the closed doors of the government, but that social groups and workers' unions are involved in some way or another in deciding certain more fundamental issues. Despite the powerlessness of the unions, the central government in Mexico in the 1920's engaged in the widest land distribution in history (in the history of the White man, but not including Imperial China in which larger land distributions took place - Y.C.). Unions also did not play any role in creating the governments' strong orientation to development of industries and encouragement of investments and initiatives in Mexico after the great land reformation, and in Brazil during the military rule after 1964. All this reflects the limited powers of the workers' unions in Mexico and Brazil in the latter half of the twentieth century. Even more so, it demonstrates the lack of interest political leaders showed for populism and for the will of the people, when they were confident that their policies were in the best interest of the State. This was characteristic of Mexico and Brazil upon the rise of strong government - in the period being surveyed - in contrast to Latin American countries - such as Uruguay - that were dependent on the masses, in which democracy was a powerful force. In Uruguay, close to 30% of the labor force is employed by the central government, and bureaucratic institutions are so developed that up to 30% of the population lives off of government pensions, and many are employed in cushy undemanding positions. The general approach there is to give something to almost everyone. Malloy concludes his analysis of government powers and the corporative by saying that it is utterly ludicrous to claim with regard to Latin America that the existence of a despotic government is inevitable. It is precisely the confrontation between groups that create the corporative and patronage in Latin America. The political parties are not absolutely irrelevant, but they are also not key players in determining the nature of political and social life. Many other institutions, including unions and patronage related powers, as well as administrative ruling powers that are not based on personal relationships help define political and social life. The government maintains careful control over the considerably influential union to insure that they remain friends rather than foes. The various laws pertaining to this matter that have been passed in the different Latin American countries can be divided into three categories: 1. Establishment of unions by the State. 2. Subsidization of unions by the State. 3. Supervision of union activity by the State. In a study of laws passed between 1905-1974 in ten Latin American countries, laws were found that mandated the membership, in recognized unions, of people who were not at all members of these unions. In this manner, these unions were given the monopolistic right to represent the workers in specific branches of labor. Other laws established forums of union representatives of different areas and classes, State financing of union activities, as well as legal guidelines regarding government supervision of union demands, union elections, and direct involvement and supervision over union affairs. The actual relations between the government and workers' unions depend upon the extent of the government's need for the workers' support. In Argentina, therefore, in the period post-1943, workers wielded considerable influence over the government because Juan Peron's regime relied on their support. The degree of their influence also depends on how industrialized the country is becoming, since workers' unions in Latin America help strengthen paternalistic relationships between workers and management. In the context of these relations, it has transpired in Latin America that workers demanded and received a portion of the industry's profits. The strength of the unions grows when they succeed in acquiring an exclusive monopoly over representation of the workers in a certain area of labor. The government will occasionally grant a right of representation to a specific union, and not to others. Connected to this phenomenon, is legalized compulsory membership in a specific union. Such laws placed certain unions under its protection, and of course insured that their activities were consistent with the loyalty they owed to the government. The government also granted subsidies to union leaders and unemployment payments, in efforts to increase loyalty and dependency. The government attempted to achieve this goal also through opposite means, by limiting the right to strike, establishing who may serve as union leader, and mandating the right of a government official to participate in and run union meetings. All these laws, combined with prohibitions against certain unions, granted the government significant power in different Latin American countries, a quasi-self-established patronage that was consistent with concepts of patrons and clients so deeply rooted in Latin American culture.