- In this part of the book, the general notion of the nation
and nationality will be discussed and learned taking the
example of Israel as a starting point. Speaking about the
special case of Israel it will be studied how the structural
maladies and wide ranging activism of the Israeli Supreme
Court has turned it into a submissive tool by those elements
who seek to create a new nation in Israel, neither Arab
nor Jewish, but Israeli. This nation is in the process of
consolidating itself, a process of severing itself from
both the Jewish and Arab Diaspora, a nation that merges
Jew and Arab together to form one homogenous whole. This
nation establishes a new religion, calling itself "Israeli
Civil Religion". The State of Israel undergoes this
process while in the opposite direction a process of disengagement
takes place between Jews and Arabs in Israel, as was demonstrated
in the previous part of this book. The ambivalence of these
trends is not only a phenomenon characterising the life
of the individual and wrenching his soul, but also has the
ability to wrench human society, causing inner schisms and
internal struggle. This book will not directly deal with
this inner schism. This schism is not an easy subject; it
can be dealt with at the fringes of another discussion.
It is worthy of special consideration, separate and in-depth,
which in my opinion should be done within a different framework;
here it may be noted that the trend of creating a new nation
by eliminating ethnic and national attributions and by living
within the framework of a shared state is a widespread phenomenon
that has occurred in other countries. The success of this
process bodes an end to the vision of a Jewish State. In
this chapter this process as a general phenomenon will be
reviewed, and the process in Israel will be viewed as a
special phenomenon within the framework of the more general
phenomenon together with a deeper understanding of human
nature, the deep and compulsive reasons for the formation
of religions, the processes of the formation of ethics,
the essential difference between religious mores and between
behaviour enacted for the sake of self interest alone, and
the advantages of religious mores over a self interested
lifestyle will be reviewed, as well as the built-in weaknesses
of Western mores in the last one hundred years ranging from
Kant to postmodernism, and the division of Contemporary
religions into three types (Theistic Monotheistic religion
from the Jewish school of thought, the Far Eastern religions
form the Hindu school of thought, and Civil Religion). While
analysing these things, diagnosing a civic society according
to the educational structure that is in place will be studied
from the perspective "tell me how the education is
organised in the state and I will tell you which elements
are dominant in the regime and which are barred from entering
the halls of power in it." Through analysing the school
structure in the USA, it will be discovered how civil religion
has reigned in the USA and how Theistic religion has been
banned from the Halls of Justice there. Similarly, the review
will include how Canada moved from the Covenant of the Protestant
and Catholic Religions whose adherents shared power between
them to a state in which the process of Americanisation
whose connotations are the spreading of Canadian civil religion
by the power holders, as a result of the changes in the
Canadian educational system. It will be seen that the situation
in Israel is exactly the same because of the parallels between
the different school networks of 'governmental', 'religious
governmental', 'Independent', 'El-Hamayan' 'Arab-governmental'
on the one hand and the Zionist parties, the NRP, Agudath-Israel,
'Shas' and the Arab parties on the other. These are just
a number of the topics that will be raised in the course
of analysing and proving these things, but the full picture
will only be seen in the continuation, where the discussion
unfolds, in all its length and details, as will be done
now. The importance of this subject. In 1999 half a million
religious and ultra-Orthodox Jews demonstrated against the
decisions of the Supreme Court. No speeches were made during
the demonstration, rather chapters of psalms were chanted
after which the crowd dispersed peacefully. This was a quiet
but very powerful protest in which a tenth of Israel's Jewish
population participated, including children, the ailing
and the aged. From the perspective of the percentage of
Israel's Jews participating in this demonstration, the numbers
are impressive, generally speaking for any demonstration,
but especially taking into account the fact that only one
other demonstration in Israel was larger. The religious
demonstrators' main charge was that whenever the public
were divided in a debate between the religious and irreligious
population, the Supreme Court' interfered on the side of
the irreligious. They judged in their favour, and adopted
an ideological standpoint in line with one of the sides
in Israeli politics. There were also complaints from the
religious side about the composition of the Supreme Court,
which was composed of those representing the secular-liberal
stance, whose influence on decisions involving Jewish religious
values tended to be negative. A counter-demonstration in
support of the Supreme Court was set up opposite this demonstration,
numbering 50,000 people, the majority of whom were irreligious,
but it was a demonstration organised by the established
organisations of the state. The question may be asked: Is
this not one of the signs of a religious war waiting to
erupt? An additional and separate question may also be raised:
Doesn't the Israeli Supreme Court and its supporters comprise
one type of political unit, and the ultra-Orthodox (Chareidi)
another? In the context of these questions, it seems appropriate
to analyse the issue of 'civil religion' from a universal
perspective while broadening our analysis when dealing with
the Israeli-context. This analysis will enable us to shed
some light on the issue. Using as a backdrop the decisions
of the Supreme Court on religious matters, as will become
clearer in the course of this discussion, an important and
honest question can be asked by those who see themselves
as critics of the Supreme Court. This question is multifaceted
and can be formulated thus: Whom does the Israeli Supreme
Court represent and whom does it serve? What role does it
play within the ever-widening ideological and political
split in Israel? Is the religious protest legitimate when
it not only criticises a specific decision but rallies against
the political legitimacy of the Supreme Court in its present
composition and world view that it embodies? Is there any
basis to the claim that today's Supreme Court acts as a
political player? The discussion on civil religion in Israel
and in the Supreme Court will raise questions, from a broader
perspective, similar questions, i.e.: To what extent is
this Supreme Court a government institution that serves
the aims of civil religion? An institution that tries to
realise the goal of impocivil religion as law in the State
of Israel and to turn Israel into a "State of all its
citizens" nullifying any of Israel's inherent centrality
to the basic interests of the Jewish People? To what extent
does the court make it difficult for those whose lifestyles
and voluntary organisations are intimately connected to
the Jewish religion? To what extent does the court play
a role as a political rival (willingly or inadvertently)
to those who continue today to support Israel as the Jewish
State? Further on it will become clearer that the religious-ultra-Orthodox
demonstration reflects a real problem that does not solely
affect the ultra-Orthodox (Chareidi) community. It is a
problem that goes to the heart of our discussion. What is
religion and what are the types of religion according to
this definition for the purposes of this discussion? General
overview according to the stages of development. For the
purposes of this discussion religion will be defined as
"the framework of beliefs and social behaviours built
on the belief in a thing that is impossible to prove, an
ideological and organisational framework, that has its own
rituals, and which usually has its own institutions."
In the course of analysing the evidence it will become clear
to what extent this definition stands up to reality. From
the beginning of the existence of humankind, man has acted
as a social creature; he has managed social organisations
that are run in accordance with the rules of social behaviour.
In order to counteract the insecurities that surround him
and the lack of knowing what the forces of nature have in
store for him, what unforeseeably great dangers lurk before
him, man strengthened his spirit in the powers of his imagination,
which provided him with justification for setting up rules
that he constructed in his mind and that he sought to harness
in order to help him. It was this setting that produced
inter alia, for example, the Totem institution; this according
to research gathered in Australia, Africa, America, South
East Asia and other places that studied primitive societies,
which research was conducted using scientific surveys combined
with the teachings of Sigmund Freud and Durkheim. It seems
that what is discussed there is a wholly universal phenomenon
in the origins of human nature. There is only one kind of
human temperament, which invariable to man's the cultural
setting or timeframe. Human nature acts within a universal
phenomenon. This universality expresses itself inter alia
in the following: (1) The prohibition of sexual intercourse
and mating between a son and his mother, between brother
and sister, though this prohibition does not extend to the
father-daughter relationship (2) The prohibition of a son
harming his father (3) Tribal affiliation obligating mutual
aid between a man and his maternal relatives, but not his
paternal relatives. Thus even if a man lived in the same
place where a group of his father's relatives dwelt, he
is under no obligation to give them aid. At the same time
he is obligated to help his mother's family, even if they
live far away from him. All these rules applied universally
on all the continents and faraway lands where there was
no contact between their respective human inhabitants since
they lived under primitive conditions. For the sake of comparison-
a Jew establishes his race through his mother- not through
his father. What Freud does, is to explain how this uniform
prototype of human lifestyle came into being amongst people
who had no means of communicating with one another. Even
if it were said that all primitive tribes originate from
one progenitor or from a pair of progenitors, the question
may still be asked as to the source of this prototypical
lifestyle. This prototype was ingrained in man through his
different tribes (or through the progenitor couple as the
source of all the tribes- according to Freud's understanding)
in such a strong fashion until it took hold of man and determined
his modes of behaviour right until contemporary times. In
the words of Freud, this prototype exists today not only
among savage and primitive tribes, but also amongst us,
the bearers of modern culture. It therefore seems that what
was said previously is correct, that the general common
traits shared by all cultures and during all periods of
time is connected to human nature and for the purposes of
analogy, are "programmed" into man from the beginning
of his existence. It needs to be added that according to
Freud's analysis these mental prototypes that he speaks
of, are not the only prototypes that are ingrained in man
(as in Darwin's approach) or that were ingrained in man
(as in the traditional religious approach)Man is ingrained
with other tendencies: 1. The inclination to help the weak
by virtue of them being part of the human race. 2. Thoughtful
curiosity based not merely on physical feelings but also,
and primarily on human reasoning. 3. A human tendency to
generalise personal matters. 4. Constant wavering of man
between "good" and "evil" as a basis
for establishing his social behaviour. This wavering caused
philosophers, moralists and religious sages to interminably
argue the question whether man's inclination is inherently
good, or whether by nature man is evil. This last-mentioned
dilemma found expression in the book of Genesis where it
speaks of man choosing between good and evil. This complex
mental configuration of man led to the Totem institution,
as it led him to other rules of behaviour connected with
Totem. These components together with Totem are the progenitors
of Theistic religion, that which is centred on the belief
in any deity (and in our concept of belief, included for
this purpose of our discussion the concept of idolatry).
Religion is the most organised and sophisticated form of
the Totem institution- and it should be added-the Totem
institution predates the institution of idol worship, from
which Theistic religion originated. (Theistic is used in
the broadest sense of the word). It is patently obvious
that as a result of the Totem institution and from the trends
and rules of behaviour connected with Totem a social lifestyle
was formed, which today has been formalised in the modern
state. As will be demonstrated later on, civil religion
was a later development of this process. Within the framework
of the development of these social rules it is possible
to encounter early on societies that lived according to
moral values and Theistic statutes-morals and laws that
are affiliated with all types of deities and with any ordinances
that were received from that deity. The connection between
religion and fear is investigated by Casirer who relies
on Bergson, whom he quotes approvingly, and who connects
the phenomenon of fear with the phenomenon of religious
adherence. This, not only in relation to the subject of
Totem in which man tricked nature while at the same time
communicating with the forces of nature, but also in the
belief of eternal life and communicating with ancestors,
whom, in their belief continue to exist even after they
have died. Fear of death was alleviated from man by relying
on the idea of a life after death, which belief was reinforced
by reliance on myths. There what was discussed was the connection
between special ceremonies connected with these mythological
figures and the overcoming of fear. Casirer also speaks
about the Dynamic Religion, which is driven by the forces
of attraction and the Static religion, which is powered
by various pressures. I suggest adding to this data, the
question, how and why religion came into being amongst men.
In Part 1 I elaborated upon it, but here I will deal with
it briefly. I spoke there of the Static Religion which predated
the Dynamic Religion. I described within that framework
primitive man seeking to protect himself from his fears
including his fear of death., his fears of forces that are
beyond his control and that derive their power from a transcendental
reality, and his communication, with the help of his vivid
imagination, with a thing or force which is also from a
transcendental reality, which force will come to his aid.
I also of the willingness of man to obey the commandments
of this force, which is superior to man and to his reality.
It is at this juncture that moral imperatives make their
appearance; they are superior to reality and to base interests.
In this way, rules of morality come into being, which are
superior to, stronger than and inimitable to any base interest,
and which impose duties (not rights) on man. Theistic laws
(laws which man assigns to any kind of deity) controlled
society's lifestyle in the religious era, which was an offshoot
of the primitive era (before there was organised religion
in the full sense of the word), and which ceased to affect
our lives the moment a civil religion came into effect.
The reigns of power have been handed to civil religion in
most Modern Day States, excluding those states which subject
themselves to any kind of Theistic Law, like Iran and Saudi
Arabia, who have subjected themselves to the rules of the
Islamic Religion as did the Ottoman Empire in its time.
An exception to this rule is Francist Spain, which is a
subject in and of itself, and where civil religion reigned
over a country whose state religion was Catholicism. As
a matter of principle then, civil religion does not disapprove
the existence of a Theistic religion within its borders,
neither does it automatically seek to disenfranchise Theistic
religions of their political status, nonetheless civil religion
does have a strong tendency to seek exclusivity in the political
realm. Civil religion as a concept is mentioned in the writings
of Rousseau which he associated with the religion that predominated
during the French Revolution, a time when the Catholic religion
lost its control over the day to day life of the state and
on the laws that had prevailed in France. One of the foreboding
indications of this "religious revolution" (the
crowning of civil religion over Catholicism) was the practice
introducing the Sabbath on the tenth day in place of the
seventh, as was the practice in Catholicism. (This innovation
was short-lived' but is useful as an indicator of the revolutionary
spirit which shows the French revolution, from an ideological
perspective, to be a "religious revolution") French
civil religion replaced belief in the Holy trinity into
belief in the civil triad "liberté, égalité
et fraternité." The civil religion fashioned
by the French Revolution believed itself from the start
(and to a great extent continues in this belief today) to
be superior to Theistic religion. In contrast, the American
civil religion according to the First Amendment to the American
Constitution, introduced two guiding principles meant to
co-exist despite the possibility that they partially contradict
each other: 1. Freedom of religious practice for all citizens.
2. Neutrality (non-interference) of the government in relation
to religions (i.e. Theistic religions as defined above).
This latter principle entrenched and encouraged the principle
of separation of state and religion.
