Table of Contents

Outline

1. The importance of this subject.
2. What is religion and what are the types of religion according to this definition for the purposes of this discussion? General overview according to the stages of development.
3. Religious institutions and Religious Rituals, their Essence and their Importance
4. Religious Wars, Civil Religion and its hardships
5. The hypocrisy of US civil religion in its manipulation of the justice system: A comparative study with France, Canada and Japan.
6. The National and International Aspect of Civil Religion: Will all followers of civil religions unite?
7. Particular Aspects of Theistic religions, each religion on its own and the degree of mutual co-operation.
8. A Survey of Publications that deal directly with Civil Religion
9. Perspectives as to the essence of the State: as a Jewish State or as or a State of all its citizens as shown by the actions of the Israeli Government Authorities.
10. The contrast between associating oneself with Israeli "civil religion" and a worldview that sees Israel as a Jewish State.
11. Relevant Judicial policy in Israel.
12. Summary: The possible and desired future.

Outline
In this article, that which will be studied, is how the structural maladies and wide ranging activism of the Israeli Supreme Court has turned it into a submissive tool by those elements who seek to create a new nation in Israel, neither Arab nor Jewish, but Israeli. This nation is in the process of consolidating itself, a process of severing itself from both the Jewish and Arab Diaspora, a nation that merges Jew and Arab together to form one homogenous whole. This nation establishes a new religion, calling itself “Israeli Civil Religion”. The State of Israel undergoes this process while in the opposite direction a process of disengagement takes place between Jews and Arabs in Israel, as was demonstrated in the previous part of this book. The ambivalence of these trends is not only a phenomenon characterising the life of the individual and wrenching his soul, but also has the ability to wrench human society, causing inner schisms and internal struggle. This article will not directly deal with this inner schism. This schism is not an easy subject; it can be dealt with at the fringes of another discussion. This subject is worthy of special consideration, separate and in-depth, which, in my opinion, should be done within a different framework. Here it may be noted that the trend of creating a new nation by eliminating ethnic and national attributions and by living within the framework of a shared state is a widespread phenomenon that has occurred in other countries.[1] The success of this process bodes an end to the vision of a Jewish State.

Here, n this article, that process as a general phenomenon will be reviewed, and the process in Israel will be viewed as a special phenomenon within the framework of the more general phenomenon together with a deeper understanding of human nature, the deep and compulsive reasons for the formation of religions, the processes of the formation of ethics, the essential difference between religious mores and between behaviour enacted for the sake of self interest alone, and the advantages of religious mores over a self interested lifestyle will be reviewed, as well as the built-in weaknesses of Western mores in the last one hundred years ranging from Kant to postmodernism, and the division of Contemporary religions into three types (Theistic Monotheistic religion from the Jewish school of thought, the Far Eastern religions form the Hindu school of thought, and Civil Religion).[2] While analysing these, diagnosing a civic society according to the educational structure that is in place will be studied from the perspective “tell me how the education is organised in the state and I will tell you which elements are dominant in the regime and which are barred from entering the halls of power in it.” Through analysing the school structure in the USA, it will be discovered how civil religion has reigned in the USA and how Theistic religion has been banned from the Halls of Justice there. Similarly, the review will include how Canada moved from the Covenant of the Protestant and Catholic Religions whose adherents shared power between them to a state in which the process of Americanisation whose connotations are the spreading of Canadian civil religion by the power holders, as a result of the changes in the Canadian educational system. It will be seen that the situation in Israel is exactly the same because of the parallels between the different school networks of ‘governmental’, ‘religious governmental’, ‘Independent’, ’El-Hamayan’ ‘Arab-governmental’ on the one hand and the Zionist parties, the NRP, Agudath-Israel, 'Shas' and the Arab parties on the other.

These are just a number of the topics that will be raised in the course of analysing and proving these things, but the full picture will only be seen in the continuation, where the discussion unfolds, in all its length and details, as will be done now.

1. The importance of this subject
In 1999 half a million religious and ultra-Orthodox Jews demonstrated against the decisions of the Supreme Court. No speeches were made during the demonstration, rather chapters of psalms were chanted after which the crowd dispersed peacefully. This was a quiet but very powerful protest in which a tenth of Israel’s Jewish population participated, including children, the ailing and the aged. From the perspective of the percentage of Israel’s Jews participating in this demonstration, the numbers are impressive, generally speaking for any demonstration, but especially taking into account the fact that only one other demonstration in Israel was larger. The religious demonstrators’ main charge was that whenever the public were divided in a debate between the religious and irreligious population, the Supreme Court’ interfered on the side of the irreligious. They judged in their favour, and adopted an ideological standpoint in line with one of the sides in Israeli politics. There were also complaints from the religious side about the composition of the Supreme Court, which was composed of those representing the secular-liberal stance, whose influence on decisions involving Jewish religious values tended to be negative.

A counter-demonstration in support of the Supreme Court was set up opposite this demonstration, numbering 50,000 people, the majority of whom were irreligious, but it was a demonstration organised by the established organisations of the state.

The question may be asked: Is this not one of the signs of a religious war waiting to erupt? An additional and separate question may also be raised: Doesn’t the Israeli Supreme Court and its supporters comprise one type of political unit, and the ultra-Orthodox (Chareidi) another?

In the context of these questions, it seems appropriate to analyse the issue of ‘civil religion’ from a universal perspective while broadening our analysis when dealing with the Israeli-context. This analysis will enable us to shed some light on the issue.

Using as a backdrop the decisions of the Supreme Court on religious matters, as will become clearer in the course of this discussion[3], an important and honest question can be asked by those who see themselves as critics of the Supreme Court. This question is multifaceted and can be formulated thus: Whom does the Israeli Supreme Court represent and whom does it serve? What role does it play within the ever-widening ideological and political split in Israel? Is the religious protest legitimate when it not only criticises a specific decision but rallies against the political legitimacy of the Supreme Court in its present composition and world view that it embodies? Is there any basis to the claim that today’s Supreme Court acts as a political player?

The discussion on civil religion in Israel and in the Supreme Court will raise questions, from a broader perspective, similar questions, i.e.: To what extent is this Supreme Court a government institution that serves the aims of civil religion? An institution that tries to realisthe goal of impocivil religion as law in the State of Israel and to turn Israel into a “State of all its citizens” nullifying any of Israel’s inherent centrality to the basic interests of the Jewish People? To what extent does the court make it difficult for those whose lifestyles and voluntary organisations are intimately connected to the Jewish religion? To what extent does the court play a role as a political rival (willingly or inadvertently) to those who continue today to support Israel as the Jewish State?

Further on it will become clearer that the religious-ultra-Orthodox demonstration reflects a real problem that does not solely affect the ultra-Orthodox (Chareidi) community. It is a problem that goes to the heart of our discussion.

2. What is religion and what are the types of religion according to this definition for the purposes of this discussion? General overview according to the stages of development.

For the purposes of this discussion religion will be defined as “the framework of beliefs and social behaviours built on the belief in a thing that is impossible to prove, an ideological and organisational framework, that has its own rituals, and which usually has its own institutions.” In the course of analysing the evidence it will become clear to what extent this definition stands up to reality.

From the beginning of the existence of humankind, man has acted as a social creature; he has managed social organisations that are run in accordance with the rules of social behaviour. In order to counteract the insecurities that surround him and the lack of knowing what the forces of nature have in store for him, what unforeseeably great dangers lurk before him, man strengthened his spirit in the powers of his imagination, which provided him with justification for setting up rules that he constructed in his mind and that he sought to harness in order to help him. It was this setting that produced inter alia, for example, the Totem institution; this according to research gathered in Australia, Africa, America, South East Asia and other places that studied primitive societies, which research was conducted using scientific surveys combined with the teachings of Sigmund Freud and Durkheim.[4] It seems that what is discussed there is a wholly universal phenomenon in the origins of human nature. There is only one kind of human temperament, which invariable to man's the cultural setting or timeframe. Human nature acts within a universal phenomenon. This universality expresses itself inter alia in the following: (1) The prohibition of sexual intercourse and mating between a son and his mother, between brother and sister, though this prohibition does not extend to the father-daughter relationship (2) The prohibition of a son harming his father (3) Tribal affiliation obligating mutual aid between a man and his maternal relatives, but not his paternal relatives. Thus even if a man lived in the same place where a group of his father’s relatives dwelt, he is under no obligation to give them aid. At the same time he is obligated to help his mother’s family, even if they live far away from him. All these rules applied universally on all the continents and faraway lands where there was no contact between their respective human inhabitants since they lived under primitive conditions. For the sake of comparison- a Jew establishes his race through his mother- not through his father. What Freud does, is to explain how this uniform prototype of human lifestyle came into being amongst people who had no means of communicating with one another. Even if it were said that all primitive tribes originate from one progenitor or from a pair of progenitors, the question may still be asked as to the source of this prototypical lifestyle. This prototype was ingrained in man through his different tribes (or through the progenitor couple as the source of all the tribes- according to Freud’s understanding) in such a strong fashion until it took hold of man and determined his modes of behaviour right until contemporary times. In the words of Freud, this prototype exists today not only among savage and primitive tribes, but also amongst us, the bearers of modern culture. It therefore seems that what was said previously is correct, that the general common traits shared by all cultures and during all periods of time is connected to human nature and for the purposes of analogy, are “programmed” into man from the beginning of his existence.

It needs to be added that according to Freud’s analysis these mental prototypes that he speaks of, are not the only prototypes that are ingrained in man (as in Darwin’s approach) or that were ingrained in man (as in the traditional religious approach)Man is ingrained with other tendencies:

i. The inclination to help the weak by virtue of them being part of the human race.

ii. Thoughtful curiosity based not merely on physical feelings but also, and primarily on human reasoning.

iii. A human tendency to generalise personal matters.

iv. Constant wavering of man between “good” and “evil” as a basis for establishing his social behaviour. This wavering caused philosophers, moralists and religious sages to interminably argue the question whether man’s inclination is inherently good, or whether by nature man is evil. This last-mentioned dilemma found expression in the book of Genesis where it speaks of man choosing between good and evil.

This complex mental configuration of man led to the Totem institution, as it led him to other rules of behaviour connected with Totem. These components together with Totem are the progenitors of Theistic religion, that which is centred on the belief in any deity (and in our concept of belief, included for this purpose of our discussion the concept of idolatry). Religion is the most organised and sophisticated form of the Totem institution- and it should be added-the Totem institution predates the institution of idol worship, from which Theistic religion originated. (Theistic is used in the broadest sense of the word). It is patently obvious that as a result of the Totem institution and from the trends and rules of behaviour connected with Totem a social lifestyle was formed, which today has been formalised in the modern state. As will be demonstrated later on, civil religion was a later development of this process. Within the framework of the development of these social rules it is possible to encounter early on societies that lived according to moral values and Theistic statutes-morals and laws that are affiliated with all types of deities and with any ordinances that were received from that deity.

The connection between religion and fear is investigated by Casirer[5] who relies on Bergson,[6] whom he quotes approvingly, and who connects the phenomenon of fear with the phenomenon of religious adherence. This, not only in relation to the subject of Totem in which man tricked nature while at the same time communicating with the forces of nature, but also in the belief of eternal life and communicating with ancestors, whom, in their belief continue to exist even after they have died. Fear of death was alleviated from man by relying on the idea of a life after death, which belief was reinforced by reliance on myths. There what was discussed was the connection between special ceremonies connected with these mythological figures and the overcoming of fear. Casirer also speaks about the Dynamic Religion, which is driven by the forces of attraction and the Static religion, which is powered by various pressures. I suggest adding to this data, the question, how and why religion came into being amongst men. In Part 1 I elaborated upon it, but here I will deal with it briefly. I spoke there of the Static Religion which predated the Dynamic Religion. I described within that framework primitive man seeking to protect himself from his fears including his fear of death., his fears of forces that are beyond his control and that derive their power from a transcendental reality, and his communication, with the help of his vivid imagination, with a thing or force which is also from a transcendental reality, which force will come to hisaid. I also of the willingness of man to obey the commandments of this force, which is superior to man and to his reality. It is at this juncture that moral imperatives make their appearance; they are superior to reality and to base interests. In this way, rules of morality come into being, which are superior to, stronger than and inimitable to any base interest, and which impose duties (not rights) on man.

Theistic laws (laws which man assigns to any kind of deity) controlled society’s lifestyle in the religious era, which was an offshoot of the primitive era (before there was organised religion in the full sense of the word), and which ceased to affect our lives the moment a civil religion came into effect. The reigns of power have been handed to civil religion in most Modern Day States, excluding those states which subject themselves to any kind of Theistic Law, like Iran and Saudi Arabia, who have subjected themselves to the rules of the Islamic Religion as did the Ottoman Empire in its time.[7] An exception to this rule is Francist Spain, which is a subject in and of itself, and where civil religion reigned over a country whose state religion was Catholicism. As a matter of principle then, civil religion does not disapprove the existence of a Theistic religion within its borders, neither does it automatically seek to disenfranchise Theistic religions of their political status, nonetheless civil religion does have a strong tendency to seek exclusivity in the political realm.[8]

Civil religion as a concept is mentioned in the writings of Rousseau which he associated with the religion that predominated during the French Revolution, a time when the Catholic religion lost its control over the day to day life of the state and on the laws that had prevailed in France. One of the foreboding indications of this “religious revolution” (the crowning of civil religion over Catholicism) was the practice introducing the Sabbath on the tenth day in place of the seventh, as was the practice in Catholicism. (This innovation was short-lived’ but is useful as an indicator of the revolutionary spirit which shows the French revolution, from an ideological perspective, to be a “religious revolution”) French civil religion replaced belief in the Holy trinity into belief in the civil triad “liberté, égalité et fraternité.” [9]

The civil religion fashioned by the French Revolution believed itself from the start (and to a great extent continues in this belief today) to be superior to Theistic religion. In contrast, the American civil religion according to the First Amendment to the American Constitution, introduced two guiding principles meant to co-exist despite the possibility that they partially contradict each other:

i. Freedom of religious practice for all citizens

ii. Neutrality (non-interference) of the government in relation to religions (i.e. Theistic religions as defined above). [10]

This latter principle entrenched and encouraged the principle of separation of state and religion.

3. Religious institutions and Religious Rituals, their Essence and their Importance

Religious and pseudo-religious ceremonies and rituals that centre on Totem, from the primitive era- even before organised religion came on the scene- strengthened the spiritual and mental faculties of man as did too the very idea of forming a society. As society and its constituent individuals progressed to higher standards of culture, its lifestyle and rituals become better organised which resulting in a more fixed religious regimen. As will be seen further on, man is unable to live a life of security and inner strength without religion, including civil religion. Emanuel Kant’s crusade against Theistic religion could have come about as a result of his dismay with this religion because of his youthful disgust of having religious ceremonies and prayers forced down his throat.[11] It is logical to assume that many others like him underwent similar experiences in their attitude toward the Christian religion of their day. Nonetheless, the wider community only accepted Kant’s moral theories because of Darwin’s scientific discoveries that refuted the Judeo-Christian version of creation.[12] There was a need for a strong and alternative anchor with which one could substitute the moral anchor that kept the Christian religion in place and which held sway over the lifestyles of the European nations. This new anchor was provided by the scientific branch (especially Darwin’s theory) as well as civil religion per Rousseau. In France deep hatred for the Church which was seen as an ally to the monarchy was an additional factor in adding weight to this new anchor. For the ramifications of this look at the Soviet Communist regime (excluding Poland) as an example, it also forbade or generally limited Theistic religious ritual, in order to remove any competing and dangerous, in its assessment, political powerbase.[13]

In France the rebellion against Theistic-Christian –Catholic religion expressed itself in a number of practical innovations, including the enactment of civil marriages, the seizure of Church property and the establishment of a 10-day workweek.[14] But what of the institutional void left by the removal of the church’s role as lifestyle regulator as well as the diminishing centrality of the church based organisations and activities, which once controlled organised life of the State? It was Civil Religion then that filled this void.

It is probably correct to assume that in this new regime the wedding ceremony would have been conducted by a state appointed marriage officer rather than a church ordained priest. The institution of marriage was conducted under the auspices of a government ministry connected to the civil religion, since the state government was the civil religion and the state was fully “in possession of” the civil religion. A similar changeover occurred with regard to religious law, whereas previously each law had to be approved by the papacy, which was then the legislative body of the state, the French National Assembly now became the organ of civil religion. Through this lens and by describing in detail the functionaries and institutions that ran political life – it is possible to view the state institutions, one by one as institutions of the civil religion.[15] That French national patriotism replaced religious faith is as an axiom that is impossible to prove but which every Frenchman believed in.[16] The French example became a paradigm for modern day Western countries as well as for most of the modern world.[17] Therefore, and owing to this fact, France turned the Church- run religious courts into obsolete institutions, which were replaced by State courts, and not just as representatives of the state governors but also as representatives of civil religion, whose precepts were the only ones acceptable in the halls of justice. This was the only way the authorities could ensure that Catholicism loses its hold on the French way of life. It was this process that similarly developed in the American version and in its different metamorphoses applied partially to a good number of other countries. The new hallowed slogan was separation of State and Religion. State organized (civilly religious) military parades became the ritual to replace religious processions, even if they did not manage to completely rid themselves of these religious processions. Sports games generally, and international sport fixtures in particular encouraged the ritual in which the modern socialized individual viewed his national team’s victory as his own. Educational institutions affiliated to the state became institutions that educated the young generation in the nationalist patriotic spirit encouraging loyalty to the state and its values- i.e. the values of civil religion. In this way the modern state education system, to the extent that it was run by the state, was turned into a religious institution, an instrument of civil religion. Independence Day or Bastille Day became ritualized by civil religion and given legitimacy politically by state administrators. Nevertheless it must be said that the above-described phenomenon symbolizes theimportof rituals to man, even in the Modern Era. It bears repeating that the tendency of man to fortify himself from situations of uncertainty (and these situations have been present from the beginning of the creation of the human race until our days) leads him to lean on religion- in all its forms-including civil religion. Testimony to the negative effects of civil religion may be found in fascist and authoritarian regimes that sprouted from civil religion, and which aided in changing the regime’s façade into that of a monster’s. Nationality and nationalism are stark expressions of civil religion. Cosmopolitanism- including the international communist, as well as multinational religions as seen in Radical Islam[18]- is the enemy of civil religion, since it subjugates man to a faith and an alternative loyalty which clashes with civil religion, which is a national religion, as will be elucidated later.

4. Religious Wars, Civil Religion and its hardships
The French Revolution, then, was among other things, also a religious war. The concept “war” from a more esoteric perspective, from the perspective of religious faith, is a much wider concept than the physical concept “war”, which describes a blood soaked armed struggle fought between two states. Nowadays war has become ever more sophisticated in all its forms and in every context, so that the concept of “war” has undergone a metamorphosis. In the field of international relations, in the last decades, the experts spoke of a “cold war” between countries joined to NATO and those affiliated with the Warsaw Pact, a war in which the militaries’ possession of weapons of mass destruction was decisive, even though neither side made any use of them, they were “static”. No shot was ever fired. Satellite surveillance and spy rings were the most active elements. Already at the time of British Imperialism, the term “imperialism” was expanded, and whereas before it was synonymous with the expansion of sovereignty over land conquered by military force, Prime Minister Disraeli viewed British imperialism as the extension of the Empire’s influence beyond areas under its political and military jurisdiction.[19] Nowadays they are referred to as “economic wars” as opposed to “economic treaties”. In the same vein when referring to the issue of “religious wars” it does not necessarily imply a war accompanied by bloodshed.[20] Religious wars are taking place in our days as they have been in the past, every day and every hour. And when at war one needs to act the part. The concept “with good advice conduct war,”[21] whose source is found in the book of religious insight, applies also to our situation of religious wars. A common strategy is the dissemination of misinformation and denial. It is possible to make gains in a war without even acknowledging that a war is taking place. It is possible to set up religious institutions without actually admitting that they are in fact institutions spreading religion. It is possible to set up institutions for the advancement of a certain sector in society while oppressing a different sector and simultaneously claiming that it was performed for the good of the whole. It is proposed that in this spirit the American Constitution be investigated as to what it has to say about religious affairs and how this is actually applied in the everyday American life. This investigation will not accept everything that is declared as the irrefutable truth. It will be seen whether it is not only the message of liberty and freedom that is spread by the Constitution, but also a declaration of war against any successful (Theistic) religious influence in the political arena by relegating such influence to the churches and other marginal institutions. Perhaps it is the message of war that is being spread by the constitution. In this way Theistic religious influence is minimised and their political freedoms are put down.

Suppressing Theistic religions in the USA follows a basic American interest.[22] Individuals of different faiths, who also were from different national ethnic backgrounds, founded this Federal political entity. The declared goal in forming this new entity was to strengthen its inhabitants by forging a new nation. Emphasising the difference amongst Americans themselves, in the context of their different religious and ethnic backgrounds was bound to endanger the formation of one grand nation. The drafters of the Constitution, then, cannot be condemned when they made the amendments; neither if they consciously intended to unite the People, and nor even if unity was not the stated purpose but rather to put a distance between (Theistic) religion and politics. Nevertheless it should be remembered that the Israeli example, which will be discussed below, is diametrically opposed to the American model. Here one People is discussed, the Jewish People, which was in exile dispersed around the globe for 1900 years, and which then regrouped and returned to their original land. In the Israeli case, of a Jewish State, the Jewish religion is not a dividing factor, but its polar opposite. Religion has a very unifying aspect to it. Without religion, the forces of separation would be on the rise, especially taking into account the fact that Jews dwelt in very different cultural milieu. How does the Jew coming from Yemen bond with the Jew coming from Romania? It is in this case scenario that Theistic religion (Judaism) alone plays the role of unifier.

At this stage it would be fitting to define what exactly constitutes civil religion. It seems improper to broaden the concept of civil religion into the same universal cosmopolitan terms, as usually defines Theistic religions. Theistic religions generally (with the notable exception of the Jewish religion) are not confined (by their definition and by their essence) to one entity, country or political society. Why, then is there a need to confine the structure of civil religion to one kind of political society? Why do we not claim it to be based on the same principles as democracy, for instance, so that this ungodly religion can be viewed at universally? This last-mentioned possibility is in fact the view of Charles Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehhiya.[23] This broad definition should be rejected. There are three reasons for this- semantics, internal substantial factors and external substantial factors.

Semantic reason: “Civil religion” is closely related to the word “citizenship.” A citizen (or civilian) is such by virtue of his being a citizen of a specific country. There is (still) no legal concept of a “citizen of the world.” Though in legal and political literature “citizen’s rights” are oft though of as part of the greater concept of “human rights”, and this theme continues to develop in the definition of universal man- that is to say- every citizen in every state possesses according to Natural Law and according to the law of Nations, the same rights, even if they rights stem from the very fact that he is a citizen of that country. Notwithstanding, when a citizen of a specific country invokes his citizen’s rights, the address for doing so is the authorities of that country. When a citizen is charged with fulfilling his duties as a citizen, it is the state of which he is a citizen that has sole jurisdiction to make such a demand and not any other international organ. The political authorities of his country (specific and concrete) are the only address for him.

Substantive Reasons from an external perspective: As civil religions developed- they developed in each and every country- the central focus for those practising the civil religion was the specific state and its symbols which were thought to have intrinsic value and not the broader idea of building states, nor the humane idea behind the functioning of a state in general.

It is true: the idea of civil religion stemmed from a general idea, the fruits of Rousseau’s philosophical toil whose author did not intend to aim his words at the French alone. The political philosophy behind civil religion is a very broad idea, aimed at humanity in general unrestricted by geographical boundaries. Yet this idea was me to rules and principles. Architects, the world over, learn the principles of technical drawing, as well as the general rules of engineering. These principles and acquired knowledge are common to architects around the world. However the structure that is eventually built in line with these principles is a concrete structure, belonging to one very specific place. The building suits this one place and does not simultaneously feature in any other place. Every structure has its place, every building its special community destined for it, who in turn put it to local use as they see fit. Every structure has its own building laws that apply to it. So too is the case with civil religion. Every civil religion comes to regulate the relationship and loyalties that are very specific between the state and its citizens. Every state has its specific citizens’ community attached to it. It is possible that the relationship that exists in France between the state and its citizens is used as a role model in Senegal, Africa who copied the “model” of Civil Religion, French style. Yet the loyalties of the Senegalese citizens will be directed toward Senegal, not France. Their focus of loyalty will be exclusive. It is on this basis that the Senegalese civil religion is able to create a focal point for the special spiritual and emotional ties between the citizens of Senegal and their country. This focal point of loyalties competes with other foci of loyalties and emotion that are and were present amongst these citizens-whether it be between them (or a part of them) and a kind of idolatry, Catholicism, tribal affiliation, ideology (Communist or democratic) and similar ties of loyalties and emotions. It is very likely that the same Senegalese citizen will remain a Catholic, a tribal member and be waving the flag of democracy and the like. It is also possible that the Senegalese authorities will not prohibit these things and may even encourage them. It is also likely that conflict of interests will not exist. The whole problem of conflicts is a subject in and of itself that deserves separate discussion. But for the purposes of defining “civil religion” it should be noted that it relates to a specific country’s society, and therefore there is no such thing as an “international civil religion” but every civil religion in each and every country must be treated separately. So far the substantive aspects from an external perspective have been dealt with.

Now the substantive reasons from an internal perspective will be discussed.

Looking at it internally means looking at the internal mechanisms of religion, each country’s underlying reasons and intentions. The difference between internal and external aspects is similar to the difference between internal and external functions of a motor car. To the question why a motor car is a land vehicle unsuitable for air or sea travel, it is possible to answer on two levels. Speaking on the level of its external features it can be said that that the motorcar does not have any wings, is not lightweight and is not hermetically sealed and therefore it is impossible to fly in it or to use it to sail on water. Speaking on the level of its internal features it can be said that that the motorcar was not designed with wings, nor was it made lightweight and was not planned to be hermetically sealed since its manufacturers were looking to provide a solution for those consumers seeking land transportation exclusively. Had they been asked to provide something suitable for air travel or sea navigation they would have built it differently and then in addition to it transporting people across land it would also be able to transport air and sea travellers.

Likewise the answers will change when speaking of civil religion, only they will be much more complex than the motorcar example. As was described in section 2 above, the motivations for forming a religion (and before that Totem) lies in the fears that humans experience, the emotions and insecurities that he feels and the impossibility of dealing with these problems by tangible means alone. Because of his nature and makeup, and owing to his limited depth of understanding, man feels that there are things that exist beyond the reality that he can grasp with his physical senses, things that he will never be able to fully solve. Since it is human nature for man to use his powers of imagination he can create an imaginary world, an unreal world, and to cling to these imaginary things so that they serve as an aid for him. This idea is present in the Jewish Prayer books. Anyone who glances at the actual prayers that Jews recite will find requests for help, expressions of faith in redemption, care for the aching soul and healing for man’s soul. Everything is directed at the G-d of Israel, who that same Jew never sees with his human eyes, but the results of his supplications he knows well. It is not by chance that Jews are found praying to the Lord. It is not coincidence but an internal need, which internal need flows from internal motivations described above.

This need does not disappear the moment a Jew loses faith in the existence of a Master of the Universe. The need still persists in him, and therefore this same Jew needs to find an alternative to his G-d. This alternative might be offered to him by his state, the State of Israel. This is not to point to the physical state, or its delegated officials: the IDF, the police, the courts, the ministers, and the members of Parliament: they do not enable him to discover spheres beyond his reality, transcendental spheres. Nonetheless the State of Israel remains the focal point of his identity with the idea and the concept of ultimate loyalty, the recipient of his desire to help, as if it were something hallowed, as a vision which has a message attached to it, as something just, as an expression of solidarity with the state’s citizens, as something for which soldiers sacrifice their lives, something which will never pass from this world and will not be nullified, something which belongs to that Jew and many like him uniting everyone into one body where his friends feel the same feelings towards national holidays, where everyone in the state celebrates those things that the state has hallowed, a uniting factor, a spiritual factor- the special spirit that flows from this state, lifting up the spirit of the state’s citizens so that the latter are prepared to give above and beyond their legal obligations that have been enacted in State Laws. At this point what emerges is the concept of the “intrinsic citizen” and the “intrinsic people” that was analysed in depth in my book on the Jewish State.[24]

Therefore, as a result of fear and out of a desire to free oneself from it and because it is the state that provides its citizens these with these intangible ways out, man must inevitably lose his faith in his G-d in order to establish this civil religion. Had civil religion not existed man would urgently need to invent it.

Since the entity to which the civil religious practitioner relates is his specific state, there cannot be an international or supranational civil religion. There can only be each country’s specific brand of civil religion.

Going back to the American example and to its brand of civil religion, defensive things will certainly be sounded off about American civil religion and about its attitude towards Theistic religions. At a scientific symposium, snippets of which will be presented later, things of this nature were said, regarding the attitude towards minority groups within the Anglo-American legal tradition.[25] This was at a seminar that centred on the opening and closing statements of Professor Aviam Sofer with the added participation of Professors Alan Aids, Milner S. Bull, Carol Weisbrod, and Sir Geoffrey Palmer, the last-mentioned being the former longstanding Prime Minister of New Zealand. Sofer noted the abandonment, by today’s American Supreme Court, of its protections over minorities, which it had previously enforced prior to its present tenure. In his reply to harsh criticism sounded off by Aides, Sofer prefaced his defensremarks abthe American Supreme Court and his claim that the Supreme Court does in fact protect minorities, including religious minorities as follows: “Have faith in the secular religion.” In his view, so it would seem protection over minority groups and over Theistic religions is a central tenet of the American secular religion and of the beliefs which this religion upholds.[26] It seems from his words, even if he does not express them in such a way, that the principles of the American secular religion are one and the same with those of the American Constitution, and that this secular religion is not especially anti Theistic religions rather it acts in defence of its majority, lest this majority be discriminated against by these other religions.

Weisbrod, one of the seminar’s participants, describes modern American society as a society in which the individual can create his environment at will. Included in this is the individual’s family status (as is expressed in the possibility of divorce or adoption) determined by the individual concerned. The Court does not interest itself in merely investigating the legal status or jurisdiction of this or that, it rather deals with judicial discretion which is the formation of a new social reality in the United States. This it does through judicial fiat and through the creation of a new (judicial) lexicon. As to the repeal of laws by judicial censure, as Sofer remarks, the question- according to Weisbrod- is complex and conflict ridden- since it is just as important to protect the minority from the majority as it is to protect the majority’s fundamental principles which are at times impaired by the minority. An example of this latter protection is when a minority group discriminates in its membership requirements on grounds of gender.

Palmer, another participant of this seminar, relates his New Zealand experiences. In New Zealand there is no judicial discretion. He argues that the only way to protect minorities as has been shown in New Zealand in its attitude towards its Maori minority which makes up 12% of the population, is through the court system which works very well in New Zealand, even if the judges do not have judicial discretion which is not practised there. He gives examples showing how the courts avoid basing their decision on judicial discretion both in New Zealand and in Britain where the legislature are encouraged to enact legislation safeguarding minority rights. He argues further that the American system of judicial discretion hampers the legislature in taking steps to protect minorities. He also sees a link [from both directions of the scales- upwards and downwards- Y.C.] between judge made law that uproots a parliamentary initiative and a parliamentary initiative that renders judicial legislation superfluous. From what he says, it appears that the secular religions in Britain and New Zealand are no worse off in their protections of minorities than is the American system (which Sofer has qualms against, especially when he reports about the changes in approach recently adopted by the US Supreme Court). He (Palmer) argues that there are two possible bodies safeguarding minorities, the courts and the electorate, and the courts are not the sole defenders of minority rights. The courts, for their part, have two options open to them, the first does not include judicial discretion, and the second does. As to the system that prevails in Britain and New Zealand (no judicial discretion) Palmer explains that they act in accordance with the rule of law. The rule of law in turn is a strong supporter of the both minority- and human rights.

Weisbrod’s words, mentioned above, it should be noted, echoed those of one of today’s most important thinkers in political philosophy, Richard Rorty, who presents the battle between American civil religion and Theistic religion , as will be demonstrated below, as one fought at all costs, and one which goes against any grain of logic. In this way he exemplifies the extent to which this war waged by American civil religion against Theistic religion is fought out of obstinacy and desperation. Rorty, in the footsteps of Kant and Nietzsche continues this war of civil religion against Theistic religion in the ideological plane. If Theistic religion used G-d’s words to act as the criteria for human behaviour, Kant and Nietzsche together with Rorty come to free man and society from Theistic religion, as will be elaborated upon below.

Rorty speaks of human language as forming reality. This he argues accords with Nietzsche’s view that it is within man’s powers to create for himself his own image, his environment and even his world. Rorty relates this power to language, and does not accept that a language is merely a means of expression or form of communication. Rorty bases his views on the argument that one cannot search for objective truth and that subjectivity is no more inferior to absolute objectivity. Going even further along this line of thought he argues that there is no such thing as objective or absolute. He argues that men invent truth, they do not reveal it. Truth is only relative and depends upon man’s inventive powers, whether in the scientific field, in the artistic world, or issues dealing with morality and social behaviour. In matters of truth he makes no distinction between science (which quite clearly discusses what is truth) and art and morality [and as I have remarked concerning Rorty- when relating to art and morality Rorty does a disservice when illogically connecting it to truth, since art is a matter of aesthetics and emotions while morality is a value judgement of social behaviour, mixed with aspects of emotion and logic- Y.C.] Rorty[27] does not offer a logical explanation for his stated position. He does not explain why the objective approach needs to be rejected. The only justification he provides is that the liberal behavioural values have furthered the causes of those ascribing to liberal society. This is the reasoning he employs when giving preference to liberal positions over national ones (the latter of which he describes using radical Nazi imagery in presenting it to his liberal readers) and over religious standpoints (which are those that were used in religious wars). Rorty debates with Michel Sandal, a person who, although liberal, preferred (like those holding religious or national views) the objective approach as truthful to the subjective approach held dear by Rorty. Since there is common ground between Sandal and those holding religious or national views, that objectivity must come up trumps against relative truth, Rorty combines all three approaches into one, presenting them all as Nazis or religious warriors (i.e. disgraceful in the eyes of his liberal readers). In this way, by confusing different standpoints, by meshing natural science together with arts and human mores, he explains why he favours the liberal approach of relative truth over any other viewpoint that supports objectivity. Thus, Rorty prefers liberal values and language to any other approach, with the reasoning that they are better and more appropriate for liberal society. He makes the case that what is good for man or society is also the truth for them. In this way he identifies truth with interest. Whatever serves me is the truth.

What links Rorty’s outlook with that of Weisbrod’s is a whole moral perspective that bases itself on the interests and on the “good” of the society that they describe. This is a view which hooks up well with Kant, who, although believing in and favouring objectivity while discarding the personal interests and biases of man, nonetheless placed man at the centre, because of man’s pure consciousness and his ability to create objective truth through this faculty.[28] Kant’s innovation sought to replace the religious and naturalist notions that both centred on something superior to man. They placed before man the challenge of reaching a higher plane, an ambition to improve oneself. The challenge of self-improvement does not stem from utilitarianism or from a chief desire to better man’s predicament, as is the objective of Western cthat was headed by Kant.

Instead of man upholding the tenets of natural- or any kind of religious morality, he lifts his eyes heavenward searching for truth, the attribute of objectivity, which (from his perspective) is the Supreme Being. Thus, the liberal man according to Rorty (like the reasonable man in Kantian thought) becomes (in his own eyes) the replacement for G-d. That is why Weisbrod puts the liberal community’s interests and guiding principles on a holy pedestal. This line of thinking arises from her supposedly balanced thinking, which is informed by the interests of the community she represents. She will only consider the interests of the minority as long as they do not clash with the interests and principles of the majority.

Therefore, Sofer’s qualm with the US Supreme Court’s present composition is not based on principle, but deals with the factual question: Do Theistic religions harm the cornerstones of American civil religion? It is a debate that is conducted within the confines of the liberal community and relates to the role civil religion’s interests play. The supremacy of civil religion over Theistic religions is never in question.

Another position, more methodical, and also more explicit, pertaining to America’s religious war, can be seen in the theory of John Dewey. This theory exemplifies the hardening of positions in the political wars (in the area of governmental influence) waged by American civil religion against Theistic religions, over American national interests. This war is fought while showing a modicum of respect towards theistic religions. Most Americans, in addition to being practitioners of American civil religion are also affiliated with theistic religious communities. The religious belief in a Deity- as a central theme- regardless of the theistic religion- is entrenched in the United States more than in almost any other country.

During the 1950s Dewey developed a moral code that disposed of religion and its absolute values both which predominated during the era just prior to modern science’s appearance (hereafter “the pre-scientific era”), and which had guided social behaviour (morality). His system introduced in their place a stable and controlled resource, trustworthy and safe, through which norms and mores would be eked out, ensuring that religion’s status (Theistic) as spiritual guide would come to an end- either directly (through the cessation of religious commandments) or indirectly (through it no longer being a reference for moral values.)

His most fundamental writings on this topic are found in Reconstruction in Philosophy, published in 1920. A second edition was released in 1948 and by 1950, two years before Dewey passed away, The New American Library of World Literature Inc. republished his book with an expanded introduction wherein Dewey explains his core ideas.[29] It is possible to find in this introduction Dewey’s last will and testament and an overall summary of his lifework.

Dewey’s contribution to his generation's notions of morality cannot be underestimated, and even today his theory remains important. Dewey engraved his signature on American causes for more than sixty years, and his sphere of influence spread beyond the confines of American soil. Contemporary post-modernist thinking can also be considered entrenched in Dewey’s theory and flowing from it. Both schools of thought argue that just as science has proved that there are no unshakeable truths, and that everything is relative even in the exact sciences, human morality too must be relative.[30]

Dewey makes mention in his introduction about the doubts and wavering that have gnawed away at the notion of American morality,[31] and for the need then to destroy it and rebuild an American (and also western) morality. He admits the fact that those who believe in religious values and its trustworthy normative source (i.e. moral code) do not face any dilemmas. For the secular individual this dilemma is left unsolved so long as moral virtues rely upon the old morality, of the pre-scientific period.[32] He then proposes that by using science and his system, not as a supporter of the prevailing morality and not even to partially amend it but rather as a total alternative to the prevailing standard and as a resource from which a new and faithful moral code can be drawn. Dewey believed, even if he did not explicitly say so, that if he succeeded in his mission, civil religion, which already then had been adopted by the political regimes of western states would be cured of fault. This would in turn relegate the position of theistic religions (the first being Christianity), which continued to attract the lion’s share of adherents and which were the effective alternative for the ruling elite’s civil religion.[33]

Dewey attempts to structure his theory on logical analysis. He goes about doing this in stages, common to each is the fact that they are so completely ungrounded in logic, so that it has to be asked why so many thinkers were duped (and still are) into following him.[34] Dewey begins with the premise that morality and science are in fact very closely related. This he shows by the fact that both science and politics underwent revolutions in the last few centuries. He asserts that moral values are created by the human intellect (just as any scientific endeavour-Y.C.) but at the same time disagrees with Kant that this is the same as pure consciousness. Morality is empirical [as is science-Y.C.] and does not presume to contain absolute truth [like in modern science-Y.C.] Politics like science and industry dismiss the effect of old theories to assist in creating new ones. It is true that philosophy deals with the human condition, but it does not confine itself to this study. While humans interest themselves in science, the universe, reality, truth- things of permanence, unconstrained by time, that are eternal- it is philosophy [which also deals partly with morality] that is responsible for the development of the natural sciences. A situation then arises where it is not quite certain whether a certain subject is of a scientific nature or a philosophical one. Darwin’s theory then may be considered philosophy, since as a theory it does not have application to anything concrete, and by definition philosophy too does not relate to concrete facts. Works that are philosophical by nature and cannot fit under the rubric of science play an important role in facilitating the study of certain new disciplines.

Dewey explains that from these new disciplines “scientific” theories were formulated that philosophically challenged religious values and moral codes that were prevalent until then in Western Europe. In the past it was science that had led the war against religion, but those events that in the past were called wars were in fact fought by a science in the narrowest sense of the word. They ignored all the other lifestyle issues-- whose origin is in the world of science- including family status, the status of women and children,[35] education, the arts, political and economic relations –whether they originated then or whether they only affect modern life,

When relating to the “war” (in his opinion and by his definition) between religion and science that took place in the west, Dewey concludes that the war ended with an unfair compromise. State employment was divided into higher domains - issues of spirituality (which science surrendered) and lower physical domain that were handed over to science. This according to Dewey’s narrative represented the partition between materialism and spirituality. Whoever was forced to accept this partition soon realised that science rises above its assigned realm redrawing the boundaries between the physical and spiritual. This caused a feeling of disarray and insecurity, which in turn sparked off and continues to inflame feuds and emotions. While relating this worldview Dewey makes the claim that he does not want to express an opinion on which side is right. Nonetheless he agrees that there is disarray, insecurity and confusion, and in an attempt to diffuse these issues he proposes reconstructing the whole moracode network instead of the olstructure that is in place. Science will then come to his aid to supervise this simultaneous destruction and reconstruction. In this way, at least according to Dewey, science will repay to philosophy that which philosophy thus far had endowed it with.

In his telling description Dewey locates for us the formation of secularism. He says that the separation of powers between morality and the old religion, which continues to deal with the spiritual sphere, and science, which deals with more material matters, and which - aided by certain philosophical disciplines- crossed the boundaries in its criticism of religious supervision over spiritual matters, caused confusion. This whole episode brought about the phenomenon of secularism, which, because of its inherent bleak outlook on the future of humankind caused many to lose direction in life. Those able to look upon the old morality as absolutely rooted in firm ground [Dewey means by this, the religious person- Y.C.] are also able to resolve any of their doubts. Others however need to embark on a more intensive search in order to pave for themselves a new way. It is Dewey himself who can offer this new solution [for the secularists- Y.C.], one that is based on scientific empirical evidence, and one that would provide a new and wider foundation for morality than the one it has stood on prior to this discovery.

In addition to the last edition’s introduction by Dewey- the book’s body[36] details how it is that science can create a new moral code. He sees the construction of this endeavour having the same application as it has in other fields of scientific research. He opines that morality and ordinary scientific research share very similar characteristics. In his detailed analysis he enumerates certain shared features: the basis for investigation and discovery in both fields; experimentation through processes of elimination; axiomatic reasoning in logical thought; different laws and criteria for what qualifies as a springboard for arriving at a result, all these apply equally to the exact sciences as they do to morality. He also states that they share a common phenomenon; after analysing a certain matter they may conclude, on the one hand that they are bound by its findings, while realising on the other, that a past practice or long-held principle is no longer relevant. These common features according to Deweyan logic make it possible to draft a moral code in the same way as one would a scientific thesis, i.e. through theoretical and practical research. When speaking about democracy and the link between it and his system[37], he sees the role democracy plays in his new morality as creating an exclusively liberal climate. Within this climate, democratic regimes are vested with the authority and rights to institute and to choose political appointees to educate the masses to be more productive, to be more ambitious and to create wider room for manoeuvre. Within this newly created atmosphere Dewey’s system can be put to better use.[38] Dewey does not suggest that his new code of morality be based on democratic decisions. It is obvious why he does not recommend this, especially since he favours destroying the old and rebuilding anew. If he was to rely on designing a moral code of binding norms underwritten by the democratic process, it would be in conflict with his central idea of a new way. Since already by the time Dewey hit the scene there was nothing new about democracy- and Dewey wanted something completely innovative. Nevertheless by harbouring these reservations toward democratic decision making (though he professed to be a sworn democrat) Dewey weakened the foundations of his theory, as will be demonstrated below.

Viewed in its entirety, Dewey’s narrative portrays a known truth; those who do not feel bound by religiously ordained moral constraints-because of their secularism- are perplexed by the problem of defining for themselves a moral code. It is quite clear that Dewey’s solution is inappropriate for those who have a close connection to religion and as a result thereof feel compelled to fulfil their moral commitments, which historically are entrenched in their religion. It is quite evident from the analysis portrayed by Dewey that the chain of events that induced western society to undergo mental change went hand in hand with the widening impact that civil religion was to have on their collective mental consciousness.

In contradistinction- if morality by its very essence is not merely a matter of consciousness and intellectual comprehension- i.e. empirical, but rather a set of values and emotions, science- neither intrinsically valuable nor very moving - is unqualified to formulate ethical norms ab initio.

From reading Dewey’s words the question left begging is whether the logic of a scientist can substitute for a debate of values traditionally held between scholars of the humanities. What about the values that morality demands its adherents to live by? From where are these carved out? And if what is discussed has been empirically proven, is it possible or even proper to set moral rules based on an empirical statistical report on the social behaviour of a specific society, without even holding a debate on the values of that society? Without knowing how the weltaunshaung of the members of that society and of its thinkers determines the correct social behaviour? Dewey fails to explain how he can hope to make a connection between scientific research and value systems. What about the emotional aspect that plays such a large role in laying out the foundations for a moral system (whether as a positivist innovation within the framework of parliamentary institutions or as a means of communicating with G-d and of emotionally performing his commandments)? How are emotions measured in the Deweyan laboratory for moral research? What kind of remedy does dry scientific justice offer man’s soul and how will a body of cold scientific thought alleviate man from his depressions and fears? It should not be forgotten: morality was always intimately connected with religion, and religion always came to relieve man from his oppressed state. Just like man’s torment stemmed from an unreal place where logic has no meaning, so too morality, coming as it does from religion, always distanced itself from reality and from self interest. Science, in contradistinction, works within the bounds of reality, the tangible, existential interest (materialism).

An additional question begs to be asked, concerning the invalidation of the existing morality. The whole idea of absolutes that run at the core of morality is an Achilles heel to Dewey’s system. He himself admits that modern science does not support objective truth and so is forced to deduce that the morality that comes as an outgrowth of his scientific system will also not be objective and will be subject to amendment. If this is what Dewy is offering us (and indeed that is what he is offering) the question left begging is what good tidings has Dewy imparted? In what way is this new morality, relative and variable better than the old morality, whose source is G-d and faith in Him? What is the special message and advantage in the Deweyan system? Where does the system ultimately lead? Is the main purpose of the system to destroy existing systems, to rebuild them anew and then to destroy them once again when they become established so that an ongoing process of destruction is formed ensuring dynamic change?

The last question that emerges relates to Dewey’s take on civil-secular religion[39] and his war on theistic religion and call for the removal of theistic religion from the state’s administrative affairs. Dewey points out that his recommendations are there to help the secular population. If so, the question is why does Dewey relate to the American people, most of whom stand firm in their beliefs in G-d, as if they were a secular nation waiting and ready to wage war on theistic religion? And how is it that this nation accepted Dewey’s theory that was meant for a secular audience? Was it in the interests of American unity, which obligates allAmericans to display common purpose bpolitically severing themselves from any divisive factors like the various religious factors?

An answer- at least partial- to this question- can be found in Dewey’s system as it relates to the educational sphere. He promoted the idea of having an American public school system where all the students, no matter their religious or ethnic background would intermingle with one another, in order that they develop a common belief system. By preaching such co-existence he hoped that these students when they eventually enter adulthood would join together harmoniously in their pursuit of common happiness. The trend was, then, to turn the schools, which were religious- on the level that they had features that were common to all western religions- into schools that were predominantly secular. Although the trend had already started by the end of the nineteenth century and it continues until our day, in 1950 an attempt to stem the tide of secularism was quickly repealed by the Supreme Court. A brief episode[40] erupted in the 1950s and 1960s with a failed experiment of conducting Bible reading classes in the public school system following the Protestant custom. The court ruled against this custom rejecting the claim that Christianity was the law of the land in the USA. Previously they rejected an appeal to allow the promotion of a general faith in G-d, even though the appeal did not ask for the recognition of any specific theistic religion.[41] This approach of the American Supreme Court is a part of the trend to turn America into a country where religion will be totally crushed, because of its divisive effects toward internal American life. This is a trend that promotes secularisation. The trend to seal off theistic religion had its precedent in America more than a century before, when the public schools and most academic institutions promoted this action. This could only be done with the active promotion of Dewey’s ideological thought. If despite all, most Americans stubbornly attend church services; this is a sign of the vitality of theistic religions and the powerlessness of civil religion, although it does not mean that the latter has totally lost their way. Still at some level civil religion does contain transcendental elements, which bind Americans together offering them some type of spiritual solace.

Generally speaking it is true that the political trend of any country is reflected by what is relayed in primary and secondary schools. In Israel too schools reflect politics, which can be seen when comparing the educational institutions with the prevailing party/political ideology. American civil religion likewise fits into what has been said. From an historical perspective the same is true of Canada, a nation that originally based its formation on a theistically religious covenant, but has since developed a secular religion, similar to that of the older member of this sorority, the USA.

Contrary to what has been said by those favouring the American system of judicial discretion, the following needs to be stated. In the USA a limited war rages between civil religion and theistic religion- a war that has been confined specifically to the field of political influence, though, considering our cautionary note above, and looking at it from a long term historical angle, this limited war has much wider repercussions. Entering the debate as representative of civil religion is the US Supreme Court. Within the framework of legislative interpretation, the US Supreme Court goes out of its way to unnecessarily impose hardship on theistic religion via its decisions relating to the educational system.[42] It is possible to view this topic by comparing the situation with that of Canada. In Canada the ruling party has been associated with the interests of the Protestant majority in the federal parliament, interests that are in opposition to those of the Canadian Catholic minority, a minority which in the province of Quebec is actually a majority. It is possible to pinpoint the struggle between these two religions, which has turned a religious battle into a cultural and linguistic war involving in an intimate manner these two religions. In the Canadian experience, the French culture and language is taken up by the Canadian minority which is in fact a Quebecois majority, while the Anglo-American language and culture is taken up by Federal Canada’s majority and Quebec’s minority.

In the United States the situation is different. American justices conduct themselves as representatives of the American civil religion, which is not a Protestant-Catholic, battle, or vice versa. The American civil religion in the United States competes politically with all historically theistic religions, fighting against any hint of a connection between religion and the state government. Theistic religion in the USA may only be practised on condition that it confines itself to the church and synagogue. Accordingly the main practitioners of civil religion are the courts themselves particularly the US Supreme Court. The latter allows theistic religions to thrive on condition that it plays no role in the halls of power. In this capacity, the Supreme Court does not play the role of a judicial organisation concerned with all religions. Rather it represents the civil religion of the government, zealously fending off the political ascendancy of any other religion (theistic) to the extent that that religion is viewed as dangerous in its ability to exert any kind of political influence.[43]

In this spirit it is possible to understand the strange judgement in the Kirias Joel Satmar Chasidim case.[44] Here the justices showed no pity over thirty mentally disabled children whose special arrangement by the authorities to alleviate their suffering was discussed and struck down by the learned justices. The arrangement reached by the authorities had no other practical consequences yet it was criticised by the court and accordingly struck down. The Supreme Court Justices placed before them the hallowed principle of complete separation between religion (theistic) and state, and for reasons of demonstrating their longstanding ruling authority invalidated a humane and pragmatic solution. The American justices reached a similar decision when discussing raising the salary of Catholic schoolteachers in the Lemon case.[45] In contradistinction to these two cases the willingness of the justices to excuse the Indians[46] and Amish cult members[47] is rather striking. In both these last instances the justices saw no inkling of a threat over their authority or any seed of competition that would sprout in the future.

As to Canada, the religious issue relating to the Protestant and Catholic power struggle reared its head after cases involving legislative amendments to the Quebec Education Act and constitutional amendments to the Newfoundland educational system were decided in the Canadian courts.[48] These decisions reflect a struggle over control of power. This struggle was carried out there, unlike the USA, by politicians rather than by the courts. In Newfoundland there were two constitutional amendments which for obvious reasons were supported by both Houses of Assembly, the provincial and federal. These amendments were also supported by the Protestant majority both of the province- Newfoundland’s- and of Canada’s federal parliament, allowing them (the amendments) to be applied to the (provincial) constitutions. It should be clarified at this point that each of Canada’s Province’s constitutions requires the approval of both the Provincial House and Federal parliament for an amendment to be effected. In the province of Quebec its majority also requested amendments to the religious education system. But the situation in Quebec was different to that of Newfoundland: Quebec’s majority was Catholic and the amendments affected the rights of Protestants, while all along as mentioned above, the federal parliament was dominated by Protestants. Therefore the amendment in Quebec could not be passed as a constitutional amendment but had to be done in the framework of legislation which could be passedexclusively by the province and did nothen require approval from Federal Parliament. The constitutional background to the educational problems was the same in these two provinces (Quebec and Newfoundland). According to the Canadian Constitution and according to Canadian custom both before and immediately after the Federation came into being the educational system was religious. There were mainly Protestant and Catholic schools. The Catholic schools focused primarily on the religious instruction element and the Catholic school was chiefly a doctrinal institution. The Protestant schools, on the other hand, placed a greater stress on studying content and less on indoctrination. These two approaches, doctrine versus scholarship squared up against each other. In both Quebec and Newfoundland a certain degree of secularisation had taken place, nonetheless, on the eve of these amendments the educational bases for both these provinces remained religious. The Newfoundland Protestants, who were the majority sought to make the study- oriented approach more efficient, in light of the technological and scientific progress, which rendered the acquisition of knowledge so vital. They strove then to amalgamate the smaller schools and to create larger schools, which could then develop and accommodate a wide-ranging curriculum. The request was out of a need to make the object of acquiring more knowledge more effective. In the beginning they were willing to reach some type of compromise solution with the Catholics. They sought ways of making the change not too drastic in advancing the study and knowledge acquisition approach at the expense of the (religious) indoctrination approach. This solution has and had always suited the Protestant approach. The Protestants who were in the majority claimed that both the Catholic and Protestant religious education were being affected since the dominance of both these religions had already been undermined. They claimed that the Protestant religious education system would be equally affected. This claim was disingenuous in light of the fact that Protestants had never stressed religious instruction in the same way as the Catholics had. The (provincial) government held a referendum on this first amendment and after the idea was approved (by a slight majority and with the participation of a very small amount of those eligible to vote) the Protestants passed this amendment in the Provincial House of assembly, after which ratification from the Federal Parliament was a mere formality. Following this the Catholics took legal action claiming that the procedure was unconstitutional. The Protestants met this with a thorny and radical reaction. An additional referendum was called in which the Protestants increased their margin of support (though also in this referendum –as before- a minority of eligible voters took part) and again both legislative houses, the provincial and federal, ratified the results. The second amendment was significantly more radical than the first and it deeply harmed Catholic education in the province. In the broadest sense of the word the struggle between these two population groups who preached very different ideologies may be viewed as a religious war. In this war the majority ended up overreacting towards the minority disrespecting its worldview in the process. Pushing ahead with the materialist agenda of the (Protestant) majority resulted in the spiritual lifestyle of the (Catholic) minority being crushed underfoot. In Quebec the struggle was centred more on cultural differences than on religious ones. The protagonists in this battle were the province’s Catholic majority and its Protestant minority. The clashes made it to the headlines in the press. They centred on signboards that were placed in public places and places of business and which were written exclusively in French. The French cultured elite intended on taking on their Protestant English-speaking minority, who were supported by the majority of Canada’s Federal parliament (which was majority Protestant). As has already been explained, because of the predominance of Protestants in the Federal Parliament Quebec’s Catholics were unable to change the educational system by means of constitutional amendment. They were then forced to opt for the legislation route, which would not require ratification on the federal level. Since Quebec, like its fellow province Newfoundland, was undergoing a process of secularisation, the only way for the Quebecois to unite under one banner was to exploit the language barrier. Language was a more effective tool in uniting the Catholic French cultural elite than was religion. Therefore, the new Quebec Education Act replaced the clause prescribing a religious standard for Provincial educational institutions with a clause demanding a language requirement. It would be pointless at this juncture to enter into a detailed chronology of how both these provinces enacted their respective amendments. What will be discussed are the motives behind forcing through separate education systems in Canada. The background of the struggle over a separate education system, like in the USA, is entrenched in the political/ regime struggle over religion or over issues that are rife with religious connotations. [49] Over the course of time, the infighting that has taken place within these two great countries has resulted in the interests, worldviews and emotions of the minority groups being crushed underfoot and being disrespectfully treated. This kind of attitude toward minorities prevalent even in liberal countries can be explained by the fact that the religious motive plays a very powerful emotional role. Religion is so strong a factor because of has been said already about its ability to deal with emotional elements of fear and insecurity of the supernatural by claiming itself to possess supernatural elements that alleviate that fear. Therefore it inevitably propagates a tough stance. Knowing this to be true, it is difficult to accept without any reservation Rorty’s claim, as stated above, that dirty play is the exclusive domain of theistic religious wars, and that the contemporary liberal American record opposes these tactics.[50]

Regarding the United States the question may be posed as to why the parents of a child who attends Catholic school receives less financial support for their offspring’s tuition than the they would if their child attended a state- run public school. In what way would equal treatment of both these educational systems (in both cases religion is taught- in the Catholic school it is Catholicism and in Public school it is [American] civil religion) impinge upon some or other important principle? How can those professing the American civil religion justify this budgetary discrimination between Catholic and civilly religious schools in a country whose courts strive to uphold equality before the law? Those wishing to explain away this conundrum point to the fact that it is not only the Catholic and religious schools that do not receive state aid but also private irreligious schools. This however fails to satisfactorily deal with the question. It is too easy to make do with the formal excuse that says that all private schools be they Catholic or otherwise are treated equally and thereby absolve the inherent inequity between Catholic and civil religious schools. This reasoning is not a strong enough alibi to the charge that the true aim of this inequality is to marginalise Catholic education. If the issue of Catholic education is being discussed (and likewise Jewish Orthodox education in the US) it is appropriate to speak of the Canadian model, where the state does provide assistance for Catholic education. American (like Canadian) Catholics devote a central part of their education on inculcating values. These values are at variance with those held by the liberal democratic state, while for Protestants the values they hold are not that much different to those which are acquired through state education. Therefore a special religious education system is more important for Catholic adherents than it is for Protestants. special classification system for schoothat are not state- run does great harm to Catholics, but doubtfully causes any trouble to Protestants. In practice what is being conveyed is a form of religious coercion. The very fact that Catholics require their children to be inculcated with a special value system, part of which is not taught by the state is the key to the whole debate. It is a source of contention between civil religion and Catholicism, more intense than that between civil religion and the Protestants[51] (who have no need for a separate educational system within the US).

The constitutional basis upon which America draws its lifeblood, as recorded in the American Constitution (not in its draft form but as interpreted by the courts from the end of the 19th century) is the result of a bitter political battle between the state and theistic religions[52], differing from Canada’s constitutional history. Canada’s unification of its provinces kept in place the existing religious education systems, which the Canadian Constitution preserved intact. Though the prevailing spirit in both Canada and the US are very similar, and the liberal democratic tradition is the most viable ideology in both countries, Canada differs in its handling of religious affairs. It proves that a modern state does not need to be by definition anti-religious (theistically speaking) to the extent that it infringes upon the space of religious activity, especially in respect of education, as has been shown above.

For the sake of balance it would be well advised to take heed of Ernest Koenker’s[53] narrative of how both democratic governments (including that of the US[54]) and Hitler’s regime exploited Christian obedience, viewing Christians as politically tools for strengthening the government’s grasp over the population. He quotes there a minister from the period of the French Revolution who claimed that when heavy taxes were imposed, the ranting of the masses against the government could be quelled by increasing the amount of religious study classes. His reasoning was that the more learned in religious subjects the masses were the more malleable they were towards the regime.

5. The hypocrisy of US civil religion in its manipulation of the justice system: A comparative study with France, Canada and Japan.

The court system in the United States refuses to accept any blame for consistently interpreting the constitution in a way that severely prejudices the theistic religions. In essence there is no one who dares point the finger in its direction, apart from the writer of this book. That said, it is a fact that when the abortion debate in the US raged on, there were books written, discussions held and angry demonstrations led against the harm caused to religious morality which is opposed to abortion. This sense of morality managed to infiltrate the political spectrum and succeeded in causing legislation to be passed forbidding abortion or at least in toughening the conditions. The central claim against the court’s judicial activism that they were engaging in “constitutional revision” or “writing a new constitution” (without in any way mentioning the religious issues involved) can be found in Lusky’s[55] treatise on the subject. This book, though like other polemical works, fails to single out civil religion as the chief opponent against theistic religion. The US Supreme Court is not attributed with discriminating against theistic religion due to the latter’s adversarial position towards secular religion. Apparently this fact goes against the claims made during the debate. Nonetheless it is advisable to be aware of the “blurring campaign” taking place in American politics by its cynical exploitation of religious symbols painting civil religion with the same paintbrush as theistic religion. In a list compiled by Robert Bellah[56] he analyses the political style of the United States presidents and traces certain phrases used in the public discourse to the Bible. Examples of this include referring to America as the “Promised Land”, professions of trust in G-d by each president, and similar expressions, especially when taking the oath of office. Though that is really what American civil religion is all about, unaffiliated to any one specific theistic religion. That may be the reason why in the United States more religious communities have blossomed than in most of the other Western countries. Generally speaking however these communities tacitly accept the premise of separation of religion and State. Only a minority of churches tries to influence the internal American political system, but this minority is itself attacked for being reactionary, a charge easily made in light of these communities’ often blatant racist ideology.

In France, the birthplace of civil religion, and the initiator of the idea of separation of religion and State, Muslim women were for many years forbidden to wear headscarves even though their religious convictions demanded that they be attired in such. This Constitutional government’s policy was for long regarded as progressive and enlightened- despite the fact that it contained clear elements of religious coercion- until a compromise solution was found and the restrictions were eased.

In Canada, where religious education[57] was the first issue to be constitutionally challenged, secularism proved itself victorious.[58] Even in Quebec, where the regime was mainly Catholic, the secular trend crept in causing the Catholic legislature to change its criterion for educational institutions from one based on religion to one based on language. The war cry for the Quebecois Catholics changed into a battle over the ascendancy of the French language and not the Catholic religion. Canada’s Federal Government’s institutions have not come out directly against religion per se,, rather it has merely shown a preference for a State based education (which nowadays is becoming increasingly more civilly religious) over Catholic- run educational institutions. In this way theistic religions are receding from power especially in the educational sphere. Also as a general belief system, religion has been overtaken by a growing liberal democratic secularism which reigns supreme in Canada, owing to the quiet , gradual and unremitting cultural revolution ,which is disconnected from the regime.

In Japan the Americans succeeded, during the military occupation of that country at the end of the Second World War, to set in place a new Constitution, ratified in 1952, on the eve of their departure. In this new Constitution, in contradistinction to the Imperial Constitution, its predecessor, the Shinto religion ceased to be the State religion and the principle of separation of state and religion was enshrined. Shinto, which many doubt its authenticity as a theistic religion and which has a direct link with Japanese nationalism (especially that aspect of Shinto, which played the role of State Religion during the Imperial period) has in the minds of many parallels with the more well known western theistic religions. Its cultural characteristics are typical of the Far East societies. Shinto deals with higher forces of nature that link man with deceased spirits (similar to the primitive religious tribes in Africa) and with other natural phenomena. Shinto adopted Confucian philosophy, which was the philosophy used to dominate society and culture in China and its environs, including Japan. Because of this and because of its cultural and historical ties to Japanese village life, it managed to create a Japanese status quo that demanded absolute compliance with all duties imposed upon the individual. Consequently Shinto is not interested in the procurement of human rights. From this perspective Japanese culture is at variance with modern western cultures that are an outgrowth of the rebellion against the past Christian hegemony over the West.[59] Official Shinto also received the emperor’s stamp of approval, turning it into a State Religion[60] spiritually binding the People of Japan with the State of Japan.[61] The Americans viewed Shinto as no different to any of the other well-known western religions. Outof a desire to weaken the position of Jap’s emperor- who traditionally symbolised theistic religion and was not merely considered a political ruler- and out of ideological motivations (inspired perhaps by civil religion?) they instituted separation of State and religion in the new Constitution which was forced upon Japan. This Constitution was imposed by force, until the Japanese voluntarily agreed to accept it, in the course of compromise agreements between them and their American occupiers. Nonetheless the Japanese never really came to terms with the fact that America had dictated its terms to Japan. The Japanese courts ratified, despite the constitutional amendment of enforcing separation of state and religion, the granting of municipal funds to Shinto priests, who oversaw events that the local authorities designated as promoting the general public interest, but which were not exclusively Shinto. Religion has also infiltrated the political process so that nowadays it is so powerful and influential, to the extent that Japan’s Prime Minister (apparently because of religious influence)slipped up by referring to Japan in the characteristically religious, and culturally entrenched term as “holy ground.” An utterance such as this from the mouth of the premier shocked Japanese political circles. It also aroused fierce opposition among anti-religious circles (practitioners of civil religion) in Japan who view religion as a hindrance and stumbling block to progress. The background to this eruption is the fact that in Japan a battle is being brewing between those who practise this new civil religion, a product of generally western and especially American influence and between those who observe traditional Shinto. Owing to the fact that state institutions were never fully taken over by practitioners of civil religion, the state has never taken a side in the conflict. This has always been the tradition of Japan, never to adopt an unambiguous stance, but rather to always accord some respect to traditional faith.

6. The National and International Aspect of Civil Religion: Will all followers of civil religions unite?

Civil religion is an imaginary entity that owes its allegiance to a concrete political regime and is therefore confined to a specific country’s political framework[62]. Theistic religion on the other hand has no intrinsic link to any specific State and may predominate in a number of countries simultaneously. [63] Nevertheless in almost all modern western style states there is a specific civil religion suited to it, which the country and its institutions frequently belongs to. This civil religion elevates the state institutions to a higher status specially designated for this religion. Superficially there does no appear to be any foreseen enmity between the civil religions. If this prediction is not made in vain it creates an interesting phenomenon. Every country has both an internal and external policy, the latter, which is part of its international policy. It is natural then, if not inevitable, that there should be a treaty between groups of states, which share a similar form of government and ideology. At the end of the scale it would be expected that there be friction between countries which have opposing forms of government and ideology. It often happens that external interests of a civil religious country force it to take positions that are contrary to the spirit of its own civil religious beliefs. Nevertheless they will do so if in the process they manage to suppress a competing theistic religion or alternatively punish a country governed by theistically religious values. Civil religious practitioners are so terrified by the idea that a country governed by theistic religious principles will spread its values to their own borders. So, for example, most of the western democratic countries were forced to support a secular military dictatorship in Algeria even though it had suspended a popular Algerian religious movement from taking part in the country’s democratic elections. This meant that even though these civil religious democratic regimes hallow the principle of democracy they were willing to support a regime that was intentionally suppressing democratic regime change. This situation was replicated in the western opposition to Iran, which had proved that internal relatively democratic change could alter key elements of the Khomeini regime. The Khomeini regime, even prior to the last democratic elections, was itself democratic in the sense that it accurately represented the feelings of the majority of Iranians. In its time it was carried on a wave of the widest popular support. Nonetheless although Iran’s latest election results were considered a stepping stone towards full democracy in that country the western States continue today as they did in the past to denigrate Iran’s regime (even after democratic elections). Taking the above into account and considering the whole Algerian fiasco it behoves us to probe the question whether civil religious democratic regimes are not only two-faced in relation to theistic religion when it affects domestic politics, but also in regard to foreign policy. Maybe the essential difference between its domestic and foreign policy is that in the latter it is easier to sense this inequitable phenomenon. The common thread in its internal and external dealings is the fear that those professing belief in G-d will infiltrate the regime. Looking at it in this way the façade of western morality is finally unmasked and what is revealed is its hypocritical power- seeking but immensely terrified spirit, fearfully imagining whether theistic religion which it had previously deposed would regain the reins of power.

It is possible to argue that depriving theistic religion of any role in internal politics is a necessary evil. It could be legitimately claimed that civil administrations have always allowed their subjects to privately lead any (theistically) religious lifestyle they please, whereas theistic religious regimes have not accorded the same privilege to those of its subjects wishing to lead a secular lifestyle. The response to this charge is simple; western theistic religions are no longer fundamentalist and do not even attempt the abolition of liberalism. As proof of this it is possible to raise the example of western states where religious Christian political parties play an important political role without in any way infringing the liberal regime’s basic principles. Also in Israel there are no Jewish religious parties that seek to introduce a Halakhic state, as is oft claimed by those wishing to scare off Israel’s secular majority. For the sake of balancing our approach the principle of separation of religion and state should on the one hand be annulled, and on the other, any possibility of political freedoms being tampered with should be removed, whether exercised by the religious or by the secular population.[64] The budget of the state should be used to foster religious lifestyles (unlike in the US where this is forbidden) in the same way as it is used to finance sporting and cultural events. A fortiori it should be clear to everyone that when theistic religious institutions run enterprises that lighten the burden imposed on the state (like Catholic schools in the US) there is no justification to withhold state aid from these institutions. There is no logic that justifies a Catholic parent whose tax money goes toward running a state school being disentitled from enjoying equal funding for his child’s Catholic school. It is therefore clear that the approach accepted in the US is unbalanced as it relates to theistic religion in the educational sphere.

With regard to foreign policy issues our discussion does not single out civil religious countries for any specific criticism. Rather it leaves these matters hanging in the air without any firm conclusions save to question the regular hypocrisy that accompanies any international relations, entangled as it is in so many competing interests. The civil -/ theistic religious debate is no exception to the usual complications involved in forming a foreign p.

7. Particular Aspects of Theistic relig; each religion on its own and the degree of mutual co-operation.

There are very few countries governed by theistic religion. Examples include Muslim states such as Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf states, Iran and Sudan. Excluded from this group is Syria, which although constitutionally defined as a Muslim state where only a Muslim is eligible to be Prime Minister; since religious law is not the law of the land it is not a religious state.[65] It is patently obvious that Britain is not governed by theistic religion even though the head that bears the royal crown- the symbol of sovereignty- is also the head of the Anglican Church, the (national) Church of England. The British monarchy after all is merely symbolic of a glorious past. It is a remnant of a reality that no longer exists, a remnant that is preserved because of British conservatism. A country that is truly ruled by theistic religion is one where theistic religion is constitutionally determined to be the only law, and therefore such a phenomenon is few and far between. It is unrealistic to speak of any mutual co-operation between these religious states. External relations between these states reveal that in fact a significant degree of non-co-operation takes place. Iran, for example exhibits a noticeable degree of hostility towards its fellow Muslim states of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. This hostility has much to do with the fact that Iran practises Shiite Islam whereas the other Muslim states practise the Sunni variety. Since the death of the founder of Islam, the prophet Mohammed, Islam split itself into these two factions, each of which competes for the title of true Islam.

In conclusion it may be cautiously said that the glue binding together civil religious countries is no weaker than that which binds countries practising the same theistic religion. In fact, it appears that the opposite is true and that civil religion binds states together much more effectively than does theistic religion.

8. A Survey of Publications that deal directly with Civil Religion

Ilana Shelach penned a very comprehensive publication that deals head on with Israeli Civil religion while actually referring to it as secular religion.[66]Shelach and her husband were killed in Russ Burka in the Sinai desert while hiking there with their children. Ironically the assailant was an Egyptian soldier, very obsessed with his religion. Ilana’s family and ideology was closely associated with the Canaanite denomination in Israel, which obviously viewed itself as very secular. The intimate ties that this researcher had to secularism in Israel are proof that her interest in the subject was aroused by her familiarity with secularism and not with religious Jewish life. Because of her personal bias, so it seems, she does not speak of a civil religion but of a secular religion. Nonetheless after reading her work one realises that she is in fact dealing with civil religion especially its secular religious character. And indeed if one thinks of the unique background to Israeli civil religion as will be relayed in the pages to follow, there is no real surprise. Secular religion is an offshoot of the Socialist Zionist movement, which pioneered resettlement of the land and which was under the influence of the anti-religious stance as taught by the Soviet Communist ideology. Western immigrants similarly brought with them the spirit of the French Revolution which also opposed religion and supported separation of State and religion, as was adopted in American parlance. Therefore Shelach’s secular religion must be related to as if it were civil religion. Shelach proves in her detailed analysis the existence of a secular-civil religion within Israel’s boundaries. Her conclusions are different from what was raised only in so far as they relate to the question of whether institutions exist for the promotion of Israeli secular-civil religion.(These by definition[67] must relate equally to practitioners of the Jewish religion, the Christian religion and Islam where each of them identifies himself with the state of Israel.) Shelach is of the opinion that Israel has no institutions of civil religion. Shelach’s conclusions are contrary to the conclusions of our discussion in this part of the book, before surveying her writing, where it was concluded that in many different countries where civil religion has reached the level of monopolising government, institutions of civil religion flourish. While the state’s institutions are always identified as self- owned, the rituals and ceremonies carried out in the name of the state become rituals and ceremonies of the civil religion. As has been said Shelach only deals with the State of Israel, whereas our discussion thus far has been much broader to include other states and to deal with the underlying principles. The particular Israeli problem has not yet been delved into. Shelach does not ponder the question whether civil religion has taken control in the state, but it can be assumed from her claim that Israel has no institutions of civil religion, that she would argue that civil religion in fact has no control over the state. An analysis of her claim yields the following equation: if it can be proved that the reigns of power in the state are not exclusively in the hands of those practising civil religion, it must be concluded that state institutions are not institutions of civil religion. However to this line of thought must be added the fact that those who practise Israeli civil religion perform rituals and ceremonies which are exclusive to the State of Israel both officially and unofficially. (Israel Independence Day; Memorial Day for Fallen Soldiers; Support for the official Israeli sports team [which in Hebrew are referred to as “Israel’s Chosen,”]; Hiking the breadth of the land; and any other activity which carries with it the scent of patriotism toward the state of Israel and adoration toward the Land of Israel, even those activities not officially recognised as “national” events) The fact that all these above rituals are properly associated with practitioners of civil religion on the one hand, together with the fact that none of the state institutions are in the hands of the civil religious population on the other is bound to create an imbalance. Those, whose religion literally is worship of the state, and who draw their strength from the existence of the state paradoxically have no real power to determine how that state is run. This situation of a loving child whose love is never really reciprocated, creates a tragic enough situation, which is at variance (if in fact it is true) with the accepted practice in the world.

Reinforcing this true but tragic impression is the fact that efforts to produce a Constitution that has equal application to Jew and other nationalities alike have proven fruitless. As I have noted in another of my writings[68] the basic constitutional principle of the state of Israel is that it is a Jewish State, which negates any possibility of it being affiliated with civil religion, which by definition cannot be Jewish. As was proclaimed in the founding document of the establishment of the State, the state of Israel is the natural successor to the Jewish State that was always in this location throughout the nation’s history. Since concepts such as Jew and Judaism are concepts that have both religious and nationalist connotations, detaching the Jewish religion from the state is gnawing at the state’s raison d’être of being a “Jewish State”. The ideological outlook of the majority of Israeli Jews shares this perspective.[69] The official Declaration of Independence is the “birth certificate” of the state. All that it confirms with regard to the rights of non-Jewish citizens is the fact that all citizens- including non-Jews- are entitled (privately) to equal rights within a particular framework that is detailed there. It enshrines only the principle of non-discrimination against private citizens (excluding a national or ethnic group) on the basis of religion, sex, culture, language, and race as well as non-discrimination with regard to political rights of every citizen to vote and be voted for public office in any state institution.[70] This declaration does not speak of equal status of nationalities, since after all it declares Israel to be a Jewish State and not a Jewish-Arab State.

In light of the situation, Shelach only manages to achieve what she set out to do in the individual domain; with regard to the group domain her mission was doomed from the start.[71] The fact that the state in its essence is Jewish bars Canaanite ideology from infiltrating into the political and constitutional spheres. A Jewish state cannot allow a new group entity to invade its political domain (as opposed to its cultural domain), an entity which distances itself from the Jewish People and from Judaism; an entity which has severed itself from the past, from Jewish history and from the ties that bind the Jewish People with the territory which today forms the State of Israel. Shelach does not conduct a constitutional discussion. Her research is confined to sociological aspects. This part (of our book) does not hide the fact that Shelach managed to confirm through her research the very existence of Canaanism, which is synonymous with civil religion, within the borders of Israel.[72] That this phenomenon exists is not in question, but to what extent does it exercise control over state institutions? To solve this question it needs to be split into two. First, the problem of whether constitutionally such control is possible has to be dealt with, and after having answered that it still needs to be established whether in any event such control could actually emerge. Clearly there are no constitutional grounds for allowing this actuality. Yet it still needs to be clarified whether control of this sort could or does take place. After analysing the (theoretical) constitutional question the practical situation must be referred to, lest there be a difference between what is practically permissible and what is constitutionally proscribed. After all there may well be an unconstitutional deviation in the present Israeli political reality.

Jewish religious parties are almost a fixture at both the executive and legislative branches (the Knesset) of government. Because of this even if civil religion has a presence it has been unable to make it fully felt at the level of government. The Supreme Court with its liberal-secular ideology is quite a different story. Owing to the system of appointing Israeli judges to the bench the ideology prevalent in the court continues to enjoy prominence. So long as this system remains in place there is no chance the court will change biases that have remained with it for decades.[73] It cannot be expected that Supreme Court Justices would sanction any change to their ideological views by approving the appointment of new judges who think that parliament is the vehicle for promoting a vibrant state democracy. The (justices of the) Court argues that they may flex their muscles even without prior approval from the Knesset. As a result of this thinking the Supreme Court has been able not only to overturn decisions of the executive but also to repeal statutes of Knesset. In this way our Supreme Court Justices have ensured that their status is elevated to the highest rungs of the regime. This Court is run by those whose worldview is very close to the principles of the Israeli Civil Religion. Therefore civil religion practitioners even if not in total control of are very intimately connected with the most authoritative institution in the land. It is this new way of seeing events discussed in the last few pages of our discussion that forces us to reach different conclusions from those reached by Shelach.

There is no one specific style that countries controlled by civil religion use to impose the said religion. In the U.S. the style is brutal and uncompromising[74]. In France, with regards to education a compromise has been reached, just as it has in Britain. In other states such as Germany, Italy and Japan the style has been moderated by the fact that parties with theistic religious leanings are allowed to participate in the political field without any constitutional bars. Through these parties theistic religion is allowed a political role alongside civil religion. Since judges with the constitutional authority to overturn legislation are appointed by representatives of these political parties, democracy has the final say, and not a judicial oligarchy. Therefore the extent to which civil religion exercises control over these countries is to a large extent dependent upon its influence over democratic, party political arrangements. In a country then which bars theistic religion from participating in elections for public office it is civil religion which controls the state apparatus and which converts state institutions into its own playground.

Dr. Haman Shelach, like his wife Ilana, also researched civil religion from an anti-theistic religious perspective. His research was conducted within the framework of his doctoral dissertation. He studies the United States situation, not Israel's, and even then he did not deal directly with civil religion managing only to skirt the issue while discussing the attitude of the American Supreme Court towards American [theistic] religions.[75]

9. Perspectives as to the essence of the State: as a Jewish State or as or a State of all its citizens as shown by the actions of the Israeli Government Authorities.

When discussing Shelach's thesis on Israeli civil religion and when pointing to the only living proof of an Israeli Civil Religion, the existence of Canaanism[76] was raised. A state's civil religion has to be equally applied to all those of its citizens who see themselves as patriots to that state, and who maintain all the ideas connected with that patriotism and with the attributes of that state. Practitioners of the American Civil Religion who fiercely uphold the principles of the American Constitution, and who by virtue thereof are liberal, will cling to America's national history and its founding fathers and will create for themselves an image of the American nation, as evidenced by their ritualistic celebration of Thanksgiving Day. Their families' national religious history prior to arriving on American shores plays no part in the civil religious framework. Participation in this American ness, in this American civil religious experience, is not limited to Protestants. The United States of America, in the eyes of the American Civil Religious practitioner, is a multi-racial and multi-ethnic nation. America's black population are not debarred from playing a role, especially since the American Constitution was designed to accord all its citizens equal treatment. The American civil religious practitioner will never disqualify an American citizen from participating in American civil religious rites based on his racial/ethnic background. The key for opening doors and gaining entry to this community oriented American civil religion is American citizenship. The American president is the president of this civil religion and the American government its (i.e. civil religion's) government .American public state institutions are this religion's institutions in the same way as institutions connected with the Catholic Church including the pope and the Catholic administrative headquarters in Rome are considered the institutions of all Catholics worldwide. Nonetheless from its very beginnings American citizens had dual loyalties. In the antebellum years they were loyal primarily to the U.S. Federal government, followed by, and of secondary importance, the individual state government. In the post-bellum period Republicanism gained the upper hand and ethnic ties overtook individual state loyalties to take second place behind an overall loyalty to the United States as a whole. Ethnic loyalties can be seen in cases where for instance Italian immigrants living in the US try help their kinsmen[77], just as in the case of other ethnic minorities. The total rupture within America whose final form was shaped by the outcome of the American Civil War and the resunew direction American nationalism would take is alldiscussed in Liah Grinfeld's writings.[78]

Owing to the fact that no two countries are alike, each country has its own unique way of centralizing the loyalties of its citizens. A multi-ethnic state like the Indian Federation will for certain struggle against dual loyalties, since the Federal government's only loyal supporters will be those who harbor similar loyalties towards the ethnic group to which the government ministers belong. In Switzerland, as is obviously the case, secondary loyalties are split between local cantons and parties that speak the same one of the four constitutionally recognized languages as that citizen. . In Belgium it is very acceptable to owe allegiance to one of the two language groups, the Flemings or the Walloons, without affecting overall loyalty towards Belgium. Therefore civil religion which is completely affiliated with the state and its institutions cannot forbid secondary loyalties so long as they are subject at all times to an overall state loyalty.

Considering the above and taking into account what I said in my book about the Jewish State[79] wherein I concluded that Israel is the State of the Jewish People in all its dispersions and that through its citizens, both Jew and Arab, the Jewish People are loyally served, three primary questions arise.

(I) Does the Knesset as the State of Israel's parliament operate on behalf of the State of the all the dispersed Jewish People or is it the parliament of a state of all its citizens? (As would fit the ideology of the civil religion)

(II) Does Israel's government act as if they are the executive authority for the State of the all the dispersed Jewish People or are they the executive authority over a state of all its citizens?

(III) Does Israel's Supreme Court act as if it is the highest judicial authority for the State of the all the dispersed Jewish People or is it the highest judicial authority for a state of all its citizens?

The Knesset: The composition of the Knesset reflects two different trends but in actuality it operates with one clear mindset. The Law of Return and the Law of Foundations of Justice[80] as well as other Laws encourage an ingathering of the exiled people. These Laws also provide a budget for creating areas demarcated for Jewish settlement in order to prevent the existence of an Arab majority in the Galilee as well as ensuring separation between Arabs living in the disputed territories and those in the Israeli Wadi 'Ara. All these actions either rely on legislative acts or have to do with the character and composition of the governments that have been approved by the Knesset. The Knesset upholds individual equality of all its citizens by not discriminating between Jews, Arabs, Druze and other minorities. On the national level however the object of their attention is the Jewish national group that is intimately linked with the Jewish Diaspora. To summarize, the Knesset acts most decidedly as if it represents all of the Jewish Diaspora, which can be most clearly demonstrated when it deals with immigrant absorption.

The Government: The government's composition is made up almost exclusively of Jews (with the exception of one instance which lasted a very brief period) who in relation to the question of representation are even more one dimensional in their attitude than the Knesset. There were some prime ministers who on the rhetorical level spoke of the "people in Israel" as if Israel was a "State of all its citizens" and as if there was one Israeli nationality not based on its Jewishness but on citizenship. Yet beyond these verbal declarations, that always seemed to pop up close to elections and were uttered in order to garner support from the Arab vote, the governments have always acted as if they were preserving Israel's prime interest to remain a Jewish State. As far as the nationalist meaning of a Jewish state is concerned the government has always acted- both on the level of rhetoric and pragmatics as heavily focused on the Jewish idea. Like Knesset the government has sought to accord equal rights to its Jewish and other citizens as it relates to the individual on the municipal level. In this regard however it has not been careful to prevent discrimination against the Arab minority when it comes to employment opportunities, municipal budgets, hiring of public servants, development work etc. This discrimination has nothing to do with our being a Jewish state, since the State's Jewish identity is in no way associated with discriminating against non-Jews. As to the different attitude with regard to the Jewish State's national aspect as opposed to its religious one, the uneven funding by every government regardless, of religious and ultra-Orthodox educational institutions as opposed to those of a more general nature, comes as a result of coalitional pressure rather than of any inner convictions that this is the right path to follow. Other budgetary considerations that touch on religious matters involve mainly similar pressures. Since "Jew" is a concept which has both religious and nationalist considerations and the Jewish religion is a national religion, the designation "Jewish State" must refer to both these planes simultaneously.

The governments of Israel have never done anything for the "Jewish State" in its religious context, because of an inner desire or conviction that they should work towards this goal. There has never been a positive impetus urging furtherance of religious causes; all that has been done in this regard is the result of negative pressures and stimuli. It follows then that Israel's governments that have displayed a good measure of sensitivity towards the nationalist aspects of the Jewish State have not displayed similar sensitivity in regard to its religious aspects.

This point of delving into this subject is not to suggest that the "Jewish Religion" per se is coercive. Yet beyond circumventing religious coercion there is a much wider field of operations upon which Israel's governments have paraded, to a great extent against their will. As a consequence of following this policy which it has been compelled to adopt, the government has eroded the Israel's status quo on religion so that it is lopsided against the Jewish religion (in its non-coercive form, obviously). This erosion owes much more to Israel's government than to its Knesset.

In any event, as a final summation of what has been said, all of Israel's governments as a rule have reacted negatively to the concept of a "civil religion", even if their positive response to the concept of a "Jewish State" is very pronounced as it relates to the nationalist connotations while contrarily exhibiting no special enthusiasm for its religious character.

The Supreme Court: At the initial stages of its tenure the Supreme Court acted like the court of the Jewish State and in its promotion of equal rights on the individual level did not oppose the policies of the Knesset or the government when it came to issues of national importance.

The Supreme Court from very early on consistently expressed its reservations with regard to the issues surrounding the religious connotations of the State of Israel being a Jewish State. An exhaustive list would be too long to be reproduced here but landmark decisions include the Shalit[81], Rufeizen[82], Kaplan[83] (admittedly this was decided in a lower tribunal, but the fact it was not appealed against in one of the higher divisions is proof that it was commensurate with the judicial policy of the Supreme Court) Jezeramcus[84] and Shakdiel[85] cases, along with a long line of other judgments including the whole Bar Ilan Street episode.[86] In all these judgments the Supreme Court decided against the status quo on religion and even against the values that are accepted in those countries that impose strict separation of state and religion, akin to the United States. Any semblance of religious coercion is immediately repealed by the Supreme Court so for instance, a law relating to the closure of public places of business on the Sabbath, recognized as constitutionally grounded in the United States was rejected out of as invalid. This was after the local municipality democraticsanctioned this provision by including it in one of its local by-laws. The closure of Bar Ilan Street, which passes through the center of the Jerusalem Chareidi (ultra-Orthodox) neighborhoods and which closure caused Sabbath travellers, at most, a few minutes delay, was deemed from the outset as coercive. Furthermore a permit issued by a Public Committee in terms of which the street would be closed during a specially allotted time was discarded when the court began its debate on the issue. It was only after much arm twisting that the permit was finally approved. At the time of handing down its judgment approving the permit the court informed the Chareidi community that if they were to make any more demands or if they would engage in violent activity the court would weigh the options of retracting the permit. Such a statement coming as it does in the middle of a court judgment was equivalent to taking sides in the secular/religious debate. If the ruling was motivated by a desire to strike a fair balance there would be no place for threatening one of the sides that in the event that they "do not act nicely" or if they "come with more demands" an evenhanded decision would be overturned and replaced by a decision lopsided against them. It is patently obvious that Supreme Court is completely negatively attuned to any issues that relate to religious aspects of the Jewish State.

When dealing with the nationalist aspects of the Jewish State, the Supreme Court Justices, until the end of the 1990s, were active in preventing the release of "captives" who in fact were prisoners of war, within the context of the war between the State of Israel and the Hezbollah. They were also very vociferous in joining Israel's demand for the release of Ron Arad from the clutches of the Hezbollah or at least for some information as to his fate. A similar patriotic stance was in evidence when the Supreme Court decided the extent of physical pressures that could legally be exerted against a Palestinian terrorist who is deemed a "ticking time bomb" (the torture case). The Court similarly backed the government, when, basing itself on the principle of reciprocity withheld the rights from two senior Hezbollah members- Mustafa Dirani and Sheikh Obeid to be visited by Red Cross personnel until similar visits could be arranged with Jewish captives held by the Hezbollah. However by the end of the 1990s this trend ended. This is strikingly demonstrated in the Katzir episode, discussed under title of the Ka'adan decision, in which Arabs demanded the right of abode in a Jewish hilltop settlement that was established by the Jewish Agency as a buffer between Arabs living in the Territories and those living in Wadi Ara.[87] The Court held that so long as no new settlements were being specifically designated for Arabs there could be no new settlements built for Jews. Following this reasoning specific land could not be allocated to the Jewish Agency since it was an organization that practiced discrimination against Arabs by setting up exclusively Jewish settlements. All these kinds of decisions reflect a trend that asserts that Israel is a State of all its citizens while denying the idea that State of Israel belongs to the People of Israel and is a realization of the Zionist enterprise.

The court's ruling, delivered in the Katzir case, is a clear example of how it conforms to the spirit of civil religion. While it is true that it still employs the terminology of the "Jewish State" and is not yet ready to use alternative language that the rest of the world uses i.e. a "State of all its citizens", it only does so for strictly legal and semantic reasons. According to this Court the rules of the game are defined in the Basic Laws, enacted in 1992, and since these Laws pay lip service to the constitutional idea of Israel as a Democratic Jewish State[88], the court follows suit. In practice the decisions of the Supreme Court Justices have already downgraded the Jewish character of the state so that it is only of symbolic, abstract value, devoid of any particularistic attributes. The state's democratic nature on the other hand is given detailed application. Paradoxically if the principle of a "Democratic State" were to be followed - a principle that has no constitutional value save for its reference in a few Laws[89] and which therefore awaits constitutional classification-it would be discovered that it is always a secondary feature which exists only in the abstract.[90]

By rights the principle of a "Jewish State" should occupy prime position, however it is the lower ranking principle that is not constitutionally enshrined- that of our being a "democratic state" that our Supreme Court has declared through its various judgments that trumps everything else. Owing to democracy's supreme value it empowers the Supreme Court with the authority to change the structure of all existent Laws and to strike down any of the governments' administrative acts , its delegated legislation or the by-laws of the local authorities on the grounds that they are all expressions of a democratic regime.

In the eyes of the Supreme Court circa 2000, all citizens enjoy equal rights not only in their capacity as individuals- which no one in Israel would question- but also in their capacity as members of various nationalities. Therefore Azmi Bishara's candidature for Prime Minister cannot be invalidated. That is what the Supreme Court believes, and that is the ideology that is mandated by members of the Israeli civil religion who observe religiously what Ilana Shelach defined as the Israeli secular (civil) religion.

The Israeli Civil Religion is then – as it emerges from our previously conducted analysis-one religion that cannot be split into two. It is not possible for a Jewish Israeli Civil Religion to operate alongside an Arab Israeli Civil Religion. To speak of the Arab ness or Jewishness of a member of the Israeli Civil Religion is pointless. That is the situation in civil religions across the globe and there is no reason why Israel should be any different especially since citizenship is "born" so to speak without any heritage or history that pre-existed that State. If members of the Israeli Civil Religion who are descendant from Jews cease to identify themselves as part of a larger Jewish Diaspora that lives outside of Israel's borders, they have to perforce cut themselves off from their antiquated history that serves to unite them with Diaspora Jewry. Continuing along the same lines it must be concluded that there is no reason why they should separate themselves from those whose roots go back to the Arab-Palestinian nation but who also practice Israeli Civil Religion. The Israeli Civil Religious practitioner as he has been defined does not bow down to the Jewish State. Instead he worships a State of Israel that has burnt all bridges with the Jewish religion, its history and its nationalist aspirations. It does not deny the right of Judaism and Islam to flourish in Israel yet for it, its emotional mainstay, and its central focus for expressing personal loyalty by the individual citizen is the State that was created on 15 May 1948, with no past just a present and a future.

In light of the judgments delivered by the Supreme Court, it would be correct to say that this court is an institution of the state of Israel that is very careful not to be associated with any one of the nationalities or religions that exist in Israel. This makes it an institution that is very close in spirit to the Israeli Civil Religion. In the opinion of this institution, as it emerges from what is contained in its judgments, not from the declarations or terminology that is used there, Israel is a "State of all its citizens". According to the latest President of the Supreme Court, there is no real difference between the concepts "Jewish State" and State of all its citizens" especially when the former has been relegated (in his opinion) to contain elements only very broadly relating to it, while the latter (which he prefers to refer to rhetorically as a "DemocraState") is embodied with concrete and particularistic meaning. The Sof Israel in his view is a "Jewish State" only to the extent that this concept is construed to be identical to a "Democratic State". Yet Barak will disagree with the opposite proposition i.e. that the State of Israel is a "Democratic State" only to the extent that this concept is construed to be identical to a "Jewish State".[91]

10. The contrast between associating oneself with Israeli "civil religion" and a worldview that sees Israel as a Jewish State.
The world-view expressed by the President of the Supreme Court Aaron Barak is the same that dominates the thinking in the most recent judgments. Present day court rulings in Israel will not present arguments that oppose Barak's world-view, and will certainly not rearrange things so that the principle of a "Jewish State" gains the upper hand over the idea of a "Democratic State". Only a small minority of cases dares to plead equality between these two concepts by blurring the differences between them.[92]

According to the principles of freedom of religion as spelled out by the founding document of the State, the Declaration of Independence, civil religion is granted equal religious standing in so far as the individual's rights in Israel are concerned (which according to the concepts of the Declaration is the citizens' rights). By contrasting the idea of equality on the individual level with the preferred [collective] idea, which is the essence and raison d’être of the state, of a "Jewish State", and by locating the points of friction between the two concepts, the differences between civil religion and the principle of a "Jewish State" can be seen. When balancing the values of a "Jewish State" versus a "Democratic State" and when discussing how the points of friction between these two are eventually reconciled, three possible outcomes must be borne in mind, i.e.

(i) A preference for a "Jewish State" over a "Democratic State"

(ii) Equal value for a "Jewish State" and a "Democratic State"

(iii) A preference for a "Democratic State" over a" Jewish State"

Possibility (a) is commensurate with what has been said thus far in the discussion in this part of the book[93]. Possibility (b) is the opinion of Menachem Elon, while possibility (c) reflects Barak's views.

In accordance with the view in (a) that holds that a "Jewish State" trumps a "Democratic State" it should be said (following the trend of the Declaration of independence) that in a private sense, on the level of the individual, any citizen who feels a common identity with the spirit of the "Israeli Civil Religion" or "Canaanism", is allowed to set up voluntary organizations and together with others he can establish institutions that enable him to undergo the Canaanite experience, so long as the Jewish religion has complete (and unequal) precedence over civil religion or any other religion for that matter. As to (b) Menachem Elon would see both concepts as vying for the same thing so that they are of equal value. According to third way of looking at it, that of Aaron Barak, level (c), the Jewish religion has no advantage whatsoever over any other religion in Israel. All religions are equal and are eligible for equal treatment, so held the court in the decision of the "Women of the (Wailing) Wall."[94] According to this third possibility practitioners of civil religion are entitled to the same burial rights as those practicing the Jewish religion and therefore there is no legal impediment to civil burials conducted by an organization which is not under the control of Jewish law or any other religious laws[95]. These practitioners are further more entitled to a mandatory order by the High Court of Justice to enable the establishment of their own religious institutions with a state budget allotted to them as is the case (which is equally applicable) with the Israeli Chief Rabbinate. The Knesset can expect to receive an order mandating it to enact appropriate legislation; otherwise the H.C.J. will set out constitutional guidelines mandating the same. In addition it is expected that the H.C.J. will order budgets set aside for civil religious educational institutions to which its members are entitled. This means that civil religious clubs will be set up that unite Jew and Arab while blurring the differences between the two. Additionally it is envisioned that a joint Arab-Jewish educational system will be put into place which will encourage intermarriage between Jew and Arab, following the new tradition of introducing the ideas of the Israeli Civil Religion or sect to the unsuspecting public. Members of this new religion or sect will be entitled to the same budgets that are presently given to synagogues, churches, mosques and religious educational institutions. Members of this religion or sect will be entitled to all of this if they only ask for it.[96]

In light of the interpretation presented in this book when it discusses the constitutional situation in the State of Israel the last mentioned possibility cannot be implemented by virtue of its being unconstitutional. However in practice the Israeli Supreme Court does not follow this line of thinking.

11. Relevant Judicial policy in Israel.

The judgments rendered in the Katzir and "Women of the Wall" episode conform to the liberal, democratic, secular and egalitarian agenda that is found in the United States and its Constitution. The Israeli Supreme Court Justices are in the habit of adopting the American terminology and case law without carefully discriminating between the constitutional situations that prevail in either country. Generally they do not even bother to mention that America has a written Constitution and case law is decided specifically in accordance with the American Constitution. The impression created is that Israeli law is linked to the American Constitution, even if the Israeli justices do not believe this or do not want others to think that that is the case. They imbibe the American ideology to such an extent that they are unable to deal with the constitutional differences that separate the two countries; simply a result of the approach that they have of late adopted.

The ruling in the Chorev (Bar Ilan Street) case was delivered in this same spirit. In an article that appeared in the supplement of the Ha'aretz weekend edition[97] the description of the Israeli Supreme Court President Aaron Barak as the "[Hassidic] Rebbe (literally: Grand Master) of the Secularists" seems an appropriate title heading for the purposes of our discussion in this part of the book. Does the Supreme Court-like its President make up the leadership of the Israeli Secular Religion? And to what degree is this court "relevant" to the State as a whole?

In the Chorev case the Justices viewed the interests of the Chareidi residents to be emotionally impaired and they juxtaposed this with the interest of freedom of movement of the secularists taking into account the fact that Bar Ilan Street was a quicker thoroughfare than any other, so that it cut travel time by a few minutes. If so the emotional impairment suffered by the religious population, which is not on the same level as a basic right of every citizen, did not fare well against the basic right so to speak of the secularists, especially since the right of "freedom" , in this case freedom of movement, is always preferred. The very fact that the problem was framed in such a manner just goes to show how ignorant the justices are when it comes to their understanding of observant Jewish lifestyles. An observant Jew is indeed concerned that "the whole Jewish people" observe the precepts of the Creator of the World, but more than this, much more than this, the observant man is worried about the education of his children- that they be educated in the religious spirit. Exposing the children of the neighborhood to massive traffic violations on the Sabbath and Festivals frustrates his ability to preserve a consistent education for his children, in the spirit that he chooses. In any event it is not simply hurt feelings that are at issue. The concept "emotions" is one that belongs to the secularist lexicon,and not to the Jewish religion. An observant Jew toils in order to fulfillthe precepts and obligations that are incumbent upon him, not for the sake of emotional fulfillment. This typifies the difference between the Western world's penchant for focusing on rights on the one hand and the religious Jew's penchant for focusing on duties, on the other. The expression "emotional impairment" reflects a secularist thought process and not a Jewish religious way of thinking.

The Chorev case is similar to litmus paper which helps us identify whether a problem exists. Indeed the problem has been identified as existing on two levels:

(i) On the level of the principle of being the authority

(ii) On the communicative level

On the level of principle of being the authority, it would appear that those principles that guide Supreme Court Justices do not dictate to them any duty to help observant and religious Jews create an environment conducive to their religious lifestyles. Connected to this is the matter of a Jewish State supporting and aiding Jews who want to fulfill Jewish religious precepts and providing them with the tools, atmosphere and conditions that will make it easier to realize their aims. On a matter of principle the aid that is extended is based on the very essence of the State, in that it is a Jewish State, whose central mission is to spread Judaism to all of its Jewish inhabitants who simply request it, within reasonable limits. This mission is the number one task of the State which precedes all others, and cannot be pushed aside by the principles of democracy as in "freedom of movement" especially in the marginal definition of that concept when speaking of a few added minutes of Sabbath travel time. The standard for evaluating interests and aims of the Jewish State are different from the standards employed by the justices in this instance. On a communicative level the justices in the Chorev case were unable to construe the Chareidi language. The Chareidim, it is true did breach the bounds of behavior, but that was not because there is something uncouth about them. The reason they resorted to lawlessness was because there was no one from among the highest authority of the land (which for all practical purposes is the Supreme Court) who understood their needs. The Chareidim spoke of their needs and the justices understood this to mean their feelings. It can be confidently said that the sides suffered from serious language and communication difficulties.

All this is reflective of a certain estrangement that leads to discrimination in practice and in deed.

12. Summary: The possible and the desired future.
In Israel the prevailing judicial trend is to separate religion and State, even if this trend is unable to prevent the continuing registration of marriages and divorces by religious authorities or the institution of a chief rabbinate and religious council. The court, when interfering with the composition of and appointments to the religious councils, acts beyond its obligations, as a correct reading of the Law reveals. Similarly when it comes to interfering in questions regarding kashruth, they often needlessly clash with the religious councils or with legislation of the Knesset.[98]

In these circumstances it should come as no surprise that the religious and Chareidi communities are increasingly turning to the ecclesiastical courts for a ruling though the status of such a ruling is only on a par with arbitration. In the future this trend will be broadened further especially if the courts continue down the same path. It is foreseeable that Chareidim will put forward political demands asking Knesset to legislate changes in the Law that will make way for ecclesiastical authorities to be recognized as a separate judicial system on par with the judicial system presently in place. From a political-moral perspective such a demand would be difficult to object to, and could only be faced off if the present judicial system altered its thinking to the extent that it emphasized its duty to act within the framework of a Jewish State, notwithstanding its democratic nature.

Doubtless neither the Israeli Supreme Court nor the majority of those, consciously or not, affiliated with Israeli Civil Religion actively seeks to introduce marriages between Jews and Arabs. In any event the idealists from either side of the spectrum will not deny this marriage option to those who seek it. In a similar vein many liberals who are not homosexual or lesbian do not deny the right of those who are so inclined to follow their inclinations. They also noisily object to any hardships the state places in the way of the gay community in contrast with the services and recognition granted by the state to straight families. Therefore just like the accusation cannot be thrown at these [straight] liberals that they undermine homosexual and lesbian activity within society so too the Supreme Court Justices cannot be accused of undermining intermarriage within society, even while acknowledging that these justices do not consciously serve the court as representatives of the Israeli Civil Religion or even attempt to further its cause.

The forecast presented here on the future awaiting Israel and on the links between the Supreme Court and Civil Religion will certainly put the backs up of any one of the Supreme Court Justices, in the event that they hear of this claim. Israeli Civil Religion is not a religion that has recognized leaders with a fixed and known membership list neither does it have established institutions that formally protect its membership. The subject of discussion is made up of an ideology that is multi faceted and divided, but which binds together many people who in practice are generally unaware of the fact that they are members of this religion or have even heard of this religion's existence. What unite the members of this religion are a common ideology, culture and ritual. A distinguishing feature of civil religion in states whose populations originate from many different lands (like the USA, Canada and Israel), is the members' total severing of emotional ties with the history of the countries or people that they originated from before arriving in their new country. In the USA, Australia and Canada the matter speaks for itself, in Israel this is not at all clear. A Jew who emigrated from Poland to Israel and who joined the Civil Religion is distinguished first and foremost by his keen interest in things that happen in Israel, and concomitantly by his total break with Jewish Polish events that are presently occurring. Furthermore: in order to sincerely join this new religion he must for instance prefer American ideals that have been absorbed in Israel, which account for the similar lifestyles and living standards enjoyed in the US and Israel, over and above the principles enunciated by his Jewish heritage.

Indeed this is the direction that seems to be unfolding in the Israeli Supreme Court's rulings that have rejected any attempt at embracing the "Jewish Heritage" as a normative source for judicial review as was the case when the legislator mandated such an inclusion in the old Law of the Foundations of Justice ,5740 (1980). Apart from their rulings the tendency of Supreme Court Justices to view the concept of a "Jewish State" as something vague having no concrete value, of very broad conceptual application can be contrasted with their clinging onto the smallest particularistic details of what is called for by the principles of a Democratic State.[99]

The Supreme Court Justices, all of them, will mock any idea that suggests they have any political link to-or patronization of any sector of the Israeli public sector in general or Israeli Civil Religion in particular. They confidently believe with all their heart and soul that they are free of all and any prejudice because when they sit in judgment they have no ties to the people involved and are thus able to dispense justice to all. To them it must be said that intentions of the heart are not at issue, but deeds, a reality embroidered by their hands and the exact product of their pens. The Israeli Supreme Justices (those who are Jewish, that is) obviously believe that they are good andloyal Jews faithful to the Jewish religion. And behold they are being told here that they have links to a new religion which intends wiping away Judaism from the Jewish State, and that in practice they are strengthening the hand of the civil religion which is bent on taking over the reins of the State and depriving the Jewish religion of any influence over the governing process.

Like these Supreme Court Justices so too the majority of Israel's Jews feel that they are good and loyal Jews (the same thing can be said with regard to Israeli Arabs who wholeheartedly believe that they are loyal Palestinians). Nevertheless looking at the principles that many of Israel's citizens rally behind, combined with the ever diminishing emotional ties to that part of Israeli life that connects them to their ancient and well worn heritage, to the point where they are almost cut off from it, and without them even being aware of it they have left the old religion, their antiquated feelings of nationality, and have created in its place a new religion, even a new people has been formed thanks to their active help. Another segment of the population has adopted two religions, one of them being civil religion. They practice one or another theistic religion in their homes and are members of the Israeli civil religion outside their homes, in the political lives they lead and in their relationship to the State. This is exactly the way the majority of Americans are, they look up to the USA, without at the same time giving up membership in this or that theistic religion.

Just like the Israeli Supreme Court Justices defended the rights of the "Women of the Wall" to realize their egalitarian aspirations by their loud chanting of the Torah portion next to the (Western) Wall while all time being wrapped in (male) religious garb, talitoth, so too continuing along this path our Supreme Court Justices in the future will look favorably upon those non-profit organizations who will increasingly demand that they receive a state budget to set up an educational system imparting values, completely severed from what is unique individually to the Old Testament, the Koran and the New Testament, as well as those values that are in common. Instead they will teach western, liberal- democratic values, with patriotic leanings to the State of Israel, and it is completely possible, even probable, that they will not raise any objections to marriages taking place between Jew and Arab, especially since the student body will be composed of both Arabs and Jews. In practice this chilling scenario that makes your hairs stand on end, is taking place right now in the most clear-cut way in Neve Shalom, which is in the Latrun district, where a mixed settlement has been set up for the express purpose of integrating Arabs and Jews.

The root of the problem is embedded in the high prestige that is given the Supreme Court Justices in Israel.[100]This status allows them to determine who will succeed their place on the bench. These Justices have become an authoritative body that is immune to any harm and that has the "final word", after the legislator has had his say. Even when the legislature amends legislation which the court's judgment disapproved of this amended piece of legislation is returned to the table of the Supreme Court Justices who again add their interpretation to it as they see fit.[101] Such a scenario has already happened as in the Harris case in South Africa[102] which is described in my book on the Jewish State.[103]

Notes

2. In regard to the general secular ideology, that does not confine itself to any specific nationality, and that sways and continues to hold sway over Western culture within their each national civil religions separately see Jacob Talmon The Beginning of Totalitarian Democracy (Tel Aviv, Dvir, 1956), Ibid., on p. 11 it is defined as a religion.

3. Also as appeared in Section 4 of Chapter 2 of Yehuda Cohen’s book Who’s afraid of a Jewish State? A Constitutional and Ideological Perspective (Tel Aviv: Law Society Publication, 2001), and as appeared in section 7 of chapter 3, and section 4(c) of chapter 6, Ibid.

4. Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (Translated by Joseph Ward Swain, George Allen and Unwin, 1967, first ed. 1915); Emile Durkheim on the Division of Power in Society (Translated by George Simpson, The Macmillan Company, 1933); The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud (Translated and edited with introduction by Dr. A. A. Brill, The Modern Library, 1938)

5. Ernest Casirer Measure of Man: Prelude to the Human culture (Am Oved, Tel Aviv, 1956), pp. 96-99.

6. Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (tr. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Breton, New York, Holt & Co., 1935) II, 25, 26, 30, 42, 28, 48.

7. That practised, in the area of civil law and property law, the Majla, which is an anthology of Islamic Religious laws (Sharia) and which also practised religious law in the areas governing the familial status applying the specific religious law on their respective religious communities, an institution that continues to have partial application in Israel.

8. Cases in which the extreme zealousness of civil religions has prevented theistic religions to play any role in the political field include the communist civil religion in most of the communist countries (excluding Poland) and the USA and France.

9. D.G. Charlton, Secular religions in France 1815-1870, (Oxford University Press, 1963).

10. Judges in United States explain the First Amendment as intended to distance the government from all religions, but do not include in this prohibition American civil religion. Had they included civil religion within the framework of separation of state and religion they would have created a very real problem of disallowing any ideological activity or groundwork within American politics. It is patently obvious that the US Judges did not deal with this assault to equality, which is a founding principle of the Constitution, an assault which has been realised in the USA from the very fact that the US does not put civil religion on an equal footing with theistic religions. Theistic religions are prevented from taking part in American politics, at least not directly, whereas civil religion reigns supreme. It is the political regime.

11. As appears under the title “Kant, Emanuel” in encyclopaedia Judaica.(Hebrew)

12. As described in a book that analyses six intellectuals whose philosophy and writings were widespread and whose theories were formulated to refute theistic religion, See Lewis White Beck, Six secular Philosophies, Religious Themes in the Thought of Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Nietzsche, Williams James and Santayana (Thoemmes Press, 1960, 1997).

13. The talk in Israel nowadays is that the presence of religious parties (Jewish) is a bad disease and that (Jewish) religion should be excluded from politics. This has been given expression by immigrants from the FSU who were fed from an anti-religious education that was indoctrinated into the FSU immigrants by their dictatorial Soviet regime. When such talk- of excluding Jewish religion from politics is sounded by Jews who arrived in Israel from the liberal West- the question may be asked as to the liberal educational background of these Western immigrants. Is it liberal to prohibit political organisation which has a religious leaning but to allow political organisation based on other interests or positions? It is possible also to explain the pioneering Zionists'- who came here after the Bolshevik Revolution- antipathy to religion in terms of their being primarily socialists. Therefore those who support separation of state and religion in Israel were influenced by the Soviet attitude towards religion, and based their logic on their desire to create a “new Jew”, who is not from the exile. A defining symbol of the exile is the connection to the Jewish religion. What are being discussed therefore are factors not really relevant but which hide behind the demand to oust religion from politics.

14. It reminds us of the early Christians who changed their Sabbath from the Jewish seventh day (Saturday) to Sunday.

15. See Charles S. Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehhiya Civil Religion in Israel: Traditional Judaism and Political Culture in the Jewish State (University of California Press, 1983), p.10. Even if the main points of this book does not deal, as will be explained later, with the trend of the adherents of civil religion to turn state institutions into their own and to exploit those institutions by imposing civil religion onto the state government the words of Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehhiya still have application to our book.

16. And see in this regard the definition of religion in the beginning of section 2 supra.

17. Even in France itself, there has been in recent years a compromise allowing religious schools to be partially subsidised by the state according to certain criteria. A different approach to the French example is the totalitarian regime of Franco in Spain where the civil religion extraordinarily was the Catholic State Religion. This is because of the unique relationship that existed in Spain where Catholicism was instrumental in enforcing a totalitarian regime under Franco. In Canada too, religious education continued to be taught since at its inception as a Federation, religion was deeply entrenched into Canadian life, a situation that with the passing of time has been taken over by a growing secularism which has undermined these religious schools. It is possible then to say that Canada has begun the journey away from being a Federation based on a G-dly covenant where the government relied on Theistic principles of law and slowly become influenced by civil religion, which in turn tries to sweep away theistic religion from the corridors of power. In this discussion the focus will be on the growing secularism of civil religion, which has become the battle cry for adherents to civil religion. Since the most basic requirement for the blooming of civil religion is the enticement of others to lose their G-dly faith, civil religion has been much stronger in secular circles than it has among those who still believe in G-d.

18. The connection between (the destruction of) the World Trade Centre and the war in Afghanistan that came in its wake, demands an explanation, which will not be discussed at this juncture.

19. See under “imperialism” in Encyclopaedia Hebraica.

20. Overstating the matter when it came to expanding meanings of concepts, the Israeli Supreme Court termed an outcome of their interpretative opinion as a “constitutional revolution” while handing down their verdict in the Mizrachi case. I mention this not to support an act of constitutional creativity but to show to what extent the modern man has been led by his fertile imagination in managing political life.

21. Proverbs, 20:18 (Translation from The Jerusalem Bible [Koren, Jerusalem, 1983], p. 816.

22. Even though the very existence of theistic religions help the internal stability in the different states (the fact that religion flourishes does not mean it plays any role in the political sphere) See The Religion of the Republic, (ed. Elwyn A. Smith, Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1971), p. 155.

23. Charles S. Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehhiya Civil Religion in Israel: Traditional and Political Culture in the Jewish State, (University of California Press, 1983), p. 3. It seems there that the authors view fascism and communism as manifestations of civil religion, as well as including it in their definition of the term "civil religion" in a later part of the book.

24. See note 5 supra, Chapter 6, section 1.

25. As it appears in Washington and Lee Law Review, Vol. 48, Spring 1991, from p.381.

26. Sofer replaced the expression “civil religion” and instead came up with “secular religion”- this alludes to the close relationship that these two concepts enjoy, and also the possible confusion in this area. The confusion arises in relation to an analysis in this section of the reason for the establishment of civil religion.

27. Further on Rorty’s views see Richard Rorty, Contingency, irony, and solidarity (Cambridge University Press, Ibid. the first three chapters.

28. The absurdity in the position taken by Kant stems from the fact that (subjective) man through his consciousness (which cannot be objective since it comes from man) discovers objective morality only after that same consciousness before this discovery created this objective morality. An absurdity then arises in the thought of Kant, first the creation of a thing in the mind and imagination of man, and thereafter the discovery of the very same thing, as this objective reality is suddenly revealed to man.

29. John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York, N.Y.: Mentor Book, The New American Library, 1950)

30. It is patently obvious that this argument prima facie is groundless. It is human knowledge that is uncertain and non-objective, not the object of the knowledge’s curiosity- laws of nature.

31. Dewey does not plumb the depths in trying to discover why these doubts and instabilities arose, just as he assumes these questions arose exclusively among the secular population and not the religious. Obviously and in light of what has been seen above it appears that the whole moral question is not entrenched in anything other than insecurities and human fears which no longer receive comfort from finding spiritual solace in the unpredictable transcendental spheres, the very power that caused the insecurity and fear in the first place. Morality is the outcome of a lifestyle for those who believe in a transcendental provider who commanded his believers to act according to its precepts and because the author of this morality hails from a higher reality so too the substantive morality will be higher than self-interest and materialism. Thus what Dewey identifies are the agonies of the American secular individual who has not managed yet to internalise a transcendental support base suitable enough to replace the G-d he no longer believes in, a replacement that American civil religion pretends to fill. Therefore Dewey’s system, based on cold science cannot last long in providing a cure for the ailing Americans, as the results speak for themselves, as can be seen by the post-modern trend following that is rife in America. What Dewey is unable to discern is that the stimulus for clinging to religion is triggered by emotions (like the emotion of fear) and the cure provided to the believer and practitioner is also, by definition emotional, as is seen in the moral code of the believer which is engulfed by emotion. Part of morality’s primal emotions is the preparedness to emotionally immerse yourself in such a way until you abnegate all interests. Herein lay the stark differences that divide morality from self-interest.

32. It is very odd that Dewey speaks to Americans as if they were a secular people, whereas it is well known that your average American believes in G-d.

33. The fundamentalist-democratic regime in Iran serves as an odd example of this alternative, especially since it is a democracy dependent on the unpredictable polling stations in general elections which are held regularly. Less stark examples can be found in any democracy, which has religious parties in elections, and Shas in Israel is no less interesting an example of this type. Also the fundamentalist victory in Algeria is a very interesting example, and the reluctance of the west to try and prevent a religious Islamic victory in Algeria sheds some light on this issue in relation to its international aspects.

34. One possible answer is to say that the interests of the ruling class (in their political thought and their political regimes) are so desperate, until they are willing to be led by any reasoning, so long as it upholds the basic principles to which they hold dear. This isn’t only about the first half of the twentieth century. The burning desire of many in the USA, including those living now, to prove that the Divine Biblical morality is no better than modern liberaldom’s version and that quite the opposite is correct can be seen inter alia in Biblical V. Secular Ethics: The Conflict (edited by R. Joseph Hoffman and Gerald A. Laure, Promtheus Books, 1988).

35. He does not explain from where he took all these allegations. One can certainly query whether the structure of the family and its inner complexities has its source in science? In light of the fact that emotions are so central to the family makeup and to morality in general, in what way does science deal with this, what tools does it have at its disposal to deal with a world of feelings?

36. Ibid. pp.139-140.

37. Ibid. pp. 161-162.

38. In this way Dewey comes across to us as an educator. Dewey died at the age of 93, and his first most striking work was in the field of education. As a scientific person he was active from the end of the 19th century until the middle of the 20th and his innovations in education remain as refreshing as they were then- The education of children was based on the idea of viewing them as complete individuals, the school then has to treat them as people with genuine needs, and should not look upon their education as merely preparing the groundwork for adulthood. He was active in the USA, Japan, China, and the Ottoman Empire, where he was an educational advisor in educational matters. As was pointed out above, his theory of relativism in morality can be considered as a pre-emptor for today’s postmodernist movement, without taking away from him his reputation as one of the fathers of American pragmatism.

39. Dewey’s theory reflects a closeness between civil religion and secularism, even though in the USA most of the supporters of civil religion are also affiliated with one or other Theistic religion, together with their being politically mainstays of the civil religious regime and in support of distancing theistic religions from the American political arena.

40. The eventual retreat reflects the struggle of the Protestant religion that wanted and tried to be the USA State religion. The experiment was blocked by the Supreme Court, which acted as a civil religious state authority, an authority that sifts out any Protestant influence from the corridors of power. The public school system supported the court’s vigilance on behalf of civil religion.

41. See Robert Michaelson “Is the Public School Religious or Secular,” in The Religion of the Republic (ed. Elwyn. A. Smith, Fortress Press Philadelphia, 1971), p.30.

42. It is perhaps possible to understand this from the very central position accorded to the US Public Education system, which is designed to relay over the ideology of the state in a unitary alternative manner. See “Introduction,” The Religion of the Republic (ed. Elwyn A. Smith,) Fortress Press Philadelphia, 1971.

43. The need for those who support a united American nation excluding religion from the political playing field is exacerbated by the fact that certain conservative religious communities in the US, who demand a conservation of the superior position of the white Protestants in the US and a concomitant downward slide among their black population, would like to exert influence on internal American politics. These communities dress themselves up as religious communities, in this context as theistically religious.

44. The judgement involving special needs children in the Satmar community was handed out recently by the US Supreme Court. See Board of Education of Kirias Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 US 687, 129 Led 2d 546.

45. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 US 602, 29, Led 2d 745

46. As was raised in the symposium when discussing the attitude of the United States Supreme Court towards minorities in the US, especially in connection with what Sofer had to say about Indians in Washington and Lee Law Review, vol. 48 Spring 1991, beginning at p. 381, and especially 402.

47. For the Amish case see Yoder v. Wisconsin, 406 US 205 37 Led 2d 15.

48. See In the matter of the reference re the Education Act S.Q 1988, c. 84 The Attorney general of Quebec also see Ryan and Teanner-D Audet-Grenier, Renelle Grenier-Gagne, File Nos. 22112, 22119, 22124, and 22129. Rempel, Justifying Constitutional Change: The legislative History of the Newfoundland Denominational Schools Senate Committee report, at 18-19 which mentions Canada inter alia. Question, 1922 to 1997 (not Commons debates 35th Parliament, 2nd Sess. At 3244, per Rock (31 May 1996) Newfoundland House of assembly Debate 42nd Leg., 3rd Sess., at 1381, per Fitzgerald (19 October 1995) at 1304, per Wells (17 October 1995). Canada Senate Debates Vol. 135 at 569, per Senator Doody (6 June 1996). Canada Senate Debates Vol. 135 at 640-41, per Senator Rompkey (11 June 1996). Senate Committee, majority report, at 7, dissenting at 34-35.

49. This struggle exemplifies how different Canada is from the USA that can be seen in the different educational systems that cater for the very young in these two independent states. In the USA the State run educational system has adopted the civil religious approach enabling this (civil) religion to spread its net across the country. In Canada the educational system has been divested from the two religious communities, Catholic and Protestant, and has been used to strengthen the hand of the Protestants against the Catholic minority. In Quebec the tables were turned against the province’s Protestant minority in favour of the Quebecois Catholics. In both instances (USA and Canada) it is the schools that have determined what regime governs the country, is it a regime of unity or one of growing divisiveness. In both instances the strength of the religious motive is displayed, whether it is theistic or civil, both have shown religion to be a strong emotional element exploited by the authorities and gaining a powerful hold over society. In so far as it pertains to the State of Israel where there are various and separate educational streams for the ultra-Orthodox chareidim, the national religious movement and the secular Zionists as well as the general Arab population (combining Muslims and Christians) as well as the specific Christian Arab education system together with the recently set up Sephardic chareidi network of Ma’ayan ha-Torah, the great sectarianism along these lines is witnessed, especially among the communities themselves. Examples are Agudath Israel, Shas, the settler movement from the militant Zionists, the irreligious Zionists and among the Arabs, those with a Palestinian heritage versus those with the Israeli heritage of being part of a minority who are not taken into account as part of the Palestinian nation beyond Israel’s borders and who participate within the political framework of Jewish-Zionist parties. Within this morass the standing of (a non-Zionist) civil religion would appear to be poor, nonetheless as will be demonstrated such a religion continues to grow. This growth is due to the ever-depleting Zionist content in the (irreligious) State educational stream. Therefore the state regime is one rife with internal cracks, disunity, riddled by internal struggles which at times seem irrelevant or fed by mere hatred between the various communities. The picture is indeed bleak, and it is this book which attempts to contribute to an overhauling of the very foundations by addressing the constitutional problem. A complete recovery can only come about once the education system is purged by the joining of various elements together at the first stage and by uniting the institutions ( Jewish and Arab separately) in the second stage. This healing process cannot be included for discussion in this book. A discussion such as this can only be carried out after full research has been devoted to the exact goings on of the education system.

50. For a more elaborate discussion on American liberal dirty play see Part five of this book especially on the Rolls and Nozick affair and American injustice.

51. Because of the fact that the majority of US citizens practise the Protestants religion, there are those who claim that there are parallels between the Protestant faith and civil religion. This is merely an optical illusion and is similar to claiming that because the majority of conflicts in a certain country hail from a specific ethnic group that ethnic group must be guilty of criminal conduct.

52. This in context was completely justified, as I have shown above.

53. Ernest B. Koenker, Secular salvation, The Rites and Symbols of Political Religions (Fortress Press, 1965), pp. 11-19.

54. On the topic of America’s political attitude towards theistic religions and to exploiting them for the purposes of broad American interests see Ernest B. Koenker supra at pp. 14-15: John Dewey conceded no value to religion except as it expresses the fundamental unities of life. His common faith bears certain resemblance to the common faith which inspired the German nation under Hitler. Many saw in the entirely new order, the vast social reconstruction undertaken under Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the final realization of Christian beliefs in American social life. Usually, however the goal envisioned in such faiths is that devotion be transferred from the Christian faith to some forms of the democratic ideal. There have been not a few voices raised to urge that democracy be the real object of devotion in American churches and synagogues. Public schools too, should teach the democratic ideal as American religion; they should be teaching a community religion whereas the churches would instil private religion. According to J. Paul Williams’ proposal, both churches and public schools would be teaching democracy as ultimate metaphysical truth.The scent of religious coercion of civil religion wafts through this idea.

55. See Lois Lusky By What Right? A Commentary on the Supreme Court’s Power to Revise the Constitution (1975).

56. Bellah, R. N., “Civil Religion in America” in Beyond Belief (Harper and Row, New York, 1970) Ch. 9.

57. In the States at the time of Independence and later when the constitution was drafted and the confederation was turned into a federal republic, there was no formal primary education system in place.

58. After this Canada effectively changed from being a theistically religious state (Catholic or Protestant where Quebec adopted the former and the rest of the provinces the latter) to a civilly religious state. This possibly explains Quebec’s reluctance to carry out its plans to fully secede from the Canadian Federation.

59. It is quite obvious that by substituting G-d with man at the centre, it was natural that they would move in the direction of expanding human rights.

60. Like Judaism

61. All of this is elaborated upon in Shiloni’s book Modern Japan (in Hebrew). Also see Law and Society in Contemporary Japan (ed. John Haley, 1988), pp. 8, 43; Lawrence W. Beer and Hiroshi Itoh, The Constitutional Case Law of Japan, 1970 through 1990, p. 53; Itsuo Sonobe, “Comparative Administrative Law: Trends and Features in Administrative Law Studies” (Japan) Administrative Law: Trends and Features, Volume 19:40, 1986, p. 45.

62. Apart from the emerging civil religion which has been integrated as part of the lexicon of the national liberation movement. Zionism during the pre-State period does not fit this category, since from the very beginning of the fledgling State’s existence it had an established and large Arab minority, and because Zionism was in essence the Jewish national movement it could not incorporate this population group. Therefore the Zionist parties that are represented in Knesset confine their civil religious ideology to Jewish secularism alone. Things will become clearer below.

63. The Economic union of western European states which long ago extended its interests way beyond exclusive economic affairs, and has formed itself into one political entity, almost a State, is a good example of the process of uniting disparate States into one large State. In consequence thereof a process of unifying the national civil religions into one has also taken place. Loyalty has appreciably changed from loyalty to Holland, France or Portugal to loyalty to the EU. It will come as no surprise if the growing closeness of Russia and the US as well as the unity between Eastern and Western Europe results in one large state of the Christian white man, which will result in one, unified civil religion. It should be stated that when speaking of the white Christian I am not referring to Christianity as the theistic religion but am referring to the specific culture that began with Christianity.

64. The historical experience of the last century is filled with examples of religious regimes blocking out any influence of other religions, but as a counter example to Iran which is the paradigm of a theistic religious state is the example of Russia and the other Communist bloc countries (excluding Poland) , the fascist regimes of Germany and Italy, and for a long period Greece (an exception to Fascist opposition to religion is Franco’s Spain which viewed Catholicism very favourably) The fact that examples are sparse and the that these regimes no longer exist strengthens the opinion that says that there is no justification for the anti-religious stance adopted by the Western civil religious states, to the extent that such bias still prevails.

65. In reality, the ideology of the Ba’ath Party- the single party reigning over Syria- is a secular ideology, similar to Iraq. What is interesting is the fact that the Khomeini Regime in Iran maintains very hostile relations with Iraq while at the same time treating Syria as a fellow ally; though in both countries the leading ideology is overwhelmingly secular. This fact reinforces a well-known fact that in foreign policy national interest trumps ideology.

66. See Ilana Shelach Effects of Secular Religion on Israel, shortened version of thesis submitted for the degree of M.A, Hebrew University Library Faculty of Arts and Social Studies, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem. In the book written by Charles Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehhiya, Civil Religion in Israel, published by the University of California, "Israeli Civil Religion" is not referred to as it is by Shelach as Secular Religion. Nonetheless I have not found it useful to follow the lead of books written by Liebman and Don-Yehhiya, even though the volume on civil religion is all- encompassing dealing with all the fundamentals of civil religion in the Israeli context. Nevertheless it is premised on certain basic defects and errors: (A) the book fails to deal with the raison d’être of religions in general and the link between this raison and the need for civil religions amongst those who do not believe in G-d and who are secular. (B) In the book (ibid. p.215) states are divided into welfare states on the one hand those states that are founded on some moral message on the other. It is contended that there is no need for a civil religion in Welfare States whereas within states with a moral message, civil religion must, by definition, be created. The authors straight away admit that their proposed classification is more theoretical than practical and it is only brought as a demarcation of the two extremes whereas all states in reality fit somewhere between these extremes, no one state fitting perfectly at either extreme. Despite the immediate clarification, the division as it exists contains within it a basic error, the failure to realise that every individual has an inherent need for civil or any religion, and because of this need religion exists. Religion does not exist because the state wants it to exist. It is true that religion is an important ingredient in the make-up of any state, but it is not the need of the state that determines the founding of a religion. A state society like a religion comes about to answer the needs of individual man. That is why these entities are created. The result cannot be confused with the reason. Furthermore, implied in what the authors state is another basic error. A country, which is set up for welfare purposes alone without any other feature that binds its citizens together, is one destined for disintegration. It is not merely another political entity that is possible to identify, rather it has no “intrinsic citizens” and therefore no “intrinsic nation”, and as was discussed in Chap 6 of this book, this state is in the process of disintegration. On the other hand there is no such thing as a state whose whole foundations are solely based on a moral message. A state with a moral message but with nothing emotional to offer is destined to the same fate as the welfare state, which is extinction. Liebman and Don-Yehhiya divide the time periods into three: from the end of the First World War until the establishment of the State of Israel, an interim period between 1948 and 1956, and the last period that extends from then until today. Their survey is confined exclusively to the Jewish population, without discussing Arabs who inhabited Israel and who were later its citizens or dealing with the issue of Canaanism. The authors raise important facts that show that although in the first period, Jews in Israel had completely or partially severed ties with their Jewish roots, in the last period under discussion they have tried to reconnect with their Jewish past. This reconnection to their past roots is referred to as a type of “new civil religion”. In this last statement they have erred irredeemably, having been trapped by a fundamental fault in their reasoning. A religion whose basic adhesive is Judaism has from the beginning right until contemporary times been referred to as the Jewish Religion, even if members of this religion no longer profess a belief in G-d. The authors define the Jewish religion of religious Jews, who are loyal to the state as a secular religion, since in their definition loyalty to the state is the sole qualification of a civil religion. This definition cannot be accepted. Judaism defines a Jew as one who is born to a Jewish mother, and even to qualify as a religious Jew only requires the observance of religious precepts, without actually worrying about that individual’s theological doubts, should he have any. Even if a Jew does not observe the precepts, he is still a Jew whose membership in the Jewish religion is unquestioned. Associating a deep connection with generations of Jewish history with Israeli civil religion as Liebman and Don-Yehhiya attempt to do is erroneous. The connection is really an emotional element of Judaism. It is one of the internal factors of religion as defined in section 2 above. It comes to answer a religious need, as was elaborated in section 2, a need that in effect creates the phenomenon of religions. Therefore the mistake that is made in this otherwise all encompassing book of Liebman and Don-Yehhiya is indeed fundamental. They describe a certain kind of Judaism (even in its secular form it is still a legitimate version of Judaism) but term it “civil religion.” This special kind of Judaism that split away from the Judaism that associated itself with the G-d of Israel, was also entrenched in Jewish history, but the focus of allegiances was never the State of Israel that has existed since 1948, but rather the People of Israel. Viewed from this perspective it must be said that it is Judaism and not civil religion. One of the characteristics of civil religion is its accessibility to all loyal citizens of the state, and therefore in the Israeli reality, its civil religion, by definition must be Canaanism- which embraces both Jewish and Arab offspring by virtue of their being citizens of the State of Israel. Therefore Liebman and Don-Yehhiya’s book can in no way contribute to our discussion.

(D) A fourth error that cannot go unnoticed is their placing of civil religion beyond the boundaries of nationality, as is obvious from the title of the book Civil Religion in Israel and not Israeli Civil Religion. The erroneous title comes from an outlook that views civil religion as an international phenomenon that inter alia exists in Israel. This does not view each state’s civil religion as distinct from each other. This mistake is also found on p.214 of this book. There they speak of a universal morality that is not unique to each state; rather in their view what divide states is their local and particular interests. Absent from the authors’ minds is the fact that religion is not an outgrowth of one or other morality system, nor the result of a state’s national interests, whose interests alone are not even motivations for establishing a state.

(E) A fifth mistake is the author’s premise that religion equals regime, and that the very act of setting up a religiously unaffiliated political regime, creates a civil religion (Ibid., p. 266). This claim stems from the authors’ superficial viewing of religion in terms of function rather than of motive and of emotion. In accordance with this opinion, King Saul’s reign over Israel created a new civil religion so that two competing religions coexisted- the theistic religion of the Prophet Samuel and the civil religion of King Saul. This absurd reading of events places the motive for the Israelite’s obedience to King Saul on the fact that he was a Jewish king who had led his people into war against their enemy. It makes no connection (as it should) to a national Jewish motive to preserve the existence of the Jewish religion.

(F) The authors themselves admit that their classification of the phenomenon taking hold of Israel after 1956, whereby Israel’s Jews looked to Jewish sources as a guide to running the state’s affairs, as a new civil religion is an idea not found in any of the literature dealing with civil religion. It must be pointed out that this idea, as it stands (and not just because no one has copied it) is simply unacceptable. This type of nomenclature cannot even be adopted. In our discussion civil religion is related to those who emotional ties to and identity with the State of Israel is unrelated to Jewish history, severed completely from it. It of necessity leads to Canaanism and a new religion, which is not Jewish, nor Moslem, and acts as a unifying factor for all those citizens loyal to the state regardless of their ethnic, racial or (theistic) religious background. Some American literature on this subject also suffers from certain defects in discussing this subject, since the discussion there tackles civil religion from a superficial and not internal angle. They go into a description of the rituals, beliefs, moral institutions and codes that are shared by a certain community and to the extent that they are unique to that community, assert (from a superficial perspective) that that community" belongs” to a certain religion. This is like analysing the phenomenon of Swiss snowfalls by looking at the external factors that accompany them such as the effects these have on both the Swiss inhabitants and on the tourists as well as the fluctuations in tourism and the extent to which profits from tourism trade are affected. This analysis will be incomplete and only partially true as it relates to snowfalls- if indeed the purpose of the analysis is to deal with snowfalls as an important topic in its own right- if the climactic factors causing snowfalls are left out of the discussion. Or- as another example, when discussing the migrations of storks and dealing with the question of when these migrations take place, what travel paths they follow and how this information helps hunters track down storks in a certain area. The discussion will be incomplete-as it relates to the migration of storks if that is an important discussion in its own right-if it does not include the stork’s needs and ordeals, the impact the weather can have, and the need to procreate, as factors that contribute to migrations. The same rule holds in a discussion of religion in general and civil religion in particular. A discussions revolving around beliefs, institutions and rituals, all point to superficial signs that aid us in identifying the existence of a religion. Even a discussion pointing to the important fact that religions impact positively on the formation of societies in general and political entities in particular does not do sufficient justice to an analysis of religion. Emphasising the nature of religion in “creating” a moral code as an exemplar of its importance manages only to scratch at the surface of the phenomenon of religion and its identifying marks that impact on human society. What is lacking in this discussion is a serious study as to the kind of distresses and type of deep-seated need that causes man to search for religion. What are the special qualities of religion in general or a certain religion in particular, that indeed are able to alleviate distress and fill the needs described above, and to what extent are religions in general or a certain religion in particular successful in their mission? A genuine discussion will not put the cart before the horse. By this I mean that discussing the benefits yielded by civil religion or any other religion towards a state’s coherence or its ability to create loyalty of the state’s subjects towards the state and its institutions places the state at the head of the discussion and not the individual. By doing this some basic truths are being ignored. Individuals created society in order that each fulfils his personal need. Likewise human being as a means of being resolved with personal distress created religion. Religious experience in turn caused man to create a moral code so that he could deal with the uncertain and insecure feeling that the world as it is would never fully contain all the forces surrounding man and influencing his life. The solution to the most fundamental questions cannot be found then within the present reality that surrounds him but has to be based on a “past”. This “past” is transcendent, and he has no way of getting there, of acquiring the knowledge and strength of dealing with these “past” things. He therefore creates with his powerful imagination that he is blessed with and that he is formed by- a world of religious faith. In order to procure the support of this world with its proximity to the” upper” worlds, he is prepared and even interested in accepting upon himself the rules of this “lofty” game. These rules do not necessarily proclaim a connection to the reality that surrounds him, or to the self-interests that are within his strength to overcome. Rather they deal with a superior spiritual reality of morality surpassing narrow self-interest. Researchers who have studied civil religion have not yet undertaken a full study of these factors. See John F. Wilson “The Status of ‘Civil Religion’ in America” in The Religion of the Republic, (ed. Elwyn A. Smith, Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1971) p.1. See also Robert N. Bellah “Civil Religion in America” Daedalus, vol. 96, no. 1 (1967), p. 1. They discuss questions like “What did American civil religion contribute to American society? Obviously this discussion cannot adequately answer the deeper questions that apply to a full discussion on the topic of civil religion, or on the topic of what constitutes religion. The discussion then is premised on a mistake, which is fact a double mistake. (A) They look there at the results of an already existent civil religion, its characteristics, rituals, beliefs and institutions to locate the essential benefits bestowed by this religion on society especially upon its moral code by which society is run. Their discussion does not touch upon the formation of religions in general and civil religion in particular. They do not deal with human needs and other emotions, which all together brought about civil religion. (B) Civil religion was created in the private domain for personal reasons and to fit the private lifestyle of the individual, not for society or its needs or for its structures. Society is after all the outcome of the individual’s needs. The individual needs for his own sake to live within society and for that reason society exists. The individual needs to be able to receive solace from his transcendental fears, which arise from a place that is beyond his reality, and he therefore creates a supernatural existence that acts as his support system. Man needs to feel spiritually whole so he creates a world of morals that is qualitatively superior to a self-interested world and that contains supreme moral values. Society, religion and morality all come to fulfil the needs of the individual, not the needs of society. Society was created for man. Obviously the inverse is untrue. One cannot say that the individual exists because society needs him to exist. As with society so too with morality and religion, man cannot afford to be without any of them. They are the offspring of his needs, and for that reason alone they exist. When speaking of religion it must then first deal with the reasons for it entering the universe, its characteristics and its essence before dwelling on the repercussions and outcomes of its dominance.

67. This point will be made much clearer below, in a separate and especially devoted section.

68. Part 6, infra.

69. This is also raised in a discussion in my book Who’s Afraid of a Jewish State? Constitutional and Ideological Aspects, note 5 supra.

70. A more elaborate discussion on the constitutional status quo in the State of Israel, in the same spirit as what was said here, can be found in Part 6 infra.

71. It will be seen however later on that she did not point to certain processes that took place in the Israeli Supreme Court that turned this court into an institution intimately linked in some of its aspects (as will be shown below) to civil religion. It will be seen later that this process, currently taking place in Israel’s new reality, is contrary to the Constitutional status quo of the State of Israel forming an unconstitutional breach which in principle should make it unenforceable. All these issues will be discussed later.

72. However it is unclear from Shelach's writings if there are two parallel civil religions- one for Arabs, the other for Jews- or is there one religion for both. Shelach's research is imprecise on this point. Nonetheless even if she is speaking of two civil religions, both of them are severed from their ethnic Diasporas who dwell outside the state- the Jewish and Palestinian Diasporas. Looked at it this way, Canaanism is faced with two alternatives, but since it has no historical or national roots that identify it with either Arabs or Jews, even two separate civil religions would over time merge together to form a common Jewish-Arab civil religion . Therefore Israeli Civil Religion later on will be related to a religion that unifies former Jews with former Arabs under one rooftop.

73. The possible objection of a solitary Supreme Court Justice who opposes the liberal-secular trend cannot be taken into account, since this has no influence on the court's final judgment.

74. The appointment of Joseph Lieberman to run as Democratic vice Presidential Candidate for the United States should not mislead us; even though Lieberman is an Orthodox mitzvah observant Jew. His Jewish religion served merely as an adornment to the American Civil Religion which tries to show itself to be non-discriminatory towards theistic religion, as if it holds by the principles of belief in G-d. This is all merely technical wrangling by a party seeking to promote its political clout by displaying (from a political-governmental perspective) Judaism, Islam and various strands of Christianity in one large beautiful glass cage. After his appointment Lieberman's words about belief in G-d as a value which enriches politics caused a storm of protest; he had crossed a red line by addressing matters of religion in a political forum. This whole episode obviously strengthened the desire of radical Protestants who have always wanted to draw their religion into the halls of justice, but these Protestants are not powerful enough to effect what is to a large extent a very revolutionary change.

75. Haman P. Shelach, Freedom of Conscience and Religion, doctoral dissertation to submitted for the degree, Doctor of Laws. In Freedom of Conscience and Religion there are various essays in memory of Haman. P. Shelach, published jointly by the Citizens Rights Association and Hapoalim Library, edited by Professor Ruth Gavison, at page 23. On page 88 Shelach concludes that "the principle of separation of state and religion was constructed, in order to prevent a reality whereby state and religion merge as was the reality then in Europe and especially in England. The last-mentioned based itself on a broad conception of religion and on the religious establishment thereby contriving a principle that was not duly flexible in relating to the continuing evolving circumstances, resulting then in unjust and undesirable results in so far as religion and freedom of conscience are concerned and causing inconsistency amongst the various decisions" Shelach does not really discuss the real need behind separating religion and state. Our discussion on the other hand addresses the need for its application in the context of today's reality, and to vigorously protest civil religion's domination over states' governments without making way for theistic religions to have their say.

76. This was a small movement formed by secular Israeli Jews as a political movement that wanted to use the concept of Israelite- regardless of the racial, linguistic or religious background – to refer to those who lived by the new culture offered them by the State of Israel, and who viewed their attachment to the Land of Israel completely unconnected to any one nation's history. Though it would seem that this movement has had its life source drained from it, in reality it is a living breathing organism. The immigration of one million immigrants from the Former Soviet Union, including a significant portion who have no connection to the Jewish Religion and its traditions, is bound to breathe new life into this movement in one or other forms, and quite possibly that process is already taking place in practice.

77. See Michael Walzer What it is to be an American (New York: Marsaio), pp. 23-49, at p. 28.

78. See Liah Grinfeld Nationalism, Five Roads to Modernity,(London: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 480. See also the opinion of Robert Palmer as it appears in Seymour Martin Lipset "The Newness of the New Nation," in Vann Woodward (ed.) The Comparative Approach to American History, (NY: Basic Books, 1968), p. 64.

79. See Who's afraid of a Jewish State?,The Ideological and Constitutional Aspects, supra note 5, ibid. Chapter 6, Section 2.

80. See Chapter 7 of my book supra note 5

81. High Court of Justice (H.C.J) 58/68 Benjamin Shalit v. License Registrar P"D vol. 23(2) p. 477. [in Hebrew]

82. H.C.J. 72/62 Rufeizen v. Minister of the Interior, P"D vol. 16 p. 2428. [in Hebrew]

83. *Criminal Court (Jerusalem) 3471/87 The State of Israel v. Kaplan, PS"M 1988 (5748) (2) p. 265. [in Hebrew]

84. *Court of Appeal 217/68 Jezeramcus v. The State of Israel P"D vol. 22 (2) p. 343 [in Hebrew].

85. H.C.J. 153/87 Shakdiel v. Minister of Religious Affairs, P"D vol. 42 (2) p. 221 [in Hebrew].

86. H.C.J. 5016/96 Chorev v. Traffic Supervisor P"D vol. 51 (4) p. 1 [in Hebrew].

87. H.C.J. 6698/95 Ka'adan v. Israel Lands Administrator (unpublished and in Hebrew), the verdict was delivered on 8 March 2000.

88. It is foreseeable according to an assessment that will be presented later, that the court will in the future swing full circle and pronounce and lay down that a "Jewish state" means in fact a "State of all its citizens" just like the President of the Supreme Court pronounced lately that Zionism also includes Arab settlement alongside Jewish settlement.

89. This emerges in the analysis conducted in my book Who's afraid of a Jewish State: Constitutional and Ideological Aspects note 5 supra.

90. So Barak declared before his appointment as President of the Supreme Court, when he was one of the justices of this court, in a published article. See Aaron Barak, "The Constitutional Revolution: Human Rights Protected" (in Hebrew) Law and Administration vol. 1 1992, pp. 9, 30.

91. See Aaron Barak, "The Constitutional Revolution: Human Rights Protected" (in Hebrew) Law and Administration vol. 1 1992, pp. 9. Also see ibid. at 230 after goes into great detail on the principle of a Democratic State as conceived by the Court's judgments.

92. See the reaction of Menachem Elon in Menachem Elon, "The Way of the Law in the Constitution: The Values of a Jewish and Democratic State in light of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty "(in Hebrew) in Judicial Activism, p. 202.

93. See note 5 supra.

94. See Verdict B, H.C.J. 3358/95 Anat Hoffman and others v. Administrative Head of Prime Minister's Office and others (in Hebrew). This judgment was delivered by a court made up of the following three justices: Matza, Strasbourg-Cohen and Beinish on 22 May 2000 (unpublished).

95. As has already been decided but was put in practice even before this decision.

96. However it is doubtful if a request will be made in the near future, apart from those requesting in order to provoke and to stigmatize the budgets that are received for Jewish religious purposes in Israel. As regards to the more distant future it is very possible that the scenario described above will come to fruition especially if the trends and power of the present court as they are today will be allowed to develop further.

97. See Supplement to Ha'aretz New Year's Eve Edition 5759, September 1998.

98. It is for this reason that Knesset felt compelled to amend the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, knowing that if they did not fix it up this Basic Law relating to the import of kosher meat, the Knesset Law dealing with this matter would have been overturned.

99. See Aaron Barak, "The Constitutional Revolution: Human Rights Protected" (in Hebrew) Law and Administration vol. 1 1992, p. 230.

100. On the silence of the legal community to utter any criticism against the Supreme Court and on that community's response of standing at attention as if they were clerks of the Supreme Court justices occupying their places to right hand side of the Supreme Court, see the "Books" supplement of Ha'aretz 1 September, 1999 edition. This is a book review by Ronen Shamir (an academic, not connected with law, who teaches in the Sociology and Anthropology Department of Tel-Aviv University) coinciding with the release of the book The Court: Fifty Years of the Judiciary in Israel published by the Court Administrator in conjunction with the Ministry of Defense, and under the title "The H.C.J. and the country that encircles it" Later on Ha'aretz conducted an interview with Professor Ruth Gavison who severely criticized the Supreme Court, which was an exceptional incident, and which caused her colleagues to severely criticize her for publishing such remarks.

101. Israeli judges follow mainly the line of thinking of American judges and at times adopt the thinking of other liberal countries such as Canada which itself is heavily influenced by the USA. See for example Michael Seymour, Rethinking Nationalism ed. Jocelyn Coutre, Kai Nielsen (Calgary, Alberta, Canada: Canadian journal of Philosophy, University of Calgary Press), p. 57. The accepted opinion there is that a nationality that makes up for the majority of a liberal state cannot define that state as having the culture of that majority nationality, which would then adopt the idea of "national culture" rather what must be followed is the system of multi-culturalism, in order that minorities or those people who do not have the same culture as that of the majority are not offended. Following this it is possible to understand Supreme Court President Barak, who wants to interpret the concept a "Jewish and Democratic State ' in a way that the word Jewish has none of the same detailed application as has the word "democratic".

102. Harris v. Minister of Interior 1952 (2) SA 428; Minister of Interior v. Harris 1952 (4) SA

103. In my book supra note 3, Ibid. Chapter three, Appendix II.

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[35] He does not explain from where he took all these allegations. One can certainly query whether the structure of the family and its inner complexities has its source in science? In light of the fact that emotions are so central to the family makeup and to morality in general, in what way does science deal with this, what tools does it have at its disposal to deal with a world of feelings?

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[74] The appointment of Joseph Lieberman to run as Democratic vice Presidential Candidate for the United States should not mislead us; even though Lieberman is an Orthodox mitzvah observant Jew. His Jewish religion served merely as an adornment to the American Civil Religion which tries to show itself to be non-discriminatory towards theistic religion, as if it holds by the principles of belief in G-d. This is all merely technical wrangling by a party seeking to promote its political clout by displaying (from a political-governmental perspective) Judaism, Islam and various strands of Christianity in one large beautiful glass cage. After his appointment Lieberman's words about belief in G-d as a value which enriches politics caused a storm of protest; he had crossed a red line by addressing matters of religion in a political forum. This whole episode obviously strengthened the desire of radical Protestants who have always wanted to draw their religion into the halls of justice, but these Protestants are not powerful enough to effect what is to a large extent a very revolutionary change.